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THE DILEMMA OF THE DOWNSTREAM STATE: 




The environmental pollution of the waters of the United States is a 
major national concern which affects government, industries, and 
the public alike.! Water pollution problems also are involved in other 
environmental areas such as the contamination of ground water 
from hazardous waste disposal sites and oil spills in ocean waters. 
Congress has responded by enacting the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, recently redesignated as the Clean Water Act,2 which 
regulates conduct that contributes to water pollution. Although 
primary efforts to regulate polluters and control pollution have been 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. ENVT'L LAW INST. FEDERAL ENVT'L LAW 2 (1974); A. REITZE, 1 ENVT'L LAW 4-2 (1972); 
Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 MICH L. REV. 
1073, 1073-74 (1970); Introduction to 1 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. at xvii-xviii (1976); Note, 
Federal Common Law o/Nuisance, 10 U. BALT. LAW REV. 107 (1981); 118 CONGo REC. 33,692 
(1972), reprinted in 1 ENVT'L POLICY DIV. OF THE CONGo RES. SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 161 (1973) (remarks of Sen. 
Muskie) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), currently the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981). The FWPCA was substantially modified by the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. As amended, the FWPCA was 
later renamed the Clean Water Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 31 Stat. 1566. This article will 
refer to the FWPCA as amended from 1972 on as the Clean Water Act (CW A). All pre-1972 
references will be to the FWPCA. 
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legislative,3 the courts continually are called upon to resolve many 
pollution problems.4 
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Milwaukee,5 reaffirmed 
the right of a state to assert a federal common law action to abate a 
nuisance caused by interstate water pollution. Upon reviewing the 
same case in 1981, the Supreme Court, in City of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois,6 announced that the use of federal common law to control 
water pollution could not be justified where Congress had enacted a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme in the area. The Court held that 
the federal common law action formally approved for Illinois in 1972 
had been "preempted" by extensive amendments made to the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act which were enacted some five 
months after the Court's 1972 decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. 7 
Later in the 1981 term, the Supreme Court extended its preemption 
holding in City of Milwaukee and stated that federal common law had 
been extinguished throughout the entire field of water pollution. 8 
Illinois' unsuccessful odyssey though the courts is a dramatic ex-
ample of the inefficacy of judicial decisionmaking dealing with major 
environmental problems. 9 It also underscores the inability of a cen-
tralized statutory scheme to address all water pollution concerns in 
3. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. v 1981); Marine Pro-
tection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("Superfund"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980). 
4. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93-853 Orig. 
(U .S., filed May 24, 1982). See Kakoullis, Federal Common Law Remedies for the Abatement of 
Water Pollution, 5 FORD. URBAN L.J. 549 (1977); Note, Federal Common Law and Water 
Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation? 49 FORD. L. REV. 500 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Preemption]; Comment, Federal Common Law of Nuisance Reaches New High 
Water Mark as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v. Milwaukee II, 2 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,101, 
10,107 (1980). 
5. 406 U.S. 91, 104-08 (1972). See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 274 (1974). 
6. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
7. Id. at 317. The 1972 amendments were enacted on Oct. 18,1972, Pub. L. No. 95-500, 86 
Stat. 816. The Court's decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), was announced on 
Apr. 24, 1972. The word "preemption" is usually reserved for analysis of federal-state law 
conflicts but as a generic term was 'used by the Supreme Court in reference to the conflict be-
tween Congress and federal courts within the federal branch. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91, 105 (1972). 
8. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
9. See F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03 (1977); R. Zener, The Federal Law 
of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 789 (1974); Comment, 
Equity and the Eco-system: Can Injunctions Clean the Air? 68 MICH L. REV. 1254, 1254-55 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Eco-System]. 
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our complex, highly developed society.10 Illinois' predicament is not 
unique; rather, it serves as a suitable model by which one can ex-
amine the interrelationship of various decisionmaking bodies - Con-
gress, federal agencies, federal courts, and the states. As a case 
study, it focuses attention on the need to develop workable judicial 
remedies to supplement legislative approaches to recognized en-
vironmental concerns,!l 
The wholesale preemption of federal common law in the area of 
water pollution was anticipated by some observers,12 but has left 
courts in considerable doubt as to the contours of this preemption 
and its application to other areas of resource pollution,!3 In 1982 the 
State of Oklahoma petitioned the Supreme Court claiming that the 
discharge of pollutants from the neighboring state of Arkansas, al-
though regulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA), severely dam-
aged Oklahoma's waters.14 Like Illinois, Oklahoma seeks to address 
interstate water pollution by means of federal common law. In light 
of its decision in City of Milwaukee, the Court may well refuse to 
hear Oklahoma's case. On the other hand, the Court may have the 
opportunity to extinguish federal common law once and for all, or at 
least define the contours of its preemption more clearly. This article 
urges a thorough reexamination of the bases of such preemption. 
In any event, the Oklahoma petition demonstrates the vitality of 
the Illinois case study. Indeed, the problems involved in both are 
essentially identical: 1) that certain pollutants are not regulated 
under the CWA;15 2) that despite compliance with national minimum 
standards out-of-state discharges are causing pollution which consti-
10. Jurgensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1976 
DUKE L.J. 1126, 1130-37; Kakoullis, supra note 4, at 549-50; Note, Environmental Law - The 
Nuances of Nuisance in a Private Action to Control Air Pollution, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 48, 81-85 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Nuances of Nuisance]. 
11. Ragsdale, Ecology and the Role of the Federal Courts, 46 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 221 (1977); 
Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Environmental Law - Nuisance - State Ecological Rights 
Arising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 597 [hereinafter cited as Note, State 
Ecological Rights]; Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV .. L. REV. 
1439 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Interstate Pollution]. 
12. See, e.g., Fort, The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law, 12 Loy. U. L. J. 131 
(1981). 
13. See infra text and notes at notes 488-514. See Post, Federal Common Law Suits to Abate 
Air Pollution, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 117, 125 (1980); Note, Umbrella Equities: Use of the 
Federal Common Law of Nuisance to Catch the Fall of Acid Rain, 21 URB. L.J. 143, 152 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Umbrella Equities] arguing for the use of federal common law to 
prevent acid rain because of its inherently interstate character. 
14. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Opposition, Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93-853 Orig. 
(U.S., filed Aug. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Reply, Oklahoma]. 
15. See infra text and notes at notes 267-84; Plaintiff's Reply, Oklahoma, supra note 14. 
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tutes a public nuisance;16 and 3) that the CWA does not address the 
problem of disputes from interstate water pollution. 17 Interstate 
water pollution occurs when pollutants emanating from one state 
enter the waters or air of a neighbor state and cause adverse effects, 
degrading that state's environment. This situation is referred to as 
the dilemma of the downstream state-what can the receiving state 
do to protect its own environment from discharges in another state? 
The phenomena of air and water pollution by their nature do not con-
fine themselves to state boundaries. 18 In the absence of clear and 
adequate statutory remedies to control such transboundary pollution 
it is inevitable that injured parties will pursue common law claims in 
the courts to abate pollution. 19 The Supreme Court in City of 
Milwaukee has made clear its disapproval of such an approach. 
The main contention of this article is that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois-that the Clean Water Act dis-
placed federal common law-was based primarily upon the Court's 
conception of the narrow lawmaking powers of federal courts rather 
than an accurate assessment of legislative intent. The CW A contains 
no legislative statement against the continued use of federal com-
mon law. 20 On a case-by-case basis there are many strong practical 
reasons for using federal common law as a necessary supplement to 
the CWA.2I Instead, the Court inferred a congressional intent 
against federal common law. 22 The Court's interpretation of legisla-
tive intent in City of Milwaukee reflected many policy concerns of 
the federal courts which, as enunciated by the Court, would seem to 
require the extinguishment of federal common law under many other 
16. See infra text and notes at notes 331-46; Plaintiff's Complaint, Oklahoma v. Arkansas, 
No. 93-853 Orig. (U.S., filed May 24, 1982). 
17. See infra text and notes at notes 314-18,333-340; Plaintiff's Reply, Oklahoma, supra 
note 14. 
18. See Gallogly, Acid Precipitation: Can The Clean Air Act Handle It? 9 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. 
L. REV. 687, 698, 707 (1981); Post, supra note 13, at 120. 
19. E.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. 
filed, 453 U.S. 917 (1981); California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 
181, 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d 
492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
20. See Section 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) 
(applying federal common law nuisance to groundwater pollution); United States v. Vertac 
Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (federal common law to abate hazards from 
dioxin spilled into creek). Cf Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 527-29 (1975), 
modified and remanded on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). 
22. 451 U.S. 304, 307-08. But see Fischer, The Availability of Private Remedies for Acid 
Rain Damages, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429, 477-78 (1981); Note, Umbrella Equities, supra note 13, at 
146. 
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environmental statutes as well. 23 Nevertheless, it is within these 
same policy bases of federal courts' decisionmaking that the vitality 
of federal common law recognized in Illinois still remains. The very 
predominance of federal courts' policy preferences in the statutory 
interpretation of the CW A in City of Milwaukee suggests a flexible 
basis by which the Court may revise its view of federal common law. 
More significantly, as a decision premised upon its reading of legisla-
tive intent, City of Milwaukee is subject to revision by a positive 
declaration from Congress preserving federal common law. 24 
This article first will set forth the factual and procedural back-
ground of the controversy in City of Milwaukee in Section II. Section 
III will discuss the development of federal common law in environ-
mental case law. Section IV will present the various interpretations 
of legislative intent in the CW A by contrasting the analysis in Il-
linois with that of City of Milwaukee. An overview of the substantive 
provisions and problems of the Clean Water Act will be presented in 
Section V. The section will delineate the dilemma of the downstream 
state using Illinois as an example. In Section VI the various pruden-
tial concerns underlying City of Milwaukee will be analyzed. An at-
tempt will be made to reconcile federal common law with due respect 
for these doctrinal policies. Section VII will discuss the implications 
of the Court's preemption holding in light of other environmental 
statutes. Finally, the article concludes by urging that a perspective 
be adopted which recognizes the crucial, albeit secondary, role of 
federal common law in the context of congressionally declared goals 
to restore and maintain the integrity of our national environment. 
II. THE CONTROVERSY IN CITY OF MILWAUKEE V.ILLINOIS 
The controversy in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois25 arose from Illi-
nois' efforts to protect its interests in Lake Michigan as a source of 
drinking water and great recreational and aesthetic value.26 In 1966, 
Illinois became apprised of serious pollution problems in Lake Michi-
gan generated by sewage discharges from industrial and municipal 
sources. Illinois became particularly concerned about discharges of 
23. See Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). 
See infra text and notes at notes 482-87. 
24. On October 26, 1981 the Senate Committee on Public Works favorably reported a bill to 
the floor which would amend Section 511 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1371, to specifically allow 
the use of federal common law. S. 1716 (formerly S. 1274), 127 CONGo REC. 1716 (daily ed. Oct. 
27, 1981) (Sen. Chafee, R.I., chmn, Envt'l Pollution Subcommittee of Senate Committee on 
Env't & Pub. Works). This amendment was regarded as necessary to correct the "misinter-
pretation" of the CWA given by the Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee. Id. 
25. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
26. Brief for Respondents at 3, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, No. 49-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 
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sewage from municipal treatment plants in the Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin area. These plants are located on the shore of Lake Michigan 
directly north of Illinois.27 Pollutants discharged into Lake Michigan 
from Milwaukee were transported by prevailing southerly currents 
and winds to the waters off Illinois' shoreline. Illinois charged that 
this concentration of pollutants created a serious health hazard to its 
citizens in the use of Lake Michigan for drinking water and for swim-
ming, and that the Milwaukee discharges interfered with Illinois' 
own efforts to clean up its own waters.28 
A. Factual Background 
Illinois' complaint focused on two categories of discharges from 
Milwaukee: municipal sewage treatment plant discharges and sewer 
overflows. An urban sewage system generally consists of a series of 
sewer networks which lead into one or more end-of-pipe collection fa-
cilities.29 There the sewage is treated according to various methods 
and then in its treated form discharged into a receiving body of 
water. These sewer conduits have overflow devices from which a dis-
crete discharge is released when the capacity of the carrying pipe is 
exceeded. 30 Although the sewer conduits eventually lead to a treat-
22, 1980). See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); C. MORTIMER, THE LAKE MICHIGAN 
POLLUTION CASE, A REVIEW AND COMMENTARY ON THE LIMNOLOGICAL AND OTHER ISSUES 6 (Sea 
Grant Inst. Univ. Wisc. 1981); LAKE CURRENTS REPORT, UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVo 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 1, 183-90, 203-04 (1967). The United States Public Health 
Service conducted studies of Lake Michigan which were incorporated into the Special Master's 
findings and adopted by the District Court in Illinois V. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 
1977). 
27. Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 6, 10-12. Lake Michigan is surrounded by 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. The two plants in question are the South Shore 
treatment facilities and the Jones Island plant, located 25 and 39 miles, respectively, north of 
the Illinois shore in Wisconsin, 451 U.S. 304, 309 (1981). South Shore discharges its treated 
sewage into Lake Michigan; Jones Island discharges into the Milwaukee Harbor which flows 
into Lake Michigan. 599 F.2d 151, 168 n.34 (1979). 
28. Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 2-5. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 96 
(1972). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1367 (1970) (repealed 1972). In 1965 and 1967 Illinois par-
ticipated in enforcement conferences pursuant to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1160, involving all 
the states surrounding Lake Michigan. Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 8, 9. 
29. There are two general types of sewer systems: separated sewers which carry only 
sewage, and combined sewers which carry both sewage and stormwater runoff in the same 
conduit. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY (CEQ) 14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Report]. The Milwaukee sewer system 
is a combination of both types. 599 F.2d 151, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1978); 451 U.S. 309 (1981). 
30. Combined sewers are especially susceptible to overflows after storms because hoth 
runoff and sewage are transported together. Overflows in separate sewers are also more likely 
during wet weather because of groundwater infiltration and occasional seepage from storm-
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ment facility, overflows and bypasses release sewage before any 
treatment has occurred. 31 Sewer overflows are a major source of 
water pollution because of the concentration of raw sewage in dis-
charges.32 
Illinois attempted to abate this contamination of its waters 
through negotiation and use of the administrative procedures of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).33 After several frus-
trating years of administrative efforts during which few enforceable 
commitments to abate interstate pollution were made,34 Illinois 
sought judicial abatement. 35 
water. C. MORTIMER, supra note 26, at 2-4; 451 U.S. 304, 309 n.2 (1981). Overflow devices are 
usually of two types, gravity overflows or mechanical bypasses. Gravity overflows are simply 
pipes placed inside the sewers which allow raw sewage to pour out when the overall level of 
sewage rises to the level of the pipe. The mechanical bypass points are usually pumps which 
are activated by electrodes inside the sewer. See 599 F.2d 151, 167-68 (1978); CEQ REPORT, 
supra note 29, at 114; C. MORTIMER, supra note 26, at 2. The sewer systems of Milwaukee in-
volved in the Illinois case had approximately 239 bypass or overflow points. 599 F.2d at 167 & 
n.33. 
31. See C. MORTIMER, supra note 26, at 11. Overflows and bypasses are designed to prevent 
damage to the central collection facility to which the sewer conduits lead. CEQ REPORT, supra 
note 29, at 114. They also serve to prevent back flooding into basements. When rainfall ex-
ceeds one-half inch, the sewer system can become overloaded and sewer overflows occur. C. 
MORTIMER, supra note 26, at 11, 29; 599 F.2d at 167. Even in dry weather, both separate and 
combined sewers are subject to blockage which releases sewage as well. 451 U.S. at 309 n.2; 
CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 114-15; C. MORTIMER, supra note 26, at 11. 
32. On the occasion of an overflow the high velocity of the flow scours the sewer conduit 
clean of previously settled sludge which is then also discharged. Overflows are a source of 
long-term pollution because the discharged solids tend to settle to the bottom of the receiving 
waterway where they form sludge deposits. These deposits are not affected by conventional 
surface treatment of the water and so continue to deplete the oxygen supply of the water and 
contribute to the development of cloudy, foul-smelling water. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 
114-15. 
33. These conferences did not result in specifically enforceable decisions and were subject to 
interminable delays. An action for enforcement of a conference decision had to allow for a six-
month period in which other modification hearings could be held. See 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)(1), 
(3), (4); id. § 1160(f)(1) (1970) (repealed 1972). Those requirements that were set were often 
unilaterally extended by individual states. 599 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1970); Comment, The 
Federal WlLter Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV., 672, 
674-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Amendments]. See EPA v. State Water 
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976). 
34. Brief for Respondents, suprlL note 26, at 8, 9, 23; Comment, FederlLl Common LlLw in 
In/frstoJe W'lter Pollution D1:sputes. 1973 U. ILL. L. F., 141, 144. Enforcement under the 
FWPCA was cumbersome, time-consuming, and rarely resulted in court action. Ipsen & 
Raisch, Enforl'ement Under the FWPCA Amendments I!f 1972,9 LAND & WATER L. REV., 369, 
:)70-75 (1974); McThernia, An Examination '!fthe FWPCA Amendments of 1.972.30 WASH. & 
L~:r, L. Rr,v. 195, 199-200 (1973). 
35. Illinois statutes confirmed the common law power of the Attorney General to seek 
judicial abatement of a public nuisance. ILL. REV. STAT. 14, §§ 11, 12 (1960). The Illinois 
lej,rislature passed the Environmental Protection Act, Ch. 111 112, which provides, in part, 
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B. Procedural History 
The gist of Illinois' complaint was that the inadequate treatment of 
sewage by municipal treatment plants in Milwaukee36 and the dis-
charge of untreated sewage from overflow points released large 
quantities of pathogenic viruses, bacteria,37 and nutrients38 into 
Lake Michigan. These pollutants were transported by lake currents 
to Illinois' waters where they allegedly caused pollution.39 Illinois 
claimed this pollution constituted a public nuisance40 which 
threatened the health and welfare of its citizens and accelerated the 
that no person shall cause or allow the discharge of any contaminants into the environment in 
any state so as to cause water pollution in Illinois, no matter what the source. ILL. REV. STAT. 
U1 112, § 1012 (1968). Pursuant to these statutes the Attorney General of Illinois brought a 
series of abatement actions against in-state polluters. Unlike the administrative avenues in the 
FWPCA, these actions succeeded in setting detailed timetables and enforceable deadlines for 
the correction of water pollution problems. See, e.g., Illinois v. United States Steel Corp., Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, 69 CH 3334 (1969); Illinois v. Republic Steel, Circuit Court of Cook 
County, 69 CH 3675 (1969) (zero discharge of industrial waste to Lake Michigan); Illinois v. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, Circuit Court of Cook County, 71 CH 3818 (1969) (Com-
plete recycling with sand filtration of remaining wastewater discharged into Lake Michigan); 
Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 10. 
36. The defendants were Milwaukee, Racine, Kenosha, and South Milwaukee. The sewerage 
commissions were the sewer commission for the City of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan 
Sewer Commission of the County of Milwaukee. The defendants will be referred to collectively 
as "Milwaukee." The Attorney General of Illinois filed the petition in the name of "The People 
of the State of Illinois," which will be referred to as "Illinois." In practice the Attorney 
General may represent or contest actions by various other agencies and offices as well. See, 
e.g., People v. Pollution Control Board, 83 Ill. App. 3d 802, 404 N.E.2d 352 (1980); See Fort, 
supra note 12, at 132 n.6. 
37. Illinois was most concerned with enteric viruses. Entero-viruses are those that inhabit 
the gastroenteric tract of human beings and warm blooded animals which are contained in 
their feces waste. Many of these viruses are pathogenic, causing such diseases as polio, 
pleurodymia, myocarditis, meningitis, and encephalitis. See 599 F.2d 151, 167 n.32 (7th Cir. 
1979). Viruses and bacteria are difficult to detect with accuracy. Public health officials usually 
refer to fecal coliform, a larger sized suspended solid, as a rough indicator of pathenogenic 
viruses in contaminated waters. Brief for Respondents, supra note 26, at 4; C. MORTIMER, 
supra note 26, at 4-6. 
38. Various pollutants act as nutrients for plant life when discharged into waterways. The 
prime nutrients are phosphate and nitrate from human and animal wastes. An increase in the 
presence of these nutrients stimulates massive growth of algae and can eventually produce ob-
noxious odors and reduce the quality of available drinking water supplies. C. MORTIMER, supra 
note 26, at vi; 599 F.2d 151, 169 n.39 (7th Cir. 1979). 
39. The pollution Illinois sought to prevent was alleged to have been caused by the discharge 
of "some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage" per day from facilities in 
Milwaukee. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). In a single month in 1976 the untreated sewage discharge 
measured from just 11 of the 239 total sewer overflow points equalled 646.46 million gallons. 
599 F.2d 151, 168 (7th Cir. 1979); 451 U.S. 304, 309 (1981). 
40. A public nuisance involves the substantial interference of a right common to the general 
pUblic. A private nuisance is based upon the interference with a person's use and enjoyment of 
property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B (tent. draft No. 16, 1970). See W. PROSSER, 
THE LAW OF TORTS, 583-91 (4th ed. 1971); w. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 102-07 (1977). 
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eutrophication41 of Lake Michigan. As parens patriae Illinois sought 
injunctive relief via the federal common law of nuisance to abate the 
pollution of its waterways from out-of-state sources. 42 
Likening the dispute to one against the state of Wisconsin, Illinois 
invoked the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
pursuant to section 1251(a)(1) of the United States Code.43 The 
Court, however, denied without prejudice the petition for original 
jurisdiction. It was determined that for purposes of section 1251 the 
Milwaukee defendants were only political subdivisions of a state. 44 
The Court's jurisdiction was therefore original but non-exclusive.45 
Although the Court could use its discretion to decline original non-
41. 451 U.S. at 310 & n.3 (1981). Eutrophication is a rapid biological enrichment process 
characterized by over-nourishment from nutrient rich pollutants or other organic matter 
which enter a waterway from sewage discharges and agricultural wastes. Limnologists regard 
phosphorous as a controlling element in the process. The results of eutrophication can be a 
murky, greenish water appearance, depletion of oxygen supply, poor water quality, obnoxious 
odors, and reduced fish stock. The overall net effect of eutrophication is that it greatly ac-
celerates the limnological aging and depletion of the waterway. C. MORTIMER, supra note 26, 
at 6; 451 U.S. at 310 n.3 (1981); 599 F.2d 151, 169 n.39 (7th Cir. 1979). The state of Michigan 
joined Illinois on this issue only. 451 U.S. at 309 (1981). 
42. A parens patriae suit is unique to states and based on a concept of standing which allows 
a state in its role as sovereign and guardian to protect its quasi-sovereign interests such as 
health and welfare, interstate water rights, and the economy of the state. BLACK'S LAW DIC· 
TIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed., 1979). Parens patriae was first recognized in Missouri v. Illinois, 
180 U.S. 208 (1901). See Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment; Parens 
Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. L. J. & SOC. PROB. 411, 411-13 (1970). 
43. Illinois argued that the controversy was one between two states because the 
municipalities and sewer commissions were instrumentalities of the state of Wisconsin. 406 
U.S. 91, 93 (1972).28 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1) (1976) implements the grant of original jurisdiction in 
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The statute provides that "[tlhe Supreme Court shall 
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of ... [alII controversies between two or more 
states." 28 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1) (1976). 
44. 406 U.S. at 91, 97-98 (1972). The Court held that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1) 
(1976), the word "states" did not include their political subdivisions. Id. at 98. For litigation 
purposes it is generally agreed that a political subdivision is not the technical equivalent of a 
state. E.g., Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 118 (1868). Municipalities have been subject to expanding liability in civil rights actions 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1883 (1970). E.g., Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Also, the extension of reserved 
state's rights given to municipalities in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
suggests the line between a state and its political subdivisions has become increasingly 
blurred. 
45. 406 U.S. 91, 95 (1972).28 U.S.C. § 1251 (bX3) (1976) provides, in part, that the Supreme 
Court "shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of ... [alII actions or proceedings by 
a State against the citizens of another State." Illinois unsuccessfully attempted to join the 
state of Wisconsin as a necessary party defendant. 406 U.S. 94-5, 97. Had Wisconsin been 
joined it is likely that the Court would have accepted jurisdiction of Illinois' case. Six weeks 
after Illinois the Court exercised its original jurisdiction and used federal common law in an 
interstate dispute between two states in Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972). 
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exclusive jurisdiction, it acknowledged the special obligations under 
Article III of the Constitution which empower the Supreme Court to 
hear any controversy to which a state may be a party.46 Thus, the 
Court stated that its original jurisdiction should be declined only 
where another adequate forum was available to afford the complain-
ing state the respect it deserved under the ConstitutionY The Court 
reasoned that remittance of the case to an appropriate federal dis-
trict court using a federal rule of decision would satisfy the obliga-
tions of Article III while permitting the Court discretion to pursue 
pressing matters on its docket.48 
Although the Court did not formulate actual relief for Illinois, its 
unanimous opinion formally recognized the validity of federal com-
mon law as a rule of decision in interstate resource disputes. The 
Court ruled that a federal district court could take jurisdiction of the 
46. 406 U.S. at 93. Article III of the Constitution provides, in part, that "[i]n all cases or con-
troversies in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The duty bound nature of this jurisdiction is an ac-
cepted tenet of federal courts doctrine. See Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
These duties are not inflexible, however, as the Court also has an obligation to promote the 
modern role of the Supreme Court as "the final federal appellate court." Ohio v. Wyandotte 
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97, 499 (1971). In Illinois, the Court stated it would honor 
original jurisdiction "only in appropriate cases" but did not delineate what factors must be 
present. 406 U.S. at 93. In Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969), the Court expressed 
the desire to invoke its original jurisdiction sparingly. In Washington v. General Motors Corp., 
406 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court reiterated its preference for the sparing use of its original 
jurisdiction so that mounting duties on its appellate docket would not suffer. This respect for 
the primarily appellate function of the Supreme Court and the cons~rvation of its limited re-
sources within the federal system were also the major impetus for the Court's denial of 
original jurisdiction in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1971). 
47. 406 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1972). The adequacy of an alternative forum has not always required 
a federal court. The Court has exercised discretion to deny jurisdiction where there exists an 
appropriate state forum. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (per curirtm); Ohio 
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 501 (1971). It has also denied jurisdiction where 
there exists an appropriate lower federal court forum. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 
19 (1939). See Note, The Original Jurisdiction Ci(the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. 
L. REV. 665, 697-98 (1959). 
48. 406 U.S. at 93-94 (1972). The Court was uncomfortable in its role as a factfinder in a 
trial de novo situation which would result from its exercise of original jurisdiction. Earlier 
cases reveal the burden which original jurisdiction suits have placed on the Court because of 
the time and effort required to hear testimony, develop a record, and occasionally retain 
jurisdiction over a case. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (22 hours oral argu-
ment, 2 special masters, 25,000 pages of transcript); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 413 
(1922) (required 11 years for trial and argument before decree was issued, enforcement of 
which encompassed 35 years of continued litigation before the Court); Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (modifiable decree issued in 1907 and finally vacated in 1938 
by the Court). In the context of the rising number of cases on the Court's docket time con-
straints have led the Court to reconsider its role as a trial forum. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals 
Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1971). See The Supreme Cnurt, 1.972 Tenn. 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1 
(1973). 
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case by asserting that a federal common law claim raised a federal 
question in satisfaction of section 1331 of the United States Code.49 
The opinion held that both a federal forum and a federal common law 
rule of decision were necessary to protect two distinct federal inter-
ests: the federal concern for the purity of the nation's water supply; 
and the state's quasi-sovereign interests in interstate natural re-
sources.50 Significantly, the federal environment statutes were 
found to be inadequate to satisfy Illinois' complaint. The administra-
tive hearing procedures provided by the FWPCA had been proven 
unsatisfactory, and the statute did not regulate those pollution prob-
lems which Illinois sought to contro1.51 Nevertheless, the Court 
noted that Congress may in the course of future legislation choose to 
"pre-empt" the field of federal common law. 52 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision, on May 19, 1972, Illi-
nois filed its complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.53 Following the Supreme Court's direc-
tives, the district court ruled that the case should be decided under 
the principles of federal common law nuisance. Trial in the district 
court did not actually commence for some time, however, as the par-
ties engaged in nearly four years of discovery and pretrial motions. 
During this period, two significant events occurred. First, five 
months after Illinois had filed its suit in federal district court, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).54 
The CW A was designed as a comprehensive overhaul of existing fed-
49. 406 u.s. 91, 99, 103 (1972). 28 U .S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides that district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions which arise under the constitution, law or treaties 
of the United States. 
50. 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5, 105 n.6, 107 n.9 (1972). Compare F. GRAD. supra note 9, at § 3.03 
(dismissing Court's choice of federal common law as dictum) with Friendly, In Praise of Erie 
- And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 385 (1964) ("A Court's stated 
. . . and necessary basis for deciding does not become dictum . . . "). Previously the Court 
had left open the question whether federal common law was considered to be a "law" for pur-
poses of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), in Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 154 
(1969). However, in that case four members of the Court stated that for purposes of § 1331(a) 
"laws" included decisional law as well as statutes. 358 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in part). This assignment of federal question jurisdiction was anticipated by 
lower court decisions. E.g .. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 
492-93 (2d Cir. 1980); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1979). But see D. CURRIE, 
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES & MATERIALS at 882 (2d ed. 1975). 
;, 1. 406 {) .S. at 103, 105 (1972). 
;'2. Id. at 107. 
;'3. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
;'4. 33 (J .S.C. §§ 12;' 1-1376 (1976). The CW A was enacted on October 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-;'00, 86 Stat. 876. 
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eral water pollution legislation which was considered to have been 
wholly unsatisfactory. 55 Second, the Milwaukee facilities did not 
comply with the requirements of CW A permits and, as contemplated 
by the Act, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
brought an enforcement action in Wisconsin state court. 56 The ac-
tion resulted in a judgment ordering that the discharges from treat-
ment plants meet minimum effluent limitations set forth in the CW A 
permits and required the elimination of sewer overflows. Despite 
this court action Milwaukee continued to violate the permit condi-
tions and the overflows continued unabated. 57 
Throughout four years of discovery preparatory to the suit in fed-
eral district court, Milwaukee made several unsuccessful motions to 
dismiss, including one based on the grounds that the newly enacted 
CWA had preempted federal common law nuisance.58 Trial on Illi-
nois' claim finally commenced in the district court on January 11, 
1979. A four-month trial ensued, during which the court made exten-
sive technical findings on the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. On July 29, 1979, the district court rendered its decision that 
the discharges of inadequately treated sewage and untreated sewage 
from the Milwaukee facilities constituted a nuisance under federal 
common law. 59 
Based on the evidence before it, the district court ordered essen-
tially two basic remedies. First, the court ordered that Milwaukee 
treat all discharges from municipal treatment plants according to 
standards more stringent than those minimum levels required by the 
CWA.60 Secondly, the court ordered the eventual control and elimi-
55. McThernia, supra note 34, at 200-02. See infra text and notes at notes 196-247. See also 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1976), construed in EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 
U.S. 200, 205 (1976). 
56. 451 U.S. 304, 311 (1981). Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), authorizes an approved 
state agency to bring enforcement actions to ensure compliance with federal permit condi-
tions. The DNR action was commenced in 1976. 
57. The DNR action was resolved by a settlement agreement after continual modifications 
of the Milwaukee discharge permits. The DNR changed its requirements, with court approval, 
to allow the elimination of dry weather sewer overflows only by 1983. No date was set for the 
elimination of wet weather overflows which were of prime importance. Instead Milwaukee was 
ordered only to initiate a program which could eventually "control" the overflows. See 599 
F.2d 151, 170 (7th Cir. 1979). 
58. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Milwaukee's motions to dismiss 
for lack of in personam jurisdiction and improper venue were denied. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 4 
E.R.C. 1849 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
59. 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
60. Id. at 305. The effluent limitations prescribed by the court were more stringent than 
those prescribed by the EPA for the secondary treatment of municipal sewage. In place of 30 
mg/l of BOD5 and suspended solids each, the court required 5 mgll; in lieu of monitoring re-
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nation of the occurrence of sewer overflows. This order required that 
Milwaukee construct additional sewage facilities besides those neces-
sary to comply with existing CW A regulations. After receiving 
assurances of feasibility from Milwaukee, the district court devel-
oped a fiscal planning timetable, with the consent of both parties, to 
effectuate the construction necessary to control sewer overflows.61 
Milwaukee sought appeal of the district court's decision before the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Milwaukee's appeal was based on 
two issues: whether the relief available in an action of federal com-
mon law nuisance may go beyond that available under the federal 
statute (CW A); and whether compliance with CW A permits pre-
cluded federal common law.62 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the 
CW A had not preempted federal common law nuisance and reiter-
ated that compliance with CW A permits did not constitute an abso-
lute defense to common law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court order for the control and elimination of sewer over-
flows and the construction timetable; yet the Seventh Circuit revised 
the district court order insofar as it imposed effluent limitations 
more stringent than those required by the CWA.63 
The Seventh Circuit determined that the minimum standards of 
control in the CW A represented a sophisticated balance of technical 
and political factors by Congress and so reversed the district court's 
order insofar as it imposed treatment standards more stringent than 
those in the CW A. Since the CW A did not address the nuisance 
caused by sewer overflows, the Seventh Circuit approved the district 
court's order to control and eventually eliminate sewer overflow dis-
charges.64 In this way the court felt it had properly tempered federal 
courts' equitable lawmaking powers with a respect for the legislative 
judgments of Congress. 65 
quirements for chlorine residue, the court required a free chlorine residue after 15 minutes of 
exposure; in lieu of 400 fecal coliform cells per 100 ml, the court required no more than 
200/100 m!. While the EPA allowed a variable 85% removal of BOD5 and suspended solids, the 
court imposed an absolute numerical maximum of 10 mg/!. See 366 F. Supp. 298, 305-07 (N.D. 
111.1977); 599 F.2d 151, 174 (7th Cir. 1979). 
61. See 304 U.S. at 311-12 (1981). The district court ordered the elimination of combined 
sewer overflows by 1986 and the construction of collection and conveyance systems to prac-
tically eliminate sewer overflows by 1989. Such elimination essentially required that any ef-
fluent from combined sewer overflow be collected and treated along with other municipal 
sewage at a central plant before discharge. See 599 F.2d 151, 170-73 (7th Cir. 1979). 
62. Id. at 155. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. at 173-75,176-77. 
65. See Illinois V. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105-07 (1972). See infra text and notes at notes 
440-67. 
310 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:295 
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the 
single question of whether the CW A had supplanted federal common 
law. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court found that 
the CW A represented a comprehensive regulatory scheme to control 
water pollution problems. The rigorous administrative mechanisms 
and detailed provisions of the Act were regarded as sufficient to fully 
address Illinois' complaints. Thus, despite the absence of a distinct 
congressional statement, the Supreme Court interpreted the CW A 
so as to require the displacement of federal common law in the 
resolution of interstate water pollution controversies. The Court em-
phasized that federal common law should be resorted to only in cer-
tain unusual circumstances.67 In view of the complex and compre-
hensive regulatory scheme in the CW A, the Court felt that federal 
courts should abstain from developing remedies to supplement the 
Act. In this light, the lower court's imposition of effluent limitations 
and control measures more stringent than the minimum require-
ments in the CW A was considered to be an encroachment on the leg-
islative functions of Congress in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.68 
Thus, through a nine-year period of litigation the Supreme Court 
had first approved and then disapproved the use of federal common 
law to resolve the controversy between Illinois and Milwaukee. In 
one sense, the Court merely pursued the avenue left open in its 1972 
decision-that Congress may choose to preempt federal common law 
by future legislation. The Court's turnabout could be explained as a 
result of the new and improved federal water pollution legislation 
which, perhaps, obviated the need for federal common law relief. Yet 
the Court's abrupt undercutting of Illinois' federal common law 
cause of action also manifests the Court's principled conception of 
the limited role of federal courts in our federal system. Two major 
developments helped to change the course of Illinois' litigation after 
1972. First, the Supreme Court's approach to federal common law, 
and its view of the role of federal courts activism generally, shifted 
to a markedly less expansive view of federal courts' power. 69 Second, 
the Congress substantially improved water pollution controllegisla-
tion in the CW A. 70 The next section will trace the development of 
federal common law and the prudential policies which justify its ex-
66. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
67. [d. at 313-15. 
68. [d. at 313-17. 
69. See infra Section VI.B. 
70. See infra Section V.A. 
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ercise. Following this an overview of the CWA will be presented in 
an effort to determine whether the Act itself can be reasonably 
viewed as displacing federal common law. 
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
In the development of the legal system of the United States 
neither Congress nor the Constitution expressly provided for the 
adoption of English common law as a whole. Thus, in the United 
States common law had been derived entirely from the judicial re-
sources of state and federal courts.71 Significantly, in our constitu-
tional federal system the federal courts are constrained in their exer-
cise of common law by conditions which do not apply to state courts.72 
First, as one of the three branches of the federal government, 
federal courts must observe the separation of powers doctrine. 73 In 
deference to the legislative functions vested in Congress, federal 
courts have exercised only a limited range of lawmaking powers.74 
Secondly, as a branch of the federal government vis-a-vis the 
states, federal courts cannot exercise their lawmaking powers in a 
manner which derogates the powers reserved to state legislatures 
and courts. Historically, most common law matters have been con-
trolled by state courts.75 The use of federal common law by federal 
courts is generally thought to imply the inapplicability of state com-
mon law in much the same manner as the more usual preemption of 
state law by federal legislation. 76 Thus, under the doctrine embodied 
71. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 659 (1834). 
72. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - For-
ward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1975); Note, The Federal Com-
mon Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1514-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Common 
Law]. 
73. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978); Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 
337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,352 (1904). See 
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-1 to 2-4 (1978). 
74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once 
Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it 
is ... for the courts to enforce them ... "); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 663 (1951) 
("It is not for [courts] to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the nation's 
lawmaking body"). 
75. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). State courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction, so they are presumed to have power over most cases. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, 
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 470-71, 800-03 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. 
76. Since the Erie doctrine presumes the states are capable of resolving disputes according 
to their own laws, the decision to utilize federal common law has usually been legitimized by 
reference to some provision of the Constitution, a federal statute, or federal treaty. 
Monaghan, supra note 72. at 12; Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 72, at 1515. 
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in the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 77 
the federal courts must give due respect to the traditional common 
law functions of state courts before contemplating the exercise of 
federal common law. 
Third, as courts of limited jurisdiction under Article III of the Con-
stitution, the judicial powers of federal courts are not broadly 
granted, but are delegated by Congress and supervised by the Su-
preme Court.78 In the broadest equitable sense, the lawmaking 
powers of federal courts arise from the need of the courts to resolve 
finally controversies which come before them. Yet in light of the 
limited jurisdiction and other fundamental constraints on federal 
judicial powers, it is apparent that even this broad equitable base of 
power is more narrow than that of the state courts, which are courts 
of general jurisdiction. 79 For all of the reasons given above, the exer-
cise of federal judicial lawmaking generally has required some 
special justification by the courts. 
Despite these prudential and constitutional restraints, federal 
courts have continued to develop common law rules of decision. This 
section will trace the development of federal common law, particu-
larly as it applies to interstate resource disputes. The 1972 Supreme 
Court decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee will then be considered as a 
representative case involving the historic justifications for federal 
common law. 
77. 304 u.s. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the States . . . "). Although 
nominally a decision based on choice of law grounds in diversity suits, the Erie doctrine has 
halted the independent development of a generalized body of common law in federal courts 
while permitting the same in state courts. Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicially 
Established Effluent Standards As A Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 B.C. ENVT'L 
AFF. L. REV. 293, 295 (1978); Fort, supra note 12, at 137 n.38. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases 
arising under the Constitution, laws of the United States, or treaties made under their authori-
ty. Article III is the fundamental source of federal judicial power, the corpus of which resides 
in the Supreme Court itself. Congress is empowered to create the lower federal courts which 
are thus subject to modification of jurisdiction by Congress. [d. at cl. 2. ("The judicial power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time obtain and establish"). Federal courts can hear only those 
cases which are within this constitutional grant and those which have been entrusted to the 
courts in a jurisdictional grant by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (federal question 
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (admiralty jurisdiction); 
28 U.S.C. § 1343 Gurisdiction over civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976»; 
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). 
79. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1030-31 (1967); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate 
Rules of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1084, 1086 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Competence 
of Federal Courts]. 
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A. Judicial Development of Federal Common Law 
The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins pronounced: 
"[t]here is no federal general common law."80 Over time, however, 
the Erie doctrine has come to stand more for a shorthand reference 
to the policy considerations which restrain federal judicial lawmak-
ing than an absolute preclusion of such powers.81 Thus, the courts 
have continued to develop federal common law within the narrow 
field allowed by the Constitution, federalism, and the Erie doctrine. 
In deference to Congress, a federal court must determine that con-
gressionallegislation has not addressed the problem before the court 
or otherwise denied the judicial power to formulate legislative-type 
relief.82 Even where these conditions are met, the common law relief 
must be consistent with relevant federal statutes and preserve the 
policies underlying those statutes.83 In its respect for the traditional 
common law domain of the state courts a federal court should deter-
mine that state law would be inappropriate or inadequate as a rule of 
decision to resolve a peculiarly "federal" problem.84 Finally, differ-
ent prudential considerations, usually articulated by the Supreme 
Court, concerning the degree of activism or restraint most appropri-
ate for federal courts have greatly influenced the promulgation of 
common law throughout different periods.85 
Although these factors have caused federal courts to exercise judi-
cial lawmaking powers in a cautious and perhaps uneven manner, 
federal common law has become well established in many "special-
ized" situations.86 Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to categorize 
80. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
81. Friendly, supra note 50, at 389-90; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Com-
petence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. 
REV. 797, 2020-28 (1957); Note, Competence of Federal Courts, supra note 79, at 1516. See 
generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 756-832. 
82. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 308 (1981); Note, Competence of Federal 
Courts, supra note 79, at 1099; Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 
1428, 1441-42 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rules of Decision]. 
83. Cf Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393-403 (1970). "This legislative 
establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes 
involved. The policy thus established has become itself a part of our law, to be given appropri-
ate weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law." Id. 
at 390-91. 
84. Hill, supra note 79, at 1031; Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 72, at 1520. See 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
85. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 800-06. 
86. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947) (there remains after Erie a 
"law of independent judicial decision"); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 
451 U.S. 77 (1981); Friendly, supra note 50, at 394-95, 407-08. 
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in the abstract those instances which justify the use of this special-
ized federal common law. Certain circumstances, either alone or in 
combination with others, historically have justified federal common 
law without actually requiring its use.87 This quixotic nature of fed-
eral common law reveals a fundamental insight: that while many of 
the constraints upon federal judicial powers are external, that is, 
ascribed to sources outside the courts such as the Constitution and 
our form of federalism, the ultimate decision regarding federal com-
mon law has been internal, that is, one made by the courts them-
selves.88 Thus, there appear to be no hard and fast rules, but rather 
an attempt to articulate in the context of each case those bounds 
beyond which federal courts should not step. 
One area in which the use of federal common law has been well 
established is that of interstate resource disputes.89 For example, in 
Hinderlider v. La Plata River Cherry Creek Ditch CO.,90 an opinion 
delivered on the same day as Erie, the Court decided the apportion-
ment of interstate waters on the basis of federal common law nui-
sance.91 More broadly, the Supreme Court has fashioned federal 
common law to resolve such matters as disputes between states over 
interstate resources or protection of a state's sovereign rights;92 
issues related to the operations of federal statutory law or to foster 
federal policy;93 issues requiring uniformity of law such as obliga-
tions to or by the United States,94 regulation of interstate com-
87. Fort, supra note 12, at 137-38 n.39; Leybold, supra note 77, at 296. See, e.g., UAW v. 
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). See Hill, supra note 79, at 1024; Note, Federal 
Common Law, supra note 72, at 1512-14; Note,Interstate Pollution, supra note 11, at 1444-45 
(1972). 
88. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 800-06. 
89. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 95 (1972); Friendly, supra note 50, at 406-07. 
90. 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
91. Id. The Court supplemented an interstate compact to apportion interstate waters which 
had originally been approved by Congress. The Court also overturned a decision by one state's 
Supreme Court under the exercise of federal common law. Id. at 105. As viewed by the Court 
the case involved a classic federalist interest authorizing federal courts to settle interstate 
disputes. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 5, 6, 7, 8; THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). 
92. E.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241-
45 (1901); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 123, 146-47 (1902); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
206 U.S. 230 (1907); Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1928); Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-71 (1931); New Jerseyv. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 
(1931); United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1973); Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 
270,275 n.5 (1974); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972); Oregon ex reI. State 
Land Board v. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375 (1977). 
93. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); 
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Gerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943). 
94. E.g., Ivy Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); 
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merce,95 and regulation which expressly preempts state law;96 ques-
tions arising under maritime law;97 and issues of international law 
affairs.98 Plainly, there exists a wide variety of "specialized" federal 
common law. 
In general, the Supreme Court has developed three basic criteria 
for the utilization of federal common law: 1) that federal common law 
is appropriate when an issue raises an overriding federal interest 
which calls for a uniform federal rule of decision; or 2) that it is ap-
propriate where an issue touches basic interests of federalism;99 3) 
that federal common law is "interstitial" in character and so should 
be used to supplement federal legislation where it is consistent with 
the purposes underlying the legislation.10o In this respect, disputes 
over state boundaries, interstate water pollution, and degradation of 
a neighbor state's environment have been classic instances calling 
for the use of federal common law. 101 
The presence of federal legislation in an area has not of itself tradi-
tionally required a federal court to abstain from the exercise of fed-
eral common law. While federal courts must determine that federal 
common law is used as a necessary supplement to legislation or that 
it will not undercut the purposes of existing legislation, it is often dif-
ficult to tell whether federal common law is exercised because of 
what Congress has said or not said, or despite what Congress has 
said or not said.102 Put simply, the decision is one for the courts 
themselves to make, ultimately policed by the Supreme Court.103 In 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Prieke & Sons, Inc. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 406 (1947). 
95. E.g., Francis v. So. Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948); Huber Baking Co. v. Strolhmann 
Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958); Dad's Root Beer Co. 
v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951). 
96. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
97. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, 
JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 40-45 (1957). 
98. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See Hill, supra note 79, at 
1042-49. 
99. Fort, supra note 12, at 137-38. These bases are determined in the context of the factors 
embodied in Erie and the separation of powers doctrines as well as the particular facts present 
in each case so that comparison of one substantive area of law with another is not particularly 
helpful. [d. at 138; Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 72, at 1539. 
100. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960). See also HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 756-832; Mishkin, supra note 81, at 780-83. 
101. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304 at 320 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 525-27; 
Leybold, supra note 77, at 299. 
102. Hill, supra note 79, at 1024, 1029-30; Leybold, supra note 77, at 296-97. 
103. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Mishkin, supra note 81, at 800-01; 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 756-832; Note, Competence of Federal Courts, supra 
note 79, at 1090. 
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any event, a federal court's decision will usually be based upon its 
reading of congressional intent. This is so because while federal 
courts submit to the paramount authority of Congress as the federal 
lawmaker, the interpretation of congressional legislation is a funda-
mental task of the federal courts. Indeed, legislative interpretation 
and the filling of statutory gaps are the most basic reasons for ini-
tiating federal common law and remain an integral function of the 
federal courts.104 For this reason federal common law is described as 
interstitial and supplemental in character. It arises from the inter-
play of the general equitable powers of federal courts retained within 
their limited jurisdiction to resolve conclusively a controversy and 
the power of the courts to interpret federal legislation. Thus, where 
federal courts have been compelled to consider federal questions 
"which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone,"lo6 they 
have exercised their lawmaking powers to resolve those questions. lo6 
Following this interstitial approach a federal court may interpret 
existing legislation as having provided certain norms or federal sub-
stantive rights for which federal common law is then fashioned to 
protect or advance. lo7 In the usual instance, the lack of a clearly ex-
104. Fort, supra note 12, at 167; Friendly, supra note 50, at 383; Hill, supra note 79, at 
1024. See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Co. (FDIC), 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK· 
ING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW, 541-46 (tent. ed. 1958); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 
830; Mishkin, supra note 81, at 799-801. "[E]ffective Constitutionalism requires the recogni-
tion of power in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legisla-
tion', rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially [to] effectuate statutory patterns 
enacted in the large by Congress." Id. at 800. 
105. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1941) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
106. Id., Board of Comm'rs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939); Miree v. DeKalb 
Cty., 433 U.S. 25, 35 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring). 
107. Federai iaw, whether constitutional or statutory, often defines substantive rights and 
duties but leaves undefined - or only partially defined - what remedies are available when 
such rights are violated. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 798. See Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying private right of ac-
tion for damages under federal common law for violation of 4th amendment rights). Federal 
courts have supplied federal common law remedies when legislation has failed to provide a 
remedy sufficient to resolve the dispute before the court. E.g., United States v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 326 U.S. 482 (1960) (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. §§ 401-426 (1976»; Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976»; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (Federal 
Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2522 (1976»; Deitrich v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1936) (Nat'! 
Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24-342 (1976». When Congress has "provided enough federal law 
... appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences." United 
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 402, 492 (1960). For a strong critique of the expansion 
of federal courts jurisdiction as a premise to extend federal judicial lawmaking to protect 
federal rights or statutory schemes, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 
464-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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pressed congressional intent on an issue is crucial. Does congression-
al silence imply that Congress wanted no supplemental remedies out-
side of the act or a recognition of them?; or does its expression of 
broad remedial purposes imply need for federal courts to fashion re-
lief or preclude it? In most cases the limits on judicial interpretation 
and lawmaking are not clear. One limitation is clear, however: that 
although federal courts have the power to effectuate federal policy 
by filling gaps in legislation they are not free to "supplement Con-
gress's answer so thoroughly that [the statute] becomes meaning-
less."108 As recognized by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Milwau-
kee, such interstitial judicial lawmaking must be in accordance with 
the statutory scheme and consistent with the statute's provisions 
rather than merely advance the statute's underlying purposes in a 
generalized manner. 109 Abstract considerations are not helpful, as 
nearly any federal judicial relief could be said to advance the pur-
poses of an act in some manner. 
1. Interstate Federal Common Law 
In the context of the limited lawmaking powers of federal courts 
and the interstitial character of federal common law, the exercise of 
federal common law to settle disputes over interstate resources or 
the interference of one state's environmental interests has been well 
established. Interstate federal common law is premised on both the 
federal interest in the area and the matter of federal relationships, 
each of which is a strong basis for federal common law. 
108. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). Where a dispute has been 
addressed by appropriate and competent legislation to provide a resolution of the controversy 
before the Court, federal common law has not been exercised. Ohio v. Kentucky, 445 U.S. 939, 
940-43 (1980). For example, in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Court applied 
the provisions of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617(a)-617(t) (1976), which 
created a detailed scheme for the apportionment of interstate waters. Although the Court had 
previously used federal common law in this area, it declined to do so in this instance because 
the federal statute provided sufficient terms to resolve the case. On the other hand, the Court 
developed a common law rule to supplement federal legislation in United States v. Little Lake 
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). In the absence of a provision dealing with the effect of 
local mineral rights statutes on the acquisition of land by the United States under the 
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, the Court developed a federal rule of decision. [d. at 593. 
109. 406 U.S. 91, 103-05 (1972); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470-71 
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Federal common law implements the federal Constitution 
and statutes, and is conditioned by them"); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 
375, 393-403 (1970). Federal courts must follow, not formulate congressional policy by finding 
a congressional judgment that federal law should govern. Note, Competence of Federal Courts, 
supra note 79, at 1084, 1099; Note, Rules of Decision, supra note 82, at 1441-42; Comment, 
Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 
825 (1976). 
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The federal common law of nuisance was first applied to an inter-
state pollution problem in Missouri v. Illinois. l1O There, Missouri 
complained that an artificial drain to be constructed by Chicago 
would discharge sanitary waste into the Mississippi River along Mis-
souri's border. Missouri claimed that its ecological interests would be 
injured by the public nuisance that would be caused by the pollution 
of its waterways. The Supreme Court overruled Illinois' demurrer 
and held that a state may claim relief under federal common law to 
abate a nuisance in its waters caused by another state.111 
One year later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper CO.,112 the Court 
provided Georgia a federal forum and a federal common law nui-
sance remedy to enjoin the emission of noxious fumes originating in 
Tennessee. Georgia alleged that sulfurous gas emissions were de-
stroying crops and orchards within its borders. The Court found that 
Georgia had sufficiently met its burden of proof to show a nuisance 
and further emphasized the strong "quasi-sovereign" rights of a 
state over the natural resources within its domain. 113 The protection 
of these interests required that a state have the right to demand that 
its environment not be denigrated by sources from without the state. 
The Court in Tennessee Copper recognized that the vindication of 
these quasi-sovereign interests of a state provided an adequate basis 
for granting federal common law relief. 114 Subsequently, many other 
states successfully brought federal common law actions based on nui-
sance and other grounds.115 In the course of this use of federal com-
110. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). See also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
111. 180 U.S. at 214; 200 U.S. at 498. 
112. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
113. [d. at 237. Here the use of the term "quasi-sovereign" was first used to describe the in-
terests of a state, as opposed to those of the nation as a whole since a state's sovereignty is 
conditioned upon its union with others under the federalist system. Leybold, supra note 77, at 
299 n.56. 
In that [quasi-sovereign] capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind 
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word 
as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air. 
206 U.S. at 237. 
114. The Tennessee Copper Court regarded the interests of one state as sufficient to invoke 
the federal common law even without an interstate dispute. Post Erie case law has tempered 
this extreme view with greater regard for judicial restraint and so the quasi-sovereign interest 
in an interstate dispute has evolved into the "federal relationship" rationale supporting 
federal common law. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972). 
115. E.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931), modified, 290 U.S. 237 
(1933), construed, 296 U.S. 259 (1935) (even when covered by a permit a municipality's dump-
ing of garbage at sea constituted an enjoinable nuisance under federal common law when it 
harmed a neighbor state's shore); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (state's 
method of draining water into an interstate stream constituted a public nuisance when lands of 
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mon law to resolve interstate resource pollution disputes, the Su-
preme Court noted that it had developed "what may not improperly 
be called interstate common law."116 
The use of this interstate federal common law has been well-
founded because it involves both the federal interest requiring a uni-
form rule of decision as well as matters of federalism between the 
states, each of which reasons alone has been regarded as justification 
for federal common law. 117 These interests may be delineated as 
follows. Predominantly supported by the commerce clause, Congress 
may enact various statutes regulating and protecting the environ-
ment, thereby envincing an independent federal concern for the en-
vironment of the Nation. Provided there is no congressional intent 
contrary to the use of federal common law, a federal court might pro-
ceed to fill legislative gaps through its interpretation of the statute. 
Nevertheless, federal courts, although a federal partner with Con-
gress, are subject to peculiar restraints of the Erie doctrine which 
may counsel against the promulgation of federal common law. Here 
the federalism rationale may overcome Erie doctrine objections. As 
part of its status in the federal system each state retains quasi-
sovereign rights to the use and control of its environment. When the 
exercise of these rights by one state interferes with the same rights 
of another state, the conflict raises issues peculiar to our federal 
system which require a federal rule of decision. 11S Put simply, our 
federal system requires a federal rule to protect the interests of one 
state from encroachment by another as well as to prevent conflicts 
amongst the states. 
Since this federalism rationale devolves from the structure and re-
lationships set forth in the Constitution, it is regarded as having con-
stitutional underpinning. 119 As Judge Friendly explained: "[t]he 
Constitution can well be deemed to require that the federal courts 
an adjoining state become flooded); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); New York v. New 
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
406 U.S. 91 (1972); Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972); Oregon ex reI. State Land 
Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977). See Hill, supra note 79, at 1024, 
1026·42; Friendly, supra note 50, at 405·22. 
116. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907) (apportioning waters of an interstate 
stream). 
117. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334-35 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Friendly, supra note 50, at 407-08; Leybold, supra note 77, at 299; Note, Preemption, supra 
note 4, at 525-27; Note, Umbrella Equities, supra note 13, at 150. 
118. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 
401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971). See Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. 
Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976); Friendly, supra note 50, at 408. 
119. Hill, supra note 79, at 1030-32, 1075; Monaghan, supra note 72, at 13-14. 
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should fashion law when the interstate nature of a controversy 
makes it inappropriate that the law of either state should govern."120 
That this federalism interest in interstate resource disputes is in-
deed derived from a federal source, the Constitution, was made ex-
plicit by the Tenth Circuit in Texas v. Pankey.l2l Texas sought an in-
junction to stop New Mexico ranchers from spraying a chlorinated 
camphene pesticide used to kill range caterpillars. Texas alleged that 
rainfall runoff containing the pesticide would pollute the Canadian 
River, an interstate waterway which flows from New Mexico into 
Texas. Texas further claimed that several municipal water supplies 
would become unuseable because of the infiltration of the pesticide. 
The Tenth Circuit granted the injunction requested based on federal 
common law nuisance. The court held that the ecological right of a 
state against improper impairment from sources outside its province 
was a matter of federal concern and relationship in our federal 
system, thereby invoking the application of federal common law.122 
2. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 1972 
The 1972 Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee123 rep-
resented the confluence of the different strands of legal precedent 
supporting federal interstate common law. First, the Court recog-
nized the application of federal judicial authority where federal con-
cerns are directly implicated and call for a uniform rule of decision. 
The Court found an independent federal interest in the purity of the 
nation's waters. According to the Court's discussion this uniquely 
federal interest could be inferred from the various statutes which 
Congress had enacted concerning the protection and regulation of 
navigable waters, such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and the Rivers and Harbors Act.124 From its review of federal stat-
utes and case law the Court concluded: "When we deal with air and 
water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal com-
mon law .... "125 
120. Friendly, supra note 50, at 408 n.119. 
121. 441 F.2d 236, 237-38 (10th Cir. 1971). 
122. [d. at 238-39, 240. 
123. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
124. 406 U.S. at 104. See FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970) (repealed 1972); Rivers and Har-
bors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, cited in 406 U.S. at 102,104. The opinion suggests that the range of 
federal legislation manifested a strong federal interest in water pollution control and that such 
pervasive federal concern would justify the use offederal common law. [d. at 101·03; Leybold, 
supra note 77, at 300, 301-02. 
125. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6 (1972). This component was used to develop federal question 
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Second, the Supreme Court in Illinois relied upon the federalism 
rationale in support of interstate common law. The Court acknowl-
edged the historical acceptance of federal common law as a rule of 
decision in interstate pollution disputes. More importantly, the Court 
specifically approved the use of federal common law to protect a 
state's ecological interests within our federal system as set forth in 
Texas v. Pankey,126 Thus, to protect the federal interest in the na-
tion's waters and to foster the federalist interest in the protection of 
Illinois' environment from out-of-state pollution the Supreme Court 
in 1972 called for a uniform federal rule rather than subject these 
concerns to various state laws. 
Third, the Court in Illinois held that the application of federal com-
mon law to interstate pollution disputes was not inconsistent with 
the FWPCA or other federal legislation in the area. Legislative con-
cern over pollution actually appears to have been a compelling reason 
for the application of federal common law in the Illinois decision. De-
scribing the scope of its equitable powers in this instance the Court 
stated that federal environmental statutes were not necessarily the 
exclusive source of federal policy and that the exact provisions of the 
FWPCA need not define the outer boundaries of common law.127 
The Illinois opinion reiterated that the exercise of federal common 
law involves the equitable powers of federal courts which allows 
them to draw upon many other sources, such as state law, in fashion-
ing a federal rule of decision. 128 Yet the opinion carefully pointed out 
that a federal court's equitable discretion is hounded by the need to 
consider the underlying policies of existing federal legislation. The 
remedy granted under federal common law must be both supported 
jurisdiction so that the lower federal courts could hear this interstate dispute case which ordi-
narily would have invoked the original jurisdiction of the Court. The Court made more clear 
the separate federal interest in water pollution when it stated that it was not only the charac-
ter of the parties as states that required the application of federal law, but the nature of the 
dispute. 
126. Id. at 100-01, 105. Federal courts have continued to settle interstate disputes in-
dependently of existing state laws or federal statutes. E.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 
589 (1945); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Vermont v. New York, 406 
U.S. 320 (1972). The Court quoted Pankey with approval, 406 U.S. at 100 (1972). 
127. 406 U.S. at 103 n.5, 104 (1972) ("Congress has evinced increasing concern with the 
quality of the aquatic environment"); id. at 102; Leybold supra note 77, at 302. 
128. 406 U.S. at 107-08 (1972). See also Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448, 457 (1957). The consideration of state standards which are then incorporated into 
the federal rule of decision is particularly important in a case such as Illinois. "[AJ state with 
high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not 
be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor." 406 U.S. at 107 
(1972). 
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by and consistent with the reasons for invoking federal common law 
in the first instance.129 
In these aspects of its decision, the Supreme Court in Illinois reaf-
firmed the interstitial use of federal common law to resolve inter-
state pollution disputes as an appropriate exercise of federal judicial 
powers. Rather than create a substantial body of law existing sepa-
rately from federal statutes, the Court utilized federal common law 
to effectuate the policies of the FWPCA where no express statutory 
remedy existed. 130 
While the Supreme Court reaffirmed the justifications for federal 
common law, it did not actually fashion relief for Illinois. Instead, the 
Court remitted the case to an appropriate federal district court, ad-
vising that a federal common law remedy be developed pursuant to 
the guidelines in the Supreme Court's opinion. The Court acknowl-
edged that the facts of a particular case ultimately would determine 
the applicability of federal common law. 131 While the Illinois opinion 
stressed the need for equitable discretion on the part of federal 
courts, it did not delineate the scope of such discretion, as it con-
cluded: "There are no fixed rules that govern; these suits will be 
equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will 
largely govern." 132 
B. Illinois as Precedent: An Unruly Mandate 
The Court in Illinois explicated the context in which federal com-
mon law can arise and set some parameters for the scope of federal 
judicial lawmaking, but the character of federal common law in any 
given case was left for development by the lower federal courts. The 
facts of the Illinois case involved three major justifications for feder-
al common law: the protection of a federal interest in clean water; 
the federalism interest in preserving a state's ecological rights within 
the federal system; and the necessity of filling legislative gaps to 
grant equitable relief. The historical development of federal common 
law indicates that each of these rationales has been relied upon 
129. Id. at 103, 107 (1972); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970); 
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). 
130. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 517; Comment, Amendments. supra note 33, at 
781. 
131. 406 U.S. 106-08 (1972). This is a function of the equitable nature of a federal court deci-
sion which turns on a case-by-case evaluation of the need for federal common law. 
132. 406 U.S. 107-08 (1972). The actual scope offederal common law nuisance has not been 
consistently delineated. Leybold, supra note 77, at 308; Note, Federal Common Law Nui-
sance, supra note 1, at 137. See infra text and notes at notes 133-45. 
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separately to justify federal common law. The Illinois decision repre-
sented a particularly strong case supporting the use of federal com-
mon law because of the intertwining of these strands of judicial 
reasoning. The Supreme Court did not clarify whether the presence 
of all three elements would be essential to the proper exercise of 
federal common law. Consequently, the Illinois decision has been 
subject to different interpretations depending on which considera-
tion has been viewed as the compelling reason for federal common 
law. While the Illinois case has provided useful precedent for the 
lower courts in the resolution of pollution disputes, a number of cir-
cuits have taken divergent approaches to the use of federal common 
law because of their disagreement concerning the nature of the fed-
eral interests recognized in Illinois,133 
One predominant question was whether federal common law could 
be applied only to interstate resources or to virtually all navigable 
waters of the nation, including wholly intrastate waters.134 The lat-
ter approach actually was adopted in a few circuit court decisions,135 
but is conceded to be an extraordinary application of the Illinois de-
cision.136 The courts also split on the question whether Illinois au-
thorized suits by parties other than states under federal common 
law137 and whether such relief should be limited to injunctive relief 
only.13s 
133. See 451 U.S. 304, 340 n.9 (1981) (cases cited therein); Fort, supra note 12, at 141-42. 
134. In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 102, the Court stated that the federal interest in 
water pollution extends to all "navigable" waters, implying that federal common law might be 
applied to intrastate waters. 
135. E .. g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and 
remanded mem., 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel 
Corp., 512 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145 
(D. Vt. 1972), afrd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
136. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewerage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 
(4th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 527 F.2d 492, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1975) (federal com-
mon law not available where interstate effects not alleged), modified and remanded on other 
.grounds, 529 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1976). 
137. E.g., Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(private parties using federal common law nuisance and implied damages remedy), vacated 
and remanded sub nom., Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. 1 (1981); City of Evansville V. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 
1979) (no individual implied right of action, but municipality can maintain suit for interstate 
water pollution), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). But see Committee for Consideration of 
Jones Falls Sewerage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (private plaintiff cannot 
maintain suit to abate interstate water pollution). 
138. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n V. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd and 
remanded .~ub nom., Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. V. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981); City of Evansville V. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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Significantly, some courts had the opportunity to refuse to apply 
federal common law in cases where the defendants had complied 
with existing discharge or pollution reduction permits.139 While 
these courts voiced considerable doubts about the validity of federal 
common law in such cases, they stopped short of invalidating its ex-
ercise. 140 
Although these differences in substantive interpretation of federal 
common law created an air of confusion, the doctrine gained credibil-
ity and stature as more courts applied it in concrete fact situations. 
After the Illinois decision and before the passage of the 1972 amend-
ments to the FWPCA, the United States filed a number of common 
law actions against polluters.141 Further, the utility of federal com-
mon law was viewed as extending to the areas of air, noise, and haz-
ardous waste pollution as well. In 1979, the Department of Justice 
and the EPA initiated a series of law suits based upon common law 
nuisance against owners of various hazardous waste dumps.142 
In 1980, the Supreme Court was afforded the chance either to pro-
vide more guidance for the lower courts or to reverse the develop-
ment of federal common law when it received a petition for certiorari 
from a Seventh Circuit case which had broadly applied the doc-
trine.143 The Court, however, refused to hear the case, thus leaving 
the Seventh Circuit's holding intact. As a result, there appeared to 
be some basis, if only by inference, that this recent development of 
federal common law was not only consistent with the mandate of Illi-
nois but also with the CW A.144 In any event, defendants in common 
law actions invariably argued that the common law had been legisla-
tively preempted with virtually no success in the district courts.145 
See Comment, Seventh Circuit Interprets Federal Common Law of Nuisance to Authorize 
Municipalities to Sue for Damages, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. 10168, 10171 & nn.35, 36 (1979). 
139. E.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973); United States v. 
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.Vt. 1973); United States v. Lindsay, 357 F. 
Supp. 784 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. 
Ill. 1973). . 
140. Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewerage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 
1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976) ("it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal 
common law which proscribes conduct which the 1973 Act of Congress [FWPCAJ legiti-
mates"). 
141. See Comment, Requiemfor the Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 11 ENVT'L L. REP. 
10,191, 10,192 (1981). 
142. See Comment, Hazardous Waste: EPA, Justices Invoke Emergency Authority, Com-
mon Law in Litigation Campaign Against Dump Sites, 10 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,034 (1980). 
143. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Evansville, No. 79-726, 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (Jan. 7, 1980). 
144. See Comment, Requiem, supra note 141, at 10,192. 
145. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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Nevertheless, by late 1980 the Supreme Court had accepted review 
of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, which con-
cluded that the CW A act had not preempted federal common law. 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
When the Supreme Court first considered Illinois' complaint in 
1972 under the FWPCA and federal common law, it warned that 
"new federal laws and new federal regulation may in time preempt 
the field of federal common law of nuisance."146 The Court did not 
indicate what type of legislation would suffice to preempt federal 
common law; nor did it have the opportunity to review the FWPCA 
as amended in 1972. That question was first squarely addressed by 
the Seventh Circuit in Illinois v. Milwaukee (Illinois 2).147 The sole 
question before the Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee was 
whether the regulatory scheme of the CW A had supplanted federal 
common law nuisance. us The CW A did not expressly preclude feder-
al common law, but the Court interpreted the provisions of the Act 
and its legislative history to discern a legislative intent which pre-
cluded the use of federal common law. 
Traditionally, in its reading of congressional intent the Supreme 
Court has construed federal statutes so as to respect existing com-
mon law rights. 149 Repeatedly the Court has stated that in the ab-
sence of an explicit congressional declaration to preclude a common 
law right, "existing common law rights [are] not to be abrogated un-
less it be found. . . so repugnant to the statute that survival of such 
a right would in effect deprive the statute of its efficacy; in other 
words, render its provisions nugatory."160 This respect for common 
law rights has been especially strong when the right is one typically 
asserted by a state. "Statutes that divest preexisting rights or privi-
leges will not be applied to the sovereign [states]" without a clear ex-
pression to that effect.161 
146. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). See Monaghan, supra note 72, at 10-11. The legislative 
supremacy of Congress over the federal courts is undisputed. [d. 
147. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). 
148. 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). 
149. E.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976); Federal Power Comm'r v. Tuscarora 
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960); Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 
224-25 (1957); United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1949); United States v. United 
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947). 
150. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (quoting Texas & Pacific 
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907». Accord Isbrandsten Co. v. Johnson, 
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). 
151. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (quoting United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 
346,359 (1949». Accord United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947). 
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The Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee has effectively revised 
this standard of statutory construction. Indulging a presumption 
against the validity of federal common law, the Court required that 
Congress affirmatively preserve common law rights which the Court 
itself felt should have been supplanted by the comprehensive scheme 
of the Clean Water Act.152 As such, the Supreme Court in City of 
Milwaukee asked fundamentally "different" questions in its review 
of the legislative record than the usual Court analysis. It is not so 
surprising that the Court was able to derive significantly "different" 
answers in its statutory interpretation. The Court's significant 
change in the mode of statutory construction and review is an indica-
tion of the present Court's underlying notion of the limited scope of 
federal judicial powers.153 The impact of the Court's presumptive 
policy inquiry into legislative intent is manifest in the divergent opin-
ions of the Seventh Circuit in Illinois 2 and the dissent in City of Mil-
waukee on the one hand, and the majority opinion in City of Milwau-
kee on the other. The next sections will outline these decisions as 
they considered the effect of the CWA on Illinois' federal common 
law claim. 
A. The Seventh Circuit's Opinion in Illinois 2, 1979 
In Illinois 2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
CW A did not preempt federal common law or limit the relief avail-
able to Illinois under common law.154 This holding was posited on a 
thorough review of the CWA's provisions, congressional intent dis-
cerned from legislative history, and specific examination of various 
sections of the Act. The court first reviewed the provisions of the 
FWPCA which the Supreme Court had found inadequate to address 
Illinois' complaint in the 1972 case. Then the regulatory and hearing 
provisions of the CW A were analyzed in detail. The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that although enforcement and hearing procedures in the 
CW A had been improved and streamlined, Illinois could not be as-
sured of an adequate remedy under the CW A any more than under 
the FWPCA.155 
152. 451 U.S. 304, 307-12 (1981). 
153. See infra Section V.C. 
154. 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979). 
155. [d. at 159-60. The FWPCA provided a series of conference procedures each of which 
entailed compliance periods of up to six months and seldom resulted in clear, enforceable 
orders. See 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)(1), (3), (4) (1970) (repealed 1972); 599 F.2d at 158. These en-
forcement procedures were described by the Supreme Court as "cumbrous", EPA v. State 
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976), and "long" and "drawn-out", Illinois 
v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). By comparison, the CWA had shortened compliance 
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In addressing the specific language of the CW A, the court first 
turned to section 511.156 Section 511 of the Act provides that the 
CW A shall not be construed so as to limit the "authority or functions 
of any officer or agency of the United States under any other law or 
regulation not inconsistent with this chapter."157 The Seventh Cir-
cuit found this language "arguably broad enough to include the fed-
eral courts."158 The court also noted that the CWA provides for con-
flicting standards through water quality limitations, site-specific de-
mands, and the technology forcing scheme of compliance, all of which 
were capable of being properly entertained by a federal court. Thus, 
where necessary to prevent harm to a complainant, the court held 
that the judicial imposition of effluent limitations more stringent 
than the minimum required by the CW A would not be inconsistent 
with the overall intent of the CW A.159 
Since the plain language of section 511 seems to refer only to the 
standard setting authority of agencies, textual support for a similar 
exercise of authority by the federal courts is equivocal at best. 16o 
Only when viewed in light of the strong policy expressed in section 
510161 does section 511 add some vitality to the Seventh Circuit's 
view that Congress did not intend to preempt federal common law. 
Section 510 of the CWA provides that a state may promulgate and 
impose standards of pollution control and effluent limitations which 
are more stringent than federal minimum requirements. The Seventh 
Circuit found this to be another indication that uniformity of stand-
ards per se was not a congressional goal in the CW A. Differences 
among federal standards were considered to be part of the structure 
times to 30 days generally, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976), and appeared to create much greater ac-
cess to an aggrieved state through NPDES hearings, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-1342(d). See infra 
text and notes at notes 290-311. 
The court noted that the hearing procedures of the CW A were geared towards enforcing the 
federal minimum discharge standards, but that these standards might not be sufficient to pre-
vent a nuisance from occurring in Illinois' waters. 599 F.2d at 167-68. 
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1371. 
157. [d. § 1371(a). 
158. 599 F.2d at 162. 
159. [d. A literal reading of section 511 would restrict its provisions to officers of agencies 
only, not courts. District courts are plainly identified as having certain roles in sections 309, 
504,505 and 509(a), principally to enforce the provisions of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 
1364, 1365, 1369(a). Other provisions of the CWA plainly refer to officers. E.g., Section 
502(11) defines effluent limitations as restrictions on quantities of pollutants set by a state or 
the administrator, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). 
160. The concept of officers used throughout the CWA in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1363(aX2XB), 1322, 
1322(a), 1313(a), appears to be in reference to an administrative agency. This does not 
necessarily exclude the judiciary and may still represent a policy judgment by Congress to 
allow for general federal authority to abate pollution by other legal devices, where necessary. 
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. See Fort, supra note 12, at 157. 
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of the CW A.162 As the Seventh Circuit noted, even federal minimum 
standards in the CW A are not uniform because of necessary modifi-
cations for specific problems and variances among permit condi-
tions.163 Sections of the Act governing standard promulgation and 
compliance further require that dischargers must not only meet 
minimum federal standards but that they must also meet more strin-
gent standards established pursuant to any "other federal law or 
regulation" or state law pursuant to section 510.164 
The Seventh Circuit found nothing in the CW A to necessitate that 
a court limit injunctive relief abating pollution to those standards set 
forth in the Act. The court finally concluded that differences among 
federal standards caused by judicial imposition of effluent limitations 
would not be inconsistent with the regulatory scheme of the CW A, 
but would be appropriate where promulgated to prevent specific 
demonstrated harms such as those in Illinois' complaint.165 
In its analysis of citizen's suit provisions and the savings clause, 
section 505166 of the Act, the Seventh Circuit found that Congress 
"deliberately chose to preserve existing rights and remedies," in-
cluding federal common law.167 The Court's review of the text and 
history of section 505(e) led to its conclusion that all pre-existing 
remedies had been preserved. There was no indication found to the 
effect that the term "common law" should be limited solely to "state" 
common law as opposed to "federal" common law.16s Congress rea-
sonably could be deemed to have been aware of the continued use of 
federal common law in the resolution of interstate pollution dis-
putes.169 Section 505(e) was interpreted as an affirmative preserva-
tion by Congress of both state and federal common law.170 
162. 599 F.2d at 162. See infra text and notes at notes 257-66. 
163. 599 F.2d at 162. Contrary to the Seventh Circuit, the environmental bar has considered 
section 510 as authorization for state regulations which defer only to requirements set by the 
EPA, not the federal courts. See KISSEL, RUSSELL & FORT, WATER POLLUTION 6-73 to 6-74 
(IICLE ENVT'L LAW HANDBOOK, 1978). 
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(c). See infra text and notes 257-66 (discussing the better-than-
best problem in the CW A). The Court rejected state pollution statute claims by Illinois, strong-
ly suggesting that for interstate waters a federal rule of decision governs. 599 F .2d at 177 
n.53. 
165. [d. at 163-65. 
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
167. 599 F.2d at 164. 
168. [d. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1499. 
169. Congress is presumed to be aware of existing legislation and common law when enact-
ing legislation. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1961); St. Louis I.M. & So. 
Ry. v. United States, 251 U.S. 198, 207 (1920); 4 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at 268 (4th ed. 1974). 
170. 599 F.2d at 164. The court noted that any other reading of the savings clause would 
1984] FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE 329 
Using equitable discretion and restraint the Seventh Circuit tai-
lored its remedy so as to be consistent with the CW A, advance its 
policies, and provide relief for the parties before it.171 In accordance 
with this standard of review, the Seventh Circuit felt that minimum 
standards acceptable to Congress provided an appropriate starting 
point since they represented congressional policy choices which had 
taken into account many social and economic considerations as well 
as technical concerns.172 The court also was mindful of the special 
concern for economic problems regarding municipal waste dis-
charges and publicly owned treatment works which were at issue be-
fore the court.173 Further, the court expressed its respect for the 
limited lawmaking role of federal courts, as it stated that a court, un-
like a legislature or an administrator, is not free to rest solely upon 
what it thinks desireable; there must be evidence to support its con-
clusion that the relief granted is necessary to protect the complain-
ing party from harm. 
Because of these self-restraint concerns, the Seventh Circuit made 
a refined analysis of the evidentiary record of the district court in 
order to ensure that there was sufficient evidence to support the nec-
essity of the more stringent limitations imposed by the district court. 
The Seventh Circuit felt it could not sustain the district court's order 
insofar as it imposed effluent limitations on Milwaukee sewer plant 
discharges which were more stringent than the "secondary treat-
reduce all common law actions to no more than an alternative avenue for the enforcement ac-
tions already set forth in the CW A. Such a restriction on the savings clause could not be 
squared with Congress's express desire to preserve common law remedies for harms not 
covered by the CWA. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1499. Commentators have suggested another inter-
pretation of the savings clause of the CW A: that Congress merely intended to assure a special 
form of jurisdiction in federal courts for enforcement claims under the act without providing 
for or rejecting other existing remedies. See Fort, supra note 12, at 159. 
171. "In applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case, a court 
should not ignore the Act but look to its provisions and principles for guidance." 599 F.2d at 
164. The court also gave special consideration to the leniency of Congress and the EPA 
towards the burdens upon municipalities in their efforts to control water pollution problems 
from treatment facilities and sewer overflows. 
172. Id. at 151, 164, 176-76. There is, however, evidence in the legislative history of the 
CW A that section 505 actions should not support judge-made pollution control standards as 
substitutes for those developed by agency procedures. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 
(1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1497. Generally there is a strong 
preference for administrative action to regulate pollution rather than the ad hoc decisional pro-
cess of the courts. Fort, supra note 12, at 161; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 517. 
173. 599 F.2d 151, 165, 176. See infra text and notes at notes 267-85. 
330 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:295 
ment" required by the CW A permits.174 The court found that the 
record below did not reveal that effluent limitations imposed by the 
district court were connected directly to the protection of Illinois' 
residents from a public health nuisance. The Seventh Circuit was 
quick to note, however, that as soon as it could be shown that the 
minimum federal effluent limitations of secondary treatment were 
inadequate to protect against the harms complained of, more strin-
gent limitations would be necessary.175 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found that the evidentiary 
record amply supported the district court's finding that Milwaukee's 
discharge of raw sewage from sewer overflows posed a significant 
risk of injury to Illinois residents. The Seventh Circuit reiterated 
that the vague and sketchy provisions of the CW A in the area of 
sewer overflows left the problem unaddressed. The court noted that 
Milwaukee had conceded that compliance with the court-ordered 
deadlines to prevent sewer overflows was feasibleY6 In light of 
these findings the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's order 
that Milwaukee build collection and treatment facilities and other 
construction to eventually eliminate sewer overflows into Lake 
Michigan. 
B. The Supreme Court Opinion 
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the CWA. The Court read section 
510 to provide that only state agencies, including state courts using 
state nuisance law, may establish more stringent controls applicable 
to in-state polluters. 177 The Court refused to find that this authority 
could be exercised by a state to affect out-of-state pollution sources 
through the federal common law of nuisance. It reasoned that any 
standards set by a federal court using federal common law would be 
federal standards and so the section 510 grant of state authority to 
set more stringent standards was regarded as inapposite to the sup-
port of federal common law.178 Authority given to the states could 
174. 599 F.2dat 176-77. 
175. Id. at 171-73,176. 
176. Id. at 173. ("Thus, it appears that defendant's [Milwaukee's] only complaint relates to 
the retention facilities required by the court"). 
177. 451 U.S. 304, 327-28 (1981). The Court did not address the Seventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of section 511 of the CWA. 
178. Id. at 327-28. 
It is one thing, however, to say that States may adopt more stringent limitations ... 
even through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state discharges. It is quite 
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not be deemed by analogy or other interpretation to allow federal 
courts to impose new standards when resolving individual cases. 
The majority in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois also rejected the 
Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation of section 505 and its savings 
clause. The Court appeared to give no credence to the Congress' 
stated policy to encourage public participation and private enforce-
ment where consistent with furthering the goals of the Act. 179 Sec-
tion 505(e), the savings clause, was restricted by the Court to its 
literal limits to mean only that nothing in the citizen suit provision it-
self precluded other remedies but that the remainder of the Act 
could and did restrict availability of relief. 180 The specific inclusion of 
"common law" in its savings clause was interpreted as a reference to 
"the more routine state common law" rather than the "limited fed-
eral common law."181 Although admitting that the savings clause 
might be read so as to include federal common law, the Court refused 
to do so because it found no expression of affirmative Congressional 
intent to preserve federal common law in particular. Having thus 
neutralized the savings clause so as to neither support nor deny the 
use of federal common law, the opinion stated that the rest of the Act 
in its comprehensiveness eliminated the justification for federal com-
mon law.182 
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme 
Court in 1972, the Supreme Court in 1981 declared that existing fed-
erallegislation had thoroughly addressed the control and prevention 
of water pollution and the specific concerns of Illinois' complaint as 
well. The Court noted that the discharge of sewage from Milwaukee 
another to say that the States may call upon federal courts to employ federal common 
law to establish more stringent standards applicable to out-of-state dischargers. 
[d. (emphasis the Court's). 
179. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, at 1499 (stating that the CW A deliberately preserves all existing remedies at com-
mon law); 451 U.S. at 343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
180. 
The subsection [505(e)] is common language accompanying citizen suit provisions and 
we think it means only that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies. 
It most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant 
formerly available federal common law actions but only that the particular section 
authorizing citizen suits does not do so. 
451 U.S. at 329. See also id. at 329 n.22. 
181. [d. at 329. See Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewerage System v. 
Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976). 
182. 451 U.S. at 330-32. "There is nothing unusual about Congress enacting a particular 
provision, and taking care that this enactment by itself not disturb other remedies, without 
considering whether the rest of the Act does so or what other remedies may be available." [d. 
at 329 n.22. 
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was covered by duly issued permits under the CW A. Similarly, since 
the CW A regulated all point source discharges, including sewer 
overflows, the Court assumed that Illinois' complaint had been ad-
dressed sufficiently. The establishment of some technical guidelines 
by the expert agency of the EPA indicated to the Court's satisfaction 
that the problem of sewer overflow had been adequately regulated. l83 
Moreover, the Court found that Illinois' interest in its waters was 
safeguarded under the CW A. The majority opinion determined that 
the CW A provided ample administrative opportunities for a state to 
protect its waters which may be adversely affected by a discharge 
from a neighbor state. l84 The Court declared it would be inconsistent 
with the regulatory scheme and the hearing procedures of the CW A 
to allow federal courts to "write their own ticket" in modifying pollu-
tion control standards for complainants who had not participated in 
the administration hearings. l85 The use of federal common law was 
considered to be particularly inappropriate in an area as complex as 
water pollution control. According to the Court, difficult technical 
issues and tough economic and social judgments made the area un-
suited for the ad hoc approach which would be engendered by the use 
of federal common law.186 In sum, the Court concluded that these 
factors demonstrated there was no statutory interstice or inade-
quacy to be filed by federal judicial relief. Thus, the Court implied a 
congressional intent to extinguish federal common law under the 
CWA.l87 
There were three dissenters from the decision in City of Milwaukee, 
all of whom joined in an opinion by Justice Blackmun. The dissent 
found that the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act 
left no doubt that Congress intended to preserve the federal common 
law of nuisance. While recognizing the detailed, comprehensive pro-
183. Id. at 318-23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1980), establishing hear-
ing procedures. See infra text and notes at notes 331-47 (discussing problems with CWA hear-
ing procedures). 
184. 451 U.S. at 324-27. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(3), (5), 1342(d)(2)(A) (The EPA may veto 
the proposed permit); id. § 1342(d)(4) (1978) (the EPA may issue a permit directly if a stale-
mate develops between an issuing and objecting state); id. § 1369(b). 
185. 451 U.S. at 326. The state enforcement action againt Milwaukee resulted in an order in 
1977 that the Milwaukee treatment plants meet the federal minimum standards in their per-
mits. It also ordered the completion of planning and construction to correct some sewer over-
flows but contained no deadline for the complete control of overflows. 599 F.2d 151, 157-59 
(7th Cir. 1979). See supra text and notes at notes 56-58 (discussing Illinois abatement efforts). 
186. 451 U.S. at 325. See Large & Michie, PrCYIJing That the Strength of the British Navy 
Depends on the Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof With 
Legal Proof, 11 ENVT'L LAW 555 (1981). 
187. 451 U.S. at 318-19,323,326. 
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visions of the CWA, the dissent noted "[t]he fact that legislators may 
characterize their efforts as more 'comprehensive' than prior legisla-
tion hardly prevents them from authorizing the continued existence 
of supplemental legal and equitable solutions .... "188 
The dissenters adopted what they regarded as a common sense 
reading of sections 511 and 510. The CWA regulatory system was 
not unitary, nor did it purport to enforce static uniformity. Accord-
ing to the dissent, section 510, which authorizes states to set more 
stringent standards, and section 511, which allows federal officers 
and agencies to adopt and enforce stricter controls, were further evi-
dence of the Act's nonuniformity.189 Moreover, both the statutory 
scheme and legal precedent revealed that compliance with a permit 
under the CW A would not insulate a discharger from liability under 
state or federal common law.190 
The dissent found the savings clause of section 505 to be a positive 
manifestation of Congress' intent to preserve federal common law as 
well as other existing remedies. Accordingly, the dissent viewed the 
savings clause as simply preventing all other existing forms of action 
from being subject to the procedural limitations of the enforcement 
actions of section 505.191 The language of section 505(e) referring to 
"other relief" under "any other statute or common law" suggested a 
broad recognition of other existing remedies outside the Act which 
was not dispelled by the legislative history of the CWA.192 
The dissent found the majority's reading of the savings clause to 
be a "strained" attempt at interpretation unsupported by any other 
judicial precedent. To suggest that section 505 did not supplant other 
existing remedies but that the remainder of the Act did so was re-
garded as an unwarranted conclusion in the context of the Act it-
self.193 The dissent noted that the majority's construction would 
188. [d. at 342 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
189. [d. at 341·42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
190. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 477, 482-83 (1931). Although 
§ 1342(k) confers assurances of protection to a permittee with respect to certain specified sec-
tions of the Act, requirements under other sections of the Act and separate legal actions re-
main unaffected. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976). 
191. 451 U.S. at 340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "To the best of my knowledge every federal 
court that has considered the issue has concluded that, in enacting section 505(e), Congress 
meant to preserve federal as well as state common law." E.g., California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 183 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); 
Illinois v. Outboard Motor Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Atlantic-Richfield Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1215, 1218-20 (D. Mont. 1979); United States ex reI. 
Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. III. 1973). 
192. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e); 451 U.S. at 342 & n.12. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
193. [d. at 342-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that Congress had 
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render "meaningless" the Act's other provisions for citizen suits and 
would require the preclusion of all pre-existing common law rem-
edies.194 
Bearing these divergent judicial interpretations in mind, the 
following section presents an overview of the provisions of the CW A. 
V. THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
This section will present the technical aspects of the CW A 195 be-
fore developing the problem areas of the Act. The structural con-
flicts within the Act will then be presented. These conflicts not only 
highlight the inability of the EPA to implement the CW A so as to be 
truly comprehensive, but also indicate that the imposition of abate-
ment standards by federal courts is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the Act. Next, the hearing and enforcement mechanisms will be dis-
cussed to demonstrate how some pollution problems are left unre-
solved under the CWA. Finally, these insights will be applied to the 
particular facts of Illinois' complaint and the problem of interstate 
pollution. 
A. Provisions and Problems 
The passage of the amendments to the FWPCA in 1972, five 
months after the Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 196 
was the culmination of a conscious effort to overhaul and improve 
previous federal water pollution legislation.197 The ambitious, far-
reaching goal of water purity in the CW A indicates a strong policy 
judgment by Congress to pursue environmental concerns general-
explicitly foreclosed the applicability of other laws in various sections of the CW A, e.g., 33 
U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1) (1976). 451 U.S. at 341 n.ll. 
194. [d. at 334-35 (discussing the Erie doctrine and the limited powers of federal courts, the 
dissent stated that the court has not "upset, nor has it since disturbed, a deeply rooted, more 
specialized federal common law that has arisen to effectuate federal interests embodied in the 
Constitution or an Act of Congress"). 
195. The primary legislation governing water pollution control has been the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970). The FWPCA was substantial-
ly modified by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500,86 Stat. 816. The FWPCA as amended in 1972 was amended further in 1977 and officially 
renamed the Clean Water Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 31 Stat. 1566. This article will refer 
to the FWPCA as amended from 1972 on as the Clean Water Act. 
196. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
197. "The [CWA] ... for all practical purposes replaces all federal water pollution control 
statutes." McThernia, supra note 34, at 202. "The impotency of . . . prior legislation is 
beyond question." [d. at 200. See generally Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 34; Note, Amendments. 
supra note 33. 
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ly.198 The stated ultimate objective of the Act is "to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the N a-
tion's waters."199 The Act also stated the national goal of eliminating 
discharges into the nation's waters and redefined pollution as any 
"man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and 
radiological integrity of water."200 These goals all manifest a pro-
found philosophical shift in the approach to water pollution control. 
Clean water was considered a necessary and worthwhile goal in it-
self.201 In the spirit of this policy orientation of the CW A, Congress 
declared that the discharge of any pollutant by any person is unlaw-
ful unless pursuant to a permit under the provisions of the Act.202 
To implement these objectives Congress authorized the EPA to 
promulgate the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES), a federal permit program to reduce the amount of pollu-
tants in each discharge into the nation's waters.203 The NPDES per-
mits predominantly apply to control point source discharges204 
whereas section 208 of the CW A provides a broad-based manage-
198. 118 CONGo REC. 33,692 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 161 
(remarks of Sen. Muskie); Fort, supra note 12, at 144-45. 
199. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976). In addition, Congress declared the short term national goal 
to "eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United States by 1985." Id. 
§ 1251(dXl); H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1972). The Act sets out other interim 
goals such as the achievement of water quality sufficient for the protection and propagation of 
wildlife by 1981. Id. § 1251(a); H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1972), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 758. 
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1362. 
201. Gould, Regulation of Point Source Pollution Under the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act. in WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION 87 (B. Lamb ed. 1980). Congress expressly stated 
that it would be unacceptable to use waterways for the disposal of waste, as the FWPCA had 
allowed on occasion. Under the FWPCA, for example, a waterway could be designated as a 
refuse dump for some limited purposes. Zener, supra note 9, at 685; Goldfarb, Better than 
Be.~t: A Crosscurrent in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. in 
WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION 118 (B. Lamb ed. 1980). 
202. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. III 1979), construed in Costle V. Pacific Legal Foundation, 
445 U.S. 198, 202 (1980). See U.S.C. § 1251(aX1)-(5). Congress left the implementation of the 
policy goals of the CWA to the EPA as an expert regulatory agency. Id. § 1311, construed in 
EPA V. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64. 70-71 (1980); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 (1977). 
203. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The EPA is authorized to set up the NPDES program. It may author-
ize a state to issue permits under its own administratively approved program to dischargers 
within the state, but in all cases the promulgated federal standards must be met. Id. § 1370. 
See id. § 1342, construed in EPA V. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200-05 
(1976). No "person" may discharge without complying with a permit. "Person" is defined 
broadly as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, state, municipality, commis-
sion. or political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). 
204. The term "point sources" generally refers to distinct or separate sources of discharge 
of pollutants, including pipes or ditches and other conduits. See infra note 217. 
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ment scheme for other sources of pollution such as agricultural 
waste runoff.205 
Historically, Congress has sought to establish standards for various 
areas of pollution, beginning with the use of nuisance standards.206 
The first legislative standards were water quality standards in the 
FWPCA.207 These standards were set by reference to the gross level 
of pollutants that a receiving body of water could hold without be-
coming polluted in a manner which would impair its use.208 Without 
regard to the cumbersome enforcement mechansims of the FWPCA 
under which Illinois attempted to operate, the liabilities of the old 
water quality standards scheme were apparent by 1972.209 In most 
instances water quality standards were unenforceable because they 
often did not relate to the actual conditions of a particular waterway. 
In addition, it was nearly impossible to determine the impact of a 
single polluter on overall water quality.210 Thus, sanctions imposed 
on any individual discharger were difficult to justify. 
In addition, the decentralized water quality standards scheme in 
the FWPCA relied primarily upon the states to regulate pollution 
problems. The lack of nationally uniform water quality standards, 
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1288. See infra note 217. 
206. Historically, the primary vehicle for controlling water pollution was the common law of 
nuisance. McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 11 U. PA. L. REV. 
27, 37 (1968). The case-by-case approach of nuisance litigation was inadequate to deal with 
complex pollution problems of industrialized society. Zener, supra note 9, at 789; Comment, 
Equity and the Ecosystem, supra note 9, at 1254-55. Nuisance litigation by nature provided an 
ad hoc methodology for controlling the effects of pollution. Regulatory schemes sought to 
diminish this role. F. GRAD, supra note 9, at § 3.03. 
207. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1257 (1965) Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (repealed 1972). 
Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 116. The concept is essentially similar to the ambient air quality 
standards embodied in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1979). 
208. The desired use of a waterway was designated as the predominant function which the 
waterway served, such as swimming, industrial dilution, or the disposal of municipal wastes. 
Thus, the implicit legal definition was "any condition which interferes with desired use of a 
water body." L. ZWICK & M. BERNSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 285 (1971). This conceptual 
scheme, in which a waterway was not considered polluted until it became unuseable for an in-
tended purpose, produced some bizarre results. If a municipality felt a river was tolerably 
clean to allow navigation the river would not be legally polluted until the water began to smell 
foul or corroded the hulls of boats. A most extreme example is that of the Cuyahoga River in 
Ohio, the designated use of which was the disposal of waste. Only after the river caught fire 
was it considered to be legally polluted under the FWPCA. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 116. 
The Total Maximum Daily Load number (TMDL) represented the legal limit of identified 
pollutants which could be allowed for each corresponding designated use classification. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1160(C)(1) (repealed 1972). 
209. EPA v. State Water Resource Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976); Ipsen & 
Raisch, supra note 34, at 674-77; Gould, supra note 201, at 87; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 
116-17. See 599 F.2d 151, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1979). 
210. Gould, supra note 201, at 86; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 117. 
1984] FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE 337 
the tendency for states not to actively regulate their own discharges, 
and the resulting interstate competition for industry at the expense 
of pollution controls contributed to the continual downgrading of 
water quality standards.2ll For all these reasons, under the FWCPA 
water quality standards alone were conceptually unsound to deal 
with the diverse, mobile problems of modern pollution.212 
In an effort to rectify these problems the NPDES system of the 
Clean Water Act (CW A) provides for technology based pollution 
standards designed to apply to individual discharges.213 By controll-
ing the amount of pollutants in each discharge Congress hoped to 
manage the overall level of pollution in a receiving waterway. Since 
technology based effluent limitations do not depend directly on the 
particular conditions of a given waterway, they may be applied uni-
formly to all discharges on a national basis.214 An effluent limitation 
restricts the amount of an identified pollutant which may be dis-
charged from any point source.215 Technology based effluent limita-
211. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 34, at 373-75; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 504 & 
n.22. Pursuant to the FWPCA, states were responsible for developing water quality standards 
applicable to their waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(1)(3) (repealed 1972). States were free to estab-
lish enforcement procedures for interstate waters. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 
(1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1420; Stewart, Pyramids ofSac-
rifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmen-
tal Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1227 (1977). Each state was to adopt some form of classifica-
tion for its waters under the FWPCA but most states never did so. Goldfarb, supra note 201, 
at 118; D. ZWICK & M. BERNSTOCK, supra note 208, at 287-89. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(14), 
1342(1) (excluding irrigation agricultural water runoff). Many non-point source problems are 
dealt with generally under section 208 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1288. See Blumm, supra note 
214, at 148; Gould, supra note 201, at 84-86; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 504. See 
NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir., 1975); 117 CONGo REC. 39,678 (1971), reprinted in 2 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1405 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
212. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3674, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1425; Stewart, 
supra note 211, at 1226-28; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 504-05; Note, Amendments, 
supra note 33, at 674-76. 
213. 33 U.S.C. § 1311; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
214. Biumm, Implementing the Clean Water Act: Progress, Problems and Possibilities, in 
WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION 147, 149 (B. Lamb ed. 1980). See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(6)(1)(C) 
(Supp. III 1979); Gould, supra note 201, at 88. 
215. The term "source" or "point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined, and dis-
crete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) 
(Supp. IV 1980). The term "effluent limitation" is defined as any restriction established on 
"quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources .... " Id. § 1362(11). "Discharge of a pollutant" is 
defined as any addition of any pollutants to navigable waters from any point source. Id. 
§ 1362(12). "Navigable waters" is a term of art referring to the "waters of the United States 
including territorial seas." Id. § 1361(7). All point source discharges are subject to permits 
under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, in which is contained applicable effluent limitations, 33 
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tions in the NPDES program are the basic device adopted by the 
CW A to control water pollution problems.216 
Another fundamental modification of the FWPCA was the pre-
dominant role given to the federal government in the CW A. The de-
velopment of a stronger federal presence in water pollution control 
largely was in response to the inadequacy of a state-by-state ap-
proach. Under the decentralized scheme of the FWPCA many states 
were slow to accept responsibility to actively regulate water pollu-
tion.217 The CW A was designed to spur states into action, and to al-
low the federal government to intervene and assume responsibility 
where states lag.218 Congress hoped that since the CWA treats 
water pollution as a national problem and provides uniform national 
standards, industry could no longer threaten to relocate to another 
state to take advantage oflenient standards.219 Consequently, while 
the Act provides a degree of local responsibility and control,220 
ultimately the CW A engages the regulatory power of the federal 
government to correct water pollution problems. 
The CW A authorizes the administrator of the EPA to promulgate 
and implement increasingly strict performance standards on a na-
U.S.C. § 1362(11). An effluent limitation can be expressed in various ways, such as maximum 
allowable concentrations (parts per million); maximum rates of discharge (pounds per day); or 
maximum discharge per unit of production (pounds per ton made). C. MORTIMER, supra note 
26, at 21-24. 
216. 
There can be no doubt that the most effective control mechanism for point source of 
discharge is one which will provide for the establishment of conditions of effluent con-
trol for each source of discharge. A permit or equivalent program . . . should pro-
vide for the most expeditious water pollution elimination program. 
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971). "Water quality will be a measure of program 
effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement." [d. at 8. 
217. By definition, the CWA excludes such control for other sources of pollution which are 
not categorized as a point source. For example, storm water runoff, construction and 
agricultural spillovers are excluded from the effluent limitation treatment of permits. 
218. For example, in order to issue discharge permits under the CW A, a state must have its 
overall water program approved by/the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Where a state program has 
not been approved ,the EPA issues permits directly, id. § 1342. In cases of emergency the EPA 
can intervene to regulate the hazard as it sees fit, id. § 1364. 
219. [d. §§ 1251, 1311, construed in E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 
(1977). See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 117 CONGo REC. 
39,678 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1405 (remarks of Sen. 
Muskie); S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3674, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, 1425-27; McTher-
nia, supra note 34, at 200-01. Regulation under the FWPCA was aimed principally at intra-
state pollution which endangered health or welfare, and even then was available only after a 
six-month wait and administrative conferences. See 33 U.S.C. § 1160(f)(1) (repealed 1972); 
Stewart, supra note 211, at 1227. 
220. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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tional basis to control point source discharges.221 Section 301 of the 
Act develops a two-stage promulgation and compliance program for 
control standards. 222 These standards constitute the minimum re-
quired level of pollution contro1.223 The federal standards are incor-
porated into the NPDES permits. NPDES permits are issued by the 
EP A, or the EPA may delegate its issuing authority to state agen-
cies after approving a state's entire water pollution control program. 
In such instance, state issued permit conditions become in effect the 
federal minimum standards for that state.224 Under section 510 of 
the Act, a state may require its dischargers to meet more stringent 
conditions deemed necessary to properly control site-specific prob-
lems.225 Under the CWA the EPA also may continue to set effluent 
221. 33 U.S.C. § 1311, construed in EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 69-70 
(1980); E.!. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 (1977). Cf Stream Pollution 
Control Bd. of Indiana v. U.S. Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1975) (Congress in-
tended a step-by-step improvement in the quality of effluent discharges). 
222. The CW A sets forth a two-stage plan for the control of pollutants in discharges. First, 
federal minimum standards must attain the "best practicable control technology currently 
available" (BPT) by 1977. The second phase, to be completed by 1987, requires that the stand-
ards apply the "best technology available" (BAT). The BAT phase, unlike the BPT phase, pro-
vides for no weighing of economic hardships in the promulgation of standards. Nonetheless, 
publicly owned treatment works - the type of pollution source at issue in City of Milwaukee -
are treated as a separate category of point sources but follow a parallel timetable which allows 
for cost considerations and revisions. Publicly owned treatment works (POTW) need only 
adopt "secondary treatment" by 1977 and the "best practicable waste technology over the life 
of the works" by 1983. 33 U.S.C. ~ 1311(b)(I)(A). 
Secondary treatment basically involves a biological decomposition process. it uses the 
bacteria already in wastewater to decompose organic matter with or without the use of 
chemical disinfectants. EPA (1974) PGM No. 8650-1 TOWARD CLEANER WATER. The EPA has 
promulgated particular regulations which define the degree of pollution reduction resulting 
from secondary treatment for three conventional pollutants only: biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD5), suspended solids, and phosphates (pH). 40 C.F.R. 133.102 (1980). Primary treatment 
involves screening and sedimentation to remove suspended organic and inorganic solids. As a 
practical matter, the EPA has defined the second, more stringent phase of treatment not as 
primary treatment, but as the best practicable treatment (BPT). Thus, the BPT phase one 
treatment standard is tantamount to secondary treatment. Blumm, supra note 214, at 152; 
CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 78-90. 
223. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1316 S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1976) reprinted 
in 1 LF:GISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 309; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692,711 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e)(3)(A) requires all states to meet 
the minimum federal effluent standards promulgated by the EPA. 
224. The state must submit a detailed program to be reviewed and approved by the EPA. 
[d. § 1342(b); 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.1-.62 (1979). Rather than require joint state-EPA coordination 
for every permit (33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)), the EPA can delegate issuing authority wholesale to a 
state yet retain the ability to object to individual state permits if it is inconsistent with EPA 
guidelines under the Act. [d. § 1342(d), construed in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 
U.S. 193, 193-94 (1980); E.I. duPont deN em ours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 119-20 & n.7 
(1977). Once a state program is approved, the federal permit program is in effect suspended 
but the EPA retains veto power over permits. [d. § 1342(d). 
225. [d. § 1370. See District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854,859 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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limitations more stringent than the federal minimum standards for 
certain water regions. For example, the EPA may set more strin-
gent standards to protect water quality for public water supplies, 
wildlife and agricultural uses, or recreational needs.226 
The overall approach to setting more stringent standards is con-
sistent with the general balance between clean water imperatives 
and economic considerations implicit throughout the CW A. It should 
be noted, however, that the Act does not purport to reach its goals 
by applying cost-benefit-alternative analysis.227 Economic and politi-
cal constraints are not established as key factors in setting pollution 
control standards. Instead, a gradual compliance timetable is ex-
pressly provided for which sets the period within which a polluter 
must comply with permit standards.228 The CW A links the establish-
ment of effluent limitations with the ability to obtain pollution con-
trol technology, thus assuring that compliance with federal minimum 
standards is technologically feasible. 229 While the Act allows for rec-
ognition of economic burdens in some specific situations and pro-
vides funding to aid others,230 it is available technology which serves 
as the basic determinant for setting effluent limitations.231 By apply-
226. Under section 301,33 U.S.C. § 1311, a discharger must comply with the conditions of a 
permit and also must meet any other limitations required under the CW A. When the EPA pro-
mulgates newer standards, these become required under the Act. The EPA may promulgate 
newer more stringent standards pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1313 (water quality 
standards); § 1316 (new source discharge standards); § 1317 (toxic discharges and pretreat-
ment standards); § 1328 (aqua-culture permits); § 1345 (disposal of sewage sludge). In setting 
certain higher standards the EPA must also hold extensive public hearings, id. § 1312(bX1), 
and judicial review of the EPA's decision must be available, id. § 1369(b). 
227. Gould, supra note 201 at 88,97-98. See CPC Internat'l Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (9th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1976); Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 509. Congress 
provided for a gradual compliance timetable which sets a period within which a polluter must 
take remedial actions to comply with the effluent standards set in the applicable permit. For 
publicly owned treatment works EPA-adopted regulations provide only that age and process 
of equipment and facilities may be considered in certain instances, most notably in the case of 
municipal sewer works. Engineering aspects of wastewater treatment, costs of new regula-
tions, and impact on other environmental media may be considered when evaluating the need 
for more stringent standards by the agency. E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(aX2), 1314(bX1XB), 
(bX2XB). See Comment, National Crushed Stone: EPA Not Required to Grant "Economic 
Hardship" Variances from 1977 Effluent Limitations, 10 ENVT'L L. REP. 10215 (1980). 
228. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(17). 
229. [d. § 1311. 
230. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4424, 4460; Gould, supra note 201, at 100. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1316(bX1XB) (in establishing or revising Federal standards of performance for new sources 
the Administrator may consider the cost of achieving such standards and other environmental 
impact or energy requirements); id. §§ 1281-1297 (authorizing grant funding program for 
municipal wastewater treatment facilities). 
231. [d. § 1311. Congress chose to link the effluent standards to the ability of polluters to 
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ing evermore stringent limitations as new processes for the treat-
ment of wastes are developed and available, the Act seeks to obtain 
its several interim goals of improved water quality and the eventual 
elimination of water pollution. 232 
The CW A has been criticized for having proclaimed ambitious 
goals without a realistic assessment of the obstacles to achieving 
clean water on a national basis. 233 Significantly, in the course of fur-
ther amendments to the CWA in 1976, Congress authorized the 
EP A to modify the dates by which point source effluent limitations 
must be met.234 This extension of the deadline reveals that despite 
the firm intentions of the Act, economic factors and compliance 
problems have forced the EPA to modify its water standards in a 
manner which continues to downgrade water quality over time. 235 
Although cost-benefit-analysis is not normally a decision factor in 
the establishment of pollution standards, the economic problems and 
local inertia which plagued the FWPCA continue as obstacles to the 
progress of pollution control under the CWA.236 Any such postpone-
ment would be at the direct expense of achieving the objectives set 
forth in the CW A. 
The following sections will explore some of the structural incon-
sistencies and unregulated problems in the provisions and implemen-
tation of the CWA which further threaten the attainment of clean 
water by a state downstream from a pollution source. 
obtain pollution control technology. Zener, supra note 9, at 220-25; Gould, supra note 201, at 
88. 
232. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(F), construed in EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 
449 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1980). 
233. B1umm, supra note 214, at 164. 
234. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, Section 45, 91 Stat. 1584,33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(g), (h), (i) (Supp. II 1977); Pub. L. No. 95-217, Section 73, 91 Stat. 1609 (1977). The 
1977 amendments created an entirely new standard for effluent limitations, Best Conven-
tional Technology. Conventional pollutants such as BOD's, suspended solids, pH, and fecal col-
iform as identified by the EPA are susceptible to more lenient treatment. The EPA is directed 
to compare the costs of attaining a reduction in pollution with the reduction of benefits derived 
from continued discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1978). The deadline for compliance with 
BCT is generally July 1, 1984, rather than 1983, although case-by-case review may extend the 
deadline even longer. Gould, supra note 201, at 97-101. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1976) as 
amended, Pub. L. No. 95-217, Section 45, 91 Stat. 1584,33 U.S.C. § 1311, (h), (i) (Supp. II 
1977). But see S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4372 (complete compliance must be achieved at the earliest date "prac-
tically possible," but in no instance later than 1983). 
235. B1umm, supra note 214, at 155-57; Quarles, Impact of the 1977 Clean Water Act 
Amendments on Industrial Dischargers, (BNA) ENVT'L REP. (Monograph) 25 (1978). 
236. Quarles, supra note 235, at 27-30; CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 114-20. 
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1. The Better-Than-Best Problem 
Technology based effluent limitations in the NPDES program ap-
ply to point source discharges regardless of the conditions of the re-
ceiving waterway. Conceptually, these effluent limitations focus on 
just one aspect of the entire pollution chain-the discrete dis-
charge-rather than encompassing a larger view including non-point 
source runoff and the existing condition of a waterbody.237 Technolo-
gy based limitations are useful because they can provide a uniform 
national standard. But because they cannot account for all sources of 
pollution, the CW A provides that federal minimum standards shall 
not be the exclusive avenue to be followed in the control of pollution. 
Congress retained the water quality-type standards of the FWPCA 
as a necessary second line of defense.238 Congress recognized that 
water quality might deteriorate below desired levels even though all 
applicable point source effluent limitations were being enforced.239 
The CW A provides that standards more stringent than the federal 
minimum may be set by both federal and state authorities to address 
certain situations.24o Consequently, the literal uniformity imposed by 
the CW A refers only to the minimum federal standards promulgated 
by the EPA and does not limit the obligations of a discharger merely 
to compliance with minimum technology based standards.241 
Section 301 of the CW A, which outlines the obligations of a dis-
charger under a permit, underscores the notion that compliance with 
237. Blumm, supra note 214, at 154-55; Gould, supra note 201, at 88; Post, supra note 13, 
at 120 n.2. 
238. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1313. See Blumm, supra note 214, at 154-55. The original draft of 
the Senate version under the supervision of Senator Muskie sought to substitute technology 
based standards for the supposedly discredited water quality standards approach. The House 
wanted to retain a water quality standards approach and distrusted the exclusive use of 
technology based limitations. As a compromise both chambers agreed to retain water quality 
standards as a back-up to technology based limitations. [d. 
239. Gould, supra note 201, at 96; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 121. This is usually due to 
the large numbers of discharges into one waterway. As water quality standards made it diffi-
cult to control the many point sources which empty into a waterway, so effluent limitations on 
each point source may fail to maintain the quality status of the overall waterway. 
240. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 authorizes a state agency approved by the EPA to promulgate 
its own site-specific standards for individual discharges so long as they are at least as stringent 
as the federal minimum. The EPA may set stricter discharge conditions on an individual basis 
for toxic or unconventional pollutants, id. §§ 1312, 1313. Section 511 of the CWA generally 
emphasizes that the provisions of the CW A shall not restrict the authority of any "officer or 
agency of the United States" to take action to abate water pollution under any other law or 
regulation not inconsistent with the Act. [d. § 1371. 
241. Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(aX1) provides that an NPDES permit must require com-
pliance with all the effluent limitations in section 301, id. § 1311. Section 301 in turn requires 
compliance with water quality standards or other more stringent standards promulgated 
under the Act. [d. § 1311(bXl)(O). 
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federal minimum standards does not suffice to satisfy all require-
ments of the statute. Pursuant to section 301 a discharger must com-
ply with not only federal minimum conditions but also with any other 
more stringent limitations contained in the NPDES permit, whether 
promulgated by the state agency or the EPA directly.242 More im-
portantly, compliance with a permit does not insulate the discharger 
from other liability if damages should occur or an action at common 
law were to be commenced.243 The Act contemplates a discharger 
will be subject to different standards from various sources of author-
ity, all with a view towards improving pollution control. The uniform 
national effluent limitations set forth in section 301 of the CW A 
establish only the uniform rate at which the nation will move toward 
the goal of clean water. In essence, the uniformity provided in the 
CW A is a uniform floor of control, not a uniform ceiling of control. 244 
It can be seen that the imposition of varying standards is inherent 
in the structure of the CWA whereas uniformity per se is not. The 
promulgation of different standards, however, each designed to sat-
isfy a different goal or implement a certain policy of the Act, may 
work to cross purposes. Rather than extending the provisions of the 
CW A to cover all pollution needs, the structural conflict of the stat-
ute may actually prevent proper attention to some pollution prob-
lems. Further, it may cause confusion and be unfair to complying dis-
chargers.246 This can be seen most clearly in the conflict between 
water quality standards and minimum technology based effluent lim-
itations. 
For example, the water quality standards retained in section 302246 
are designed to implement the interim goal to achieve water quality 
242. Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(bX1XC), assumes that permitted discharges will meet mini-
mum effluent limitations and requires that a discharger under an NPDES permit meet "any 
more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards. . . ." 
243. [d. § 1311(b), construed in EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control 
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1976). Despite the provision of section 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k), 
that compliance with an NPDES permit will be deemed compliance with most sections of the 
CW A, it does not suffice to ensure that a discharger has met all requirements under the CWA, 
nor does it insulate the discharger from other liability. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). For example, compliance with a permit under the CWA would not be a defense to 
an action at common law. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in [19721 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3746-47, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
1, at 1499. See generally Stream Pollution Control Bd. of Indiana v. U.S. Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 
1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1975). 
244. Gould, supra note 201, at 106,120. See NRDC V. Castle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); Note, Amendments, supra note 33, at 717-19. 
245. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 115. 
246. 33 U.S.C. § 1312. Note that the goals to be protected are identical to those of section 
101 of the CWA, id. § 1251(aX3) (fishable/swimmable waters). 
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capable of supporting and protecting wildlife and recreation in and 
on the water. In the event that technology based effluent limitations 
applied to point sources will not result in sufficient water quality, the 
second line of defense, water quality based limitations, must be im-
plemented. Regardless of the criteria used to establish uniform fed-
eral technology based limitations, water quality based limitations 
will impose more stringent limitations upon point source dis-
charges.247 
The conflict between standards is most acute regarding section 
303.248 Section 303 requires that new water quality based limitations 
be promulgated to achieve water quality standards which cannot 
otherwise be met by the application of technology based limitations 
used in phase one BPT or secondary treatment.249 Section 303 con-
tinues pre-1972 water quality standard procedures and presumes 
that these standards shall continue beyond phase one BPT to 
upgrade phase two BAT as necessary. 250 Pursuant to section 303 
each state is required to establish and periodically revise water quali-
ty standards for its waterways.251 Unlike section 302, section 303 
247. The establishment of water quality based effluent limitations pursuant to section 302 is 
above and beyond the federal minimum effluent limitations in section 301. Section 302(a), id. 
§ 1312(a) authorizes the Administrator to establish revised effluent limitations or alternative 
control strategies to achieve necessary water quality standards which would otherwise not be 
met by the application of phase one BPT effluent limitations. The Administrator is required to 
hold a public hearing to determine that the extra social and economic costs of compliance do 
not outweigh the need for stringent standards. Id. § 1312(bX1), (2). The CWA is quite vague as 
to the criteria by which water quality standards are to be judged. Water quality standards are 
to be sufficient to "protect human health and welfare, enhance water quality, and serve the 
purposes of the Act." Id. § 1313(cX2). 
248. Id. § 1313. Problems of conflict attributable to § 302 should be limited since its water 
quality standards will terminate with the achievement of the interim goal of fishable/swimma-
ble waters by 1983 as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2). Also, § 302 provides for ameliorative 
weighing which eases its impact; § 303 has no such limits. 
249. See id. § 1311, which sets forth a two-step plan of increasingly stringent effluent limita-
tions to control the discharge of pollutants into water. See supra note 222. 
250. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(eX3), (f); R. Zener, supra note 9, at 719; Gould, supra note 201, at 
106; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 115, 122-23. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(dX1XA) provides that each 
state shall identify those waters within its borders for which the effluent limitations required 
by section 301(bX1XA) are not sufficient to attain water quality standards. The state must then 
establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for identified pollutants at a level sufficient to 
achieve water quality standards with a "margin of safety" to account for seasonal variations 
and lack of knowledge concerning the interrelationship of effluent limitations and water quali-
ty standards. Id. § 1313(dX1XC). The TMDL numbers for pollutants is dispersed by waste 
allocation among discharge point sources by incorporating the figures into individual 
discharge permits as effluent limitations under section 301(bX1XC). R. Zener, supra-note 9, at 
719. 
251. See supra text and notes at notes 207-12. States must review all water quality stand-
ards every three years. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(cX1). The states then submit proposed standards to 
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does not allow for the relevance of social or economic factors when 
setting water quality based limitations.252 Plainly, this exacerbates 
possible conflicts and burdens of compliance. Where severely pol-
luted waterways are concerned, water quality based limitation will 
require much greater expense and development by a discharger than 
federal minimum technology based limitations would otherwise re-
quire.253 One commentator has aptly dubbed this conflict the "Better 
than Best" problem.254 
The EPA's approach to the better-than-best problem essentially 
has been one of delay.255 The agency's reluctance to implement a 
strong water quality standards program is an operational aspect 
which undermines the CWA's ability to address problems such as 
those raised by Illinois.256 The fundamental fear expressed by states 
and the EPA is that enforcement of the water quality standards as 
written would result in plant closures and a major disruption of the 
planning processes and consistency within the Act.257 Since the ex-
the EPA which can then specify changes. If a state refuses to alter its standards, EPA can pro-
mulgate revised or new water quality standards. [d. § 1313(c)(3), (4). As a general matter, the 
EPA can promulgate new water quality standards whenever necessary to meet the re-
quirements of the Act. [d. § 1313(c)(4)(B). 
252. [d. § 1313, construed in NRDC v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 2127, 2128 (D.D.C. 1975); 
Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 122. 
253. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 123. In most cases it is expected that application of phase 
one BPT limitations will not result in water quality which satisfies the fishable/swimmable 
goals of section 302. Phase two BAT limitations should satisfy most water quality standard re-
quirements, however. Gould, supra note 201, at 106-07. The continual extension of phase one 
BPT casts some doubt on whether the advent of phase two BAT will be enough to reconcile the 
competing demands of minimum effluent limitations and more stringent water quality stand-
ards. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 120. In any event, most observers feel that for heavily 
polluted waterways universal application of phase two BAT limitations will not result in ac-
ceptable water quality standards under the Act. [d. at 120, 122; Kakoullis, supra note 4, at 
549,550. 
254. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 115. This tag refers to the fact that water quality stand-
ards as set forth in the CW A require better water quality than the minimum effluent limita-
tions of the Act will attain in each of the BPT and BAT phases. 
255. The EPA has faltered in its attempts to codify necessary criteria for water quality 
standards. Biumm, supra note 214, at 155. See Note, EPA's Ten Years of Rulemaking for 
Water Quality Standards Nears Completion, 15 NAT. RES. L.J. 511 (1983). 
The consent decree in NRDC v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 2127, 2128 (D.D.C. 1975), obligated the 
EPA to "establish a specified and substantial program with the objective and capability of 
determining whether more stringent limitations, guidelines, and standards are necessary" to 
meet section 302 water quality requirements for toxic pollutants. The EPA did not meet the 
consent decree's 1977 deadline. 
256. See infra text and notes at notes 331-47. 
257. See Blumm, supra note 214, at 155; Gould, supra note 201, at 107; Goldfarb, supra 
note 201, at 124. For example, in New Jersey it has been estimated that nearly 80% of the 
state's waterways will not meet water quality requirements even if all polluters comply with 
technology based effluent limitations. Preliminary studies indicate that a substantial portion 
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tra costs of compliance with water quality based limitations would be 
borne by the economy of the state itself, state program incentives 
run counter to the imposition of stricter standards on discharges. 
The result has been that most states merely comply with federal min-
imum technology based effluent limitations and nothing more.258 
The EPA has guidelines for downgrading water quality stand-
ards.259 To avoid the consequences of the better-than-best problem 
the EPA allows a state to obviate the need to adopt water quality 
based limitations by reclassifying its waterways. Where the condi-
tion of a waterway precludes the satisfaction of water quality stand-
ards even if all point source discharges complied with technology 
based limitations, the waterway may be classified as "water quality 
limited."260 This enables the state merely to continue compliance 
with federal minimum technology based effluent limitations. In prac-
tice, the EPA has chosen to grant three-year exemption periods 
from water quality standards altogether where it can be shown that 
man-made pollution or technical inadequacies prevent the necessary 
improvement of water quality.261 The original deadline for the pro-
mulgation and achievement of water quality standards passed with-
out being met by most industrialized urban areas. 262 Eventual com-
of the pollution load is from background, untraced point sources and non-point sources. The 
conclusion is that formulaic application of § 303 would result in plant closures in a state 
already suffering 12% unemployment. Also, if industrial areas such as New Jersey were 
forced to adopt more stringent standards, state location shopping by industry is expected. 
Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 124. 
258. Stewart, Regulation and Innovation, 5 U. CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1298 (1981); Stewart, 
supra note 211, at 1210-221; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 120; Note, Public Participation in 
State NPDES Enforcement, 6 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 185, 205-07 (1980); EPA GUIDELINES FOR 
DEVELOPING OR REVISING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS at 4 (1973). 
259. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 130.17 (1980). 
260. Id. See Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 124. This classification scheme is basically a post-
ponement device. Waters for which the minimum effluent limitations of the CW A will meet 
water quality standards are classified as "effluent limited" which disposes of the need to adopt 
water quality standards. As a result, for both classes of waters the federal minimum in effect 
becomes the only level of pollution control required. Id. at 124, (BNA) [(1974-75)] ENVT'L REP 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS; 40 C.F.R. § 35.155 (1974); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,040 (May 23, 1979) 
(allowing classification to a lower use). 
261. EPA GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING OR REVISING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS at 4 
(1973). The EPA has granted special exemptions for area-wide waterways of heavy pollution. 
Most recently the EPA considered the wholesale revision of water quality standards to reflect 
cost factors of compliance not provided for in section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. (BNA) [1975-76] 
ENVT'L REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS at 1178. 
262. Section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313, does not provide for delays from cost-effectiveness 
weighing. See supra text and notes at notes 247-49. There is no provision in the CWA for per-
mitting a discharger to violate water quality standards adopted under section 303 of the Act. 
Only recently has the EPA attempted to skirt this issue by allowing a state to reclassify its 
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pliance with section 303 water quality standards is expected to en-
counter nearly insurmountable obstacles of funding, scheduling, 
technical uncertainty, and state inertia.263 The EPA has wrestled 
with this dilemma without any resolution. 
The administrative and economic concerns of the states and the 
EPA are certainly not unfounded. Further, they imply that it would 
somehow be unfair to a permit-approved discharger if the minimum 
compliance requirements were to become constantly more stringent 
to account for factors nominally outside the purview of a technology 
based standards approach. 264 Nevertheless, Congress has changed 
neither the structure nor the goals of the CW A. It is clear that the 
Act requires that a discharger be subject to some conflicting sources 
of pollution reduction standards in order to attain pollution abate-
ment goals. Section 301 plainly contemplates that compliance with 
an NPDES permit does not insulate a discharger from the obligation 
to meet more stringent requirements, including those resulting from 
common law actions. 265 
Examination of the better-than-best problem reveals a more trou-
bling flip-side to the problem. If the actual pressures of compliance 
under the CWA result merely in the achievement of NPDES mini-
mum standards, how can one state protect its more stringent stand-
ards? The full implication of the better-than-best problem is that it 
results in the "leveling" of water quality, effectively downgrading 
water quality to minimum standards. This is the tide against which a 
state must push in order to protect its standards from degradation 
by neighboring states complying with minimum standards. Further-
more, although the NPDES minimum standards are virtually the 
waters to a lower level of use, thereby downgrading the applicable water quality standards. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 35.155 (1980) (44 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (May 23, 1979)). 
263. It is estimated that in many industrialized states it may be years before waste load 
allocations (TMDL) - the data necessary to establish more stringent standards - for water 
quality may even be developed, let alone enforced. In 1977 Congress extended the deadline for 
compliance with phase one from 1977 to 1984 on a case-by-case basis. Publicly owned treat-
ment works must meet secondary treatment standards by 1983 instead of the original 1977 
deadline. These extensions have forestalled the applicability of a strict water quality program, 
since it has become difficult to ascertain at what point phase one can be said to have failed 
definitively to meet water quality standards. More directly, the EPA has not actively devel-
oped the criteria to judge water quality standards. Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 123-25; Gould, 
supra note 201, at 99-101,116. 
264. See, e.g., GAO, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: MA~Y 
WATER QUALITY STANDARD VIOLATIONS MAY NOT BE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO JeSTIFY COSTLY 
PREVENTIVE ACTIONS, CED-80-86 (July 2, 1980); Biumm, supra note 214, at 147, 155. 
265. See supra text and notes at notes 190, 243; NRDC v. Castle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
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only standards to be met, these standards are not designed to be all-
inclusive. They do not apply to all pollutants, nor to all pollution situ-
ations. 266 Why should a demonstrable nuisance condition on a water-
way go unabated when the discharges which brought about that 
nuisance were in compliance with such NPDES minimum standards? 
These are the fundamental issues raised by the better-than-best 
problem - the conflict between the need for uniformity and certain-
ty, and the need to address a wide variety of pollution problems 
which are not amenable to a standard level of treatment. The follow-
ing section examines the manner in which the provisions of the CW A 
hinder the treatment of a serious, but non-standard pollution prob-
lem: municipal sewer overflows. 
2. Title II Funding and Sewer Overflows 
This section will review the status of projects designed to control 
municipal sewer treatment discharges and sewer overflows. The dis-
cussion will serve as a concrete example of the manner in which the 
provisions of the CW A serve to restrict treatment standards more 
stringent than the federal minimum and actually leave some areas of 
water pollution unaddressed. Title II of the CW A authorizes a 
massive construction grants program for municipal sewage treat-
ment facilities. 267 Congress displayed special concern for the lack of 
municipal resources to meet sewage disposal needs and hoped to 
avoid municipal compliance delays by making funding available.268 
Generally, the funding provisions of the CW A exert powerful gravi-
tational pressures upon the states so that municipal sewage plants 
266. See supra text and note at note 216. 
267. In Title II, Grants for Construction of Treatment Works, Congress declared the na-
tional goal to make funding available for the planning and construction of municipal sewage 
treatment facilities. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4). Congress gave special consideration to the great 
amount of resources that would be required to properly address municipal pollution needs. S. 
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
36,089, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 165 (Sen. Muskie), 2 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1379 (Sen. Magnuson). Funds are not available for the 
operation of treatment facilities, only to defray construction costs. This suggests immediate 
constraints on the usefulness of the program. B1umm, supra note 214, at 154-56. See 451 U.S. 
304, 322 n.15 (1981). 
268. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 
1458-59; 599 F.2d 151, 176 (7th Cir. 1979); B1umm, supra note 214, at 156. Note that compli-
ance does not depend upon the receiving of funds by a discharger. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1292,1297. 
The CW A provides that federal grant funds shall be used to fund "the most cost efficient alter-
native to comply with sections 301 .... " [d. § 1292(2)(C). The EPA has defined "cost effi-
cient alternative" as that treatment which will meet section 301 minimum requirements with 
the least resource cost over time. 40 C.F.R. Part 35 1 E App. A (1979), 43 Fed. Reg. 44,807 
(Sept. 27, 1978). 
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are usually designed only to meet the federai minimum requirement 
of secondary treatment.269 Sewer overflows of the sort involved in 
City of Milwaukee rarely receive funding and hence remain largely 
uncorrected.270 
Conventional solutions to sewage treatment and sewer overflows 
are very expensive. Municipal collection and treatment facilities are 
usually huge, centralized, capital-intensive structures requiring de-
tailed long-term construction timetables. 271 By contrast, sewer over-
flows are usually dispersed over a broad geographic area and are not 
amenable to single centralized treatment. Successful approaches to 
the elimination of sewer overflows are decentralized, encompassing 
management practices, variations in routine maintenance, and a 
269. The principle problem with compliance with federal minimum standards by municipal 
dischargers is that the standards themselves intrinsically are tied to a huge grant-in-aid pro-
gram under Title II of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1265. See Biumm, supra note 214, at 152. 
Congress has not been reluctant to alter the guidelines governing funding, which has increased 
uncertainty and decreased the effectiveness of federal funds. Also, occasional presidential im-
poundment of the construction funds have resulted in the EPA's inability to disburse funds. 
Even when not encumbered by political influences, the funding program has been so ineffi-
cient that it was left with $1 billion in unobligated funds for each of the first three years of the 
program. J. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL RESOURCES 
POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 1, 80-83 (1976); Blumm, supra note 214, at 153. 
270. Although sewer overflows are covered by the NPDES permits, the EPA has not 
established effluent limitations for sewer overflows. Instead, the level of control warranted for 
sewer overflows is made on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the availability of funding. 40 
C.F.R. § 133.03(a) (1980); EPA, BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW CONTROL 
4 (1979). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1292(2XA), (B). 
Municipal sewer treatment plants generally are publicly owned treatment works (POTW) 
under the Act. "Treatment works" is not a term separately defined for purposes of Title III 
enforcement in the CW A. In Title II, Grants for Construction, treatment works arE; defined as 
"any devices and systems used in the storage, treatment, recycling, and reclamation of 
municipal sewage ... [or] disposing of municipal waste, including storm water runoff, or in-
dustrial waste, including waste in combined storm water and sanitary sewage systems." Id. §§ 
1292(2XA), (B). For purposes of Title II funding the definition of treatment works is broad and 
specifically includes sewer overflows; yet for purposes of Title III standards and enforcement, 
sewer overflows are excluded from the definition of treatment works, and so are not even sub-
ject to secondary treatment effluent limitations. Id. §§ 1311, 1342; 40 C.F.R. § 133.03(a) 
(1980). In 1981 Congress developed a grant program directed specifically toward control of 
combined sewer overflows, § 201(m) 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m), Pub. L. No. 97-117 (Dec. 1981). 
271. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 112-16. Congress authorized the EPA to obligate $18 
billion to municipalities during fiscal years 1973 to 1977. 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1972). Subsequent 
law appropriated $28.18 billion through fiscal year 1979. Id. § 1287 (Supp. II 1979). As of 
March, 1979, the EPA had committed $20.7 billion of the total $28 billion available, but only 
$1.7 billion of those funds represented completed projects. EPA, MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION 
DIY., OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS, CLEAN WATER FACT SHEET at 2 (1979). At an 
average outlay of $4 billion per year, the Municipal Treatment Construction Program under 
CWA is the single largest program in the EPA. Id. at 1. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 115; 
EPA REpORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS, PGM 430/9-
78-006 (1978) at 1-10 [hereinafter cited as CSO REPORT]. 
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broader view of the interrelationship of sewer overflows and other 
water problems.272 
The unconventional management oriented projects which are 
suited to sewer overflow correction are not easily evaluated under 
the construction oriented facilities planning regulations which deter-
mine eligibility for federal funds. 273 Facilities planning analysis 
favors conventional large-scale construction solutions to municipal 
discharge problems generally. The decentralized management 
oriented model of sewer overflow correction is not within the usual 
experience of planners and designers. Further, the nature of sewer 
overflow correction often requires a large expenditure for a relative-
ly minimal incremental gain of overflow control. Individual sewer 
overflow projects are therefore difficult to cost-justify under facili-
ties planning.274 Because sewer overflows are difficult to qualify as a 
least-cost alternative eligible for federal funding, these projects are 
typically assigned lowest priority on a state's project list. 275 Since 
sewer overflow projects are traditionally low priority because of fa-
cilities planning uncertainties, they seldom receive funding and are 
rarely built.276 
Another drawback of the grant provisions is that funds are geared 
only towards projects required to be built to meet federal minimum 
standards. Projects designed to achieve greater than minimum 
standards must withstand intensive facilities planning scrutiny. For 
sewage treatment plants this means that nearly all projects are de-
signed merely to meet secondary treatment requirements and mini-
272. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 115-16. Sewer overflows do not necessarily occur at 
the end-of-pipe treatment facility, but from many diverse points along the system. As such 
they resemble non-point sources because they cannot be readily gathered into a single discrete 
discharge. This reveals part of the difficulty - sewer overflows are covered by permits under 
the CWA, but the permits contain no treatment standards. See id. at 86, 116; csa REPORT, 
supra note 271, at 8-3. 
273. CEQ REPORT, s'upra note 29, at 115-17. "Facilities planning" is a term of art used to 
describe the process of performing and analyzing engineering alternatives, feasibility studies 
and construction estimates before a plan can be approved by the EPA for funding. See csa 
REPORT, supra note 271, at 8-3 to 8-5; 40 C.F.R. 35.917-35.917.9 (1978); id. 35.903 (1980). 
274. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117; csa REPORT, supra note 271, at ES-9-10; EPA, 
1978 NEEDS SURVEY: COST METHODOLOGY FOR CONTROL OF csa AND STORMWATER DISCHARGE, 
No. 43013-79-003 (1979). 
275. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117; csa REPORT, supra note 271, at 8-3. Subject to 
certain budget constraints, the EPA is authorized to fund, in matching form, as much as 75% 
of the cost of each qualifying treatment project necessary to meet the requirements of the 
CW A. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1284, 1296. The states assign priority for their own projects which 
are then submitted to the EPA for facilities planning analysis to determine eligibility. [d. 
§ 1282(a)(2). 
276. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117; csa REPORT, supra note 271, at 8-4. 
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mum storage capacity.277 Projects which call for advanced waste-
water treatment, even where necessary, must be separately justi-
fied. 278 
These drawbacks hamper sewer overflow projects most acutely. 
The EPA has not yet promulgated effluent limitations for sewer 
overflows and the secondary treatment requirement does not apply 
to sewer overflows.279 Only monitoring and some containment prac-
tices are required under an NPDES permit. Indeed, the actual level 
of sewer overflow correction depends on a case-by-case evaluation 
tied to the availability of funding. 280 The lack of existing predeter-
mined standards by which to measure the adequacy of a project 
makes it difficult to design a sewer overflow project as a least-cost 
alternative. The net result of these funding provisions is that while 
sewer overflow projects are eligible for grants, they are rarely 
funded and so the problem of sewer overflow remains largely uncor-
rected.281 
Sewer overflows recently have been recognized as the second 
largest category of water pollution problems in the nation.282 In re-
cent amendments to the CW A, Congress expressly recognized that 
neither the provisions of the CWA nor EPA's implementation of the 
277. B1umm, supra note 214, at 152,153,162; CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 120. Federal 
money is available only for planning and construction of facilities, not for operation and main-
tenance. Local governments often fail to commit sufficient local funds to continue the opera-
tion of plants at their minimum-design capacity. This results in "polluted waters and wasted 
federal dollars." B1umm, supra note 214, at 153-54, 162. 
278. Certain eligible innovative treatment works may receive as much as 850/0 funding. 33 
U.S.C. § 1282(a)(2). Nevertheless, the overall thrust of the program has been to discourage 
projects designed to meet more than minimum standards. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117, 
120; B1umm, supra note 214, at 153. More importantly, the program has been subject to occa-
sional modifications by Congress. For example, Congress has strongly considered abandoning 
all advanced wastewater treatment programs, and the percentage of funding available for 
projects has varied from 75% to 50% over time. 
279. See 451 U.S. 304, 322 n.15 (1981); Tripp, Tension and Conflicts Under the Clean Water 
Act, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 225, 228-29 (1977). 
280. As a result, the EPA regulations have established only some monitoring and control 
practices, leaving the actual limitations to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 40 C.F.R. § 125, 
3(c)(2) (1980); id. § 133.103(a). See EPA, BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW 
CONTROL 4 (1979). Actual limitations or pollution control judgments are made in practice by 
reference to engineering factors and the availability of funds rather than water quality or 
pollution factors. B1umm, supra note 214, at 154. 
281. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117, 120. The least-cost alternative is that which will 
meet federal requirements with minimal resource costs over time. 40 C.F.R. § 35.155, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 44,807 (Sept. 27,1978). Yet for sewer overflows, 'standards' and 'least cost alternative' 
effectively are defined in terms of each other because there are no predetermined federal re-
quirements for sewer overflows. Tripp, supra note 279, at 229. 
282. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 116; EPA REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1978 NEEDS SURVEY 
FOR CSO 43019-79-001, at 5 (1979). 
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Act had satisfactorily addressed the problem of combined and sepa-
rate sewer overflows in urban areas. 283 In its Report to Congress in 
1978 the EPA found that "only a small portion of combined sewer 
overflow needs have been addressed . . ." under the CW A. 284 De-
spite the acknowledgment of the funding program's operational dis-
couragement of sewer overflow abatement projects, the EPA 
Report recommended that Congress continue with the same grant 
program. As an existing, familiar program its retention would avoid 
further construction delays that the adoption of a revised funding 
program might cause. In effect, the program was retained for what 
it would not do rather than what it could do-an avoidance 
rationale. 285 
The foregoing overview of the CW A, presentation of the better-
than-best problem, and discussion of combined sewer overflow proj-
ects serves as a context for several basic observations. First, federal 
minimum standards are not exclusive levels of control, but are sub-
ject to upward revision by both state and federal authorities under 
the CW A. Second, such non-uniformity is a concomitant feature of 
the CW A which appears to allow some leeway for judicial action to 
abate particular water problems consistently with the Act. Third, 
compliance problems and powerful economic pressures contribute to 
state and EPA inertia and the adherence to NPDES minimum stand-
ards only. Fourth, the net result of the EPA implementation of its 
mandate has been to allow the continued downgrading of water qual-
ity to levels at or below the NPDES minimum and only rarely above 
that minimum. Fifth, these minimum standards are not necessarily 
designed to cover all pollutants and specifically do not control some 
major sources of pollution, such as combined sewer overflows. The 
emphasis on mere compliance with NPDES minimum standards has 
become an obstacle barring the maintenance of more stringent water 
quality standards. Finally, it is apparent that the CWA, like any 
other putatively comprehensive legislative scheme, does not address 
283. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 3676. The EPA WaS directed to prepare and submit a report on the status and control 
of combined sewer overflow pursuant to § 516(b) of CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1375(c). In 1977 Con-
gress extended the deadline by which publicly owned treatment works must comply with 
secondary treatment standards from 1977 to 1983. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1976) as amended, 
Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 45, 91 Stat. 1584. The amendment was intended to address the fact that 
approximately two-thirds of municipal dischargers failed to comply with secondary standards. 
Hall, The Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW., 233, 240 (1978). 
284. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CONTROL OF COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW IN THE 
UNITED STATES, MCD Rpt. No. 50 at 8-2, 8-3 (October 1, 1978). 
285. Id. at 8-11; CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117-18. 
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all water pollution problems and leaves virtually unregulated some 
areas which nominally have been addressed. It remains to be seen 
whether a state could successfully protect its more stringent stand-
ards from deterioration by polluting states upstream by resorting to 
the administrative procedures of the CW A to compel the upstream 
state discharger to upgrade its discharge requirements beyond the 
federal minimum. 
B. The Dilemma of the Downstream State Under the CWA 
The cooperative federalism enforcement scheme of the CW A pro-
vides that a state may impose its own pollution control standards so 
long as they are more stringent than the federal minimum.286 The 
authorization of section 510 permitting a state to set standards 
beyond those imposed by federal requirements raises the issue of 
conflicting state standards. Pollution spillover effects from one state 
to another have posed a major dilemma for any systemmatic attempt 
to regulate pollution.287 The use of nationally uniform technology 
based effluent limitations does relieve structural differentiation be-
tween pollution contained in one state and pollution with interstate 
effects, but this assumes that compliance with federal minimum limi-
tations alone would prevent the occurrence of adverse effects of 
pollution in other states.288 The nonuniformity of standards provided 
for in the Act, environmental science and common experience 
strongly suggest otherwise.289 
The dilemma of the downstream state can be described generally 
as follows. In an effort to clean up its waters, State A has adopted 
standards more stringent than the minimum pursuant to sections 
510 and 301 of the CW A. River X runs through State A and is a ma-
jor target of this pollution abatement. Upstream from State A along 
River X lies State B. State B discharges pollutants into River X in 
compliance with NPDES minimum standards. Nevertheless, dis-
286. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. Fort, supra note 12, at 153; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 529-
31. 
287. Post, supra note 13, at 117; Stewart, supra note 211, at 1229; Note, Preemption, 
supra note 4, at 531 n.193. 
288. Post, supra note 13, at 120 n.32. The minimum federal standards set pursuant to sec-
tion 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, and applied to all NPDES permits pursuant to section 402(b), 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(b), are not set with health or welfare goals in mind. Commentators have noted 
that the phase one BPT standards adopted actually represented the average level of control 
that existed before the CWA was passed. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 201, at 96-102. The 
federal minimum standards may be deficient to prevent adverse spillover effects from one 
state to another. Citizens for a Better Environment v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir., 1976). 
289. See supra text and notes at notes 237-66. 
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charged pollutants from State B continually flow downstream to 
State A. State A has determined that compliance with minimum 
standards will not protect River X and will in fact result in further 
downgrading of its waters. Unless State A can convince or compel 
State B to respect its need for more stringent standards, State A's 
efforts will be fruitless and its waters will become polluted. To add a 
note of urgency to this dilemma, what if the influx of State B's 
discharges has resulted in a water condition in State A that presents 
an enjoinable nuisance as a threat to public health? 
1. Hearings Provisions in the CW A 
The CW A contains several hearing provisions which appear to pro-
vide a means of preventing one state's pollution from injuring the 
waters of a neighboring state. Nominally, federal overview is pro-
vided in an effort to accommodate conflicting state standards.290 
Under the NPDES program, the permit issuing agency must notify 
the EPA of any permit to be issued by the state. 291 If the state agen-
cy determines that discharge under a permit might affect the waters 
of another state, notice of the proposed permit issuance and oppor-
tunity to comment must be given to the neighboring state.292 The ad-
ministrative hearing procedures of the CW A provide that the af-
fected state may recommend that the issuing state modify its permit 
so as to prevent adverse effects on water quality outside the state. 
The Act, however, does not obligate the issuing state to incorporate 
recommendations to protect water quality in an affected state.293 
The permitting state need only inform the EPA and affected states 
290. The EPA can delegate permit issuing authority to a state only after approval of the 
state's entire water program. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). The EPA may still veto the issuance of any 
individual permit. [d. § 1342(c)(2), (3). Where states have failed to promulgate satisfactory 
water quality standards, EPA must establish such standards directly. [d. § 1313(c). See Crown 
Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 193-94 (1980); Fort, supra note 12, at 154-55. 
291. To institute its own water program a state must submit to specific EPA procedures. 40 
C.F.R. §§ 123.1-123.62 (1980). In order to receive approval, each state agency under the 
NPDES system is required to notify the EPA of any permit to be issued under the program. 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1). 
292. [d. §§ 1342(b)(3), (5); id. § 1341(a)(2). 
293. [d. §§ 1342(b)(5), d) (a state affected by the proposed permit may request public hear-
ings and urge the imposition of higher standards); id. § 1341(a)(2) (the affected state may re-
quest the Administrator to veto a state permit and formulate a new permit); id. § 1313(c) (the 
affected state may request higher water quality standards to protect its own standards), con-
strued in Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198, 200-02 (1980). See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(b)(4), (5) (1976); 40 C.F.R. 123.23(b)(2) (1980). Note that by contrast, a permit issued 
directly by the EPA rather than a state must respect water quality standards of neighboring 
states at the outset. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). 
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in writing with reasons for not accepting suggestions.294 In this 
event, the CW A provides for review of the challenged permit by the 
EP A. The Administrator may object to the issuance of the permit or 
veto it if the waters of another state may be adversely affected. This 
can be done, however, only on the basis that the permit violates the 
minimum standards already imposed by the Act.295 
The EPA also may choose to summarily affirm the proposed per-
mit, without having to specify its reasons for so doing. Summaryaf-
firmance of the permit as being in compliance with federal standards 
is not directly subject to further judicial or administrative review. 296 
Veto and review authority of the EPA were designed to control the 
operation of permitted discharges, not as an impetus to upgrade pol-
lution standards.297 Even in instances where a state permit on its 
face violates federal guidelines, EPA review has often deferred to 
the need for localized site-specific "variations" and approved the 
permit.298 Where the Administrator objects to a proposed permit as 
being outside the authority of the Act, the issuing state may request 
a formal hearing before the EPA. If the Administrator then endorses 
the permit, it will be issued directly by the EPA.299 This in turn 
would allow the affected state to seek judicial review of the formal 
294. [d. § 1342(b)(4), (5); 40 C.F.R. § 123.23(b)(2) (1980); 40 C.F.R. § 123.75(c)(2) (1980); 45 
Fed. Reg. 33471 (1980); 123 CONGo REC. 12,934 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1979). 
295. 40 C.F.R. § 123.75(c)(2) (1980); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(d)(I), (2)(B). The EPA cannot reject a 
permit which on its face is in compliance with the minimum federal limitation of secion 301. [d. 
§ 1311, and existing EPA regulations; District of Columbia V. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 861-62 
(D.C. Cir., 1980). 
296. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3), (e) (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,133 (Aug. 21, 1978); Blumm, 
supra note 214, at 157-58. Such acts are within the discretion of the Administrator and not 
subject to judicial review under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, or the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), construed in Miamus River Preservation Committee V. EPA, 
541 F.2d 899, 909 (2d Cir., 1976). 
297. Note, Adjudicatory Hearings Under the NPDES, 9 EcoL. L.Q. 1, 17 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Note, NPDES Hearings]. 
298. [d. at 17-19. 
299. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(d)(I), (d)(2)(B). The issuing state may either amend the permit or re-
quest an adjudicatory hearing. [d. § 1342(d). Thus, in order to get an offending state to modify 
its discharge, an adversely affected state would stand a better chance if the EP A were to veto 
the proposed permit. [d. § 1342(d)(3)(A) provides that after vetoing one state's permit at the 
request of another, the EPA must issue a permit containing "conditions which such permit 
would include if it were issued by the Administrator" originally. [d. § 1342(d)(3), (4). Since the 
EPA should respect all neighboring states' water quality standards when it issues an NPDES 
permit directly, id., the adversely affected state may be able to convince the EPA to tighten 
the proposed permit conditions. In any event, EPA vetoes of state permits have been very 
rare. Note, NPDES Hearings, supra note 297, at 17. Also, the EPA has never modified a state 
permit to respect water quality standards under section 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a). Kakoullis, 
s'upra note 4, at 130. 
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EP A decision under the CW A and general provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.300 
The efficacy of the provisions for federal oversight of state pro-
grams is undercut in practice. Actual federal review of state permits 
is sparse.301 This has been attributed to the lack of sufficient EPA re-
sources and an emphasis on state autonomy which encourages lax 
federal review.302 The EPA also is burdened with the direct regula-
tion of those many states whose programs have not been approved to 
issue NPDES permits.303 Although the EPA has authority to review 
any state permit, the legislative history of the CWA indicates that 
this authority is to be reserved for permits of major significance. 304 
Consequently, the CWA provides that the EPA may waive review 
authority for entire classes of discharges or for individual permits as 
it sees fit. This waiver is a discretionary function of the Administra-
tor and, as such, is not directly subject to judicial review. 305 A recent 
report to Congress confirmed that the EPA often waives broad 
classes of discharges, especially those for which detailed guidelines 
have not been drawn.306 
Recent judicial interpretations underscore the narrowness of re-
view and veto power of the EPA even in cases of major signifi-
cance.307 In Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 308 the Administrator objected to 
a state permit which allowed a polluter to meet water quality stand-
300. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(lXF). EPA decisions on effluent limitations are subject to circuit 
court review. [d. § 1369(b)(1), construed in Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle, No. 
79-1183, slip. op. at 10-15 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 8, 1980). The APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), 
makes any final agency action reviewable and authorizes a court to set aside action that is ar-
bitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706. If the decision is a formal ad-
judicatory hearing, it may be judicially set aside if not supported by substantial evidence on the 
record. 
301. Note, Public Participation in State NPDES Enforcement: Questionable Basis, Good 
Policy, 6 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 185, 206 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, NPDES Enforce-
ment]; Note, NPDES Hearings, supra note 297, at 30-32. 
302. Note, NPDES Enforcement, supra note 301, at 206-07. 
303. There are approximately 32 states with approved programs. Nearly all remaining 
states are regulated directly by the EPA. Until 1982 Massachusetts had a unique joint regula-
tion program with the EPA. See Kakoullis, supra note 4, at 1129. 
304. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1972). See also NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
305. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3); Note, NPDES Enforcement, supra note 301, at 205-06. Only 
non-discretionary acts of the Administrator are subject to review under section 509 of the 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369. 
306. Note, NPDES Hearings, supra note 297, at 20. 
307. Neither the CWA nor the EPA have defined what constitutes a major discharge. In-
stead it has been left to an ad hoc determination resulting in somewhat inconsistent regional 
standards of review by the EPA. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 8-9,173. 
308. 567 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1977). 
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ards by a process of flow augmentation - simply increasing the flow 
of water to dilute pollutants. The court ruled EPA could not veto the 
permit on this ground because nothing in the CW A expressly pro-
hibited flow augmentation. The method itself was held not to violate 
any promulgated regulation even though in operation it would not at-
tain compliance with federal standards. The court found the EPA 
veto to have been an ad hoc policy determination only.309 In 
Washington v. EPA ,310 the court held that the EPA could not veto a 
proposed state permit on the basis of effluent limitations in the per-
mit where the EPA had not established effluent limitations on a na-
tional basis for the discharge in question. Again, the agency judg-
ment was considered to have been an ad hoc policy determination in-
sufficient to support the veto. 
In the context of transboundary pollution, the hearing and com-
ment procedures do not provide definitive or satisfactory solutions 
to interstate disputes. The CW A mechanism is keyed merely to no-
tice and opportunity to request that a victim state's waters be re-
spected. This input itself is geared only towards the minimum stand-
ards already established by the EPA. 311 As the case decisions above 
indicate, the EPA could not impose stricter standards upon the 
discharger state's polluters at the request of the victim state unless 
the EPA had previously established water quality standards or other 
criteria on which to base its administrative decision. Thus, while the 
hearing provisions appear to provide some help to a downstream 
state, ultimately, the CW A fails to specify how the burden of pre-
venting or compensating for interstate spillover pollution is to be 
allocated between the polluter and the affected states. 
2. Enforcement Provisions in the CWA 
In light of the limited scope and effect of the administrative 
mechanism dealing with interstate disputes, the strengthened en-
forcement provisions of the CW A are regarded as significant.312 If 
the EPA finds a discharger in violation of any condition or limitation 
under the Act it may impose civil and/or criminal sanctions.313 De-
309. Id. at 669. In response to the decision in Ford Motor the EPA proposed regulations to 
provide that flow augmentation is not an acceptable device for meeting point source re-
quirements. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,037, 37,132 (1978), codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.2(bX3) (1979). 
310. 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978). 
311. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 530-31. 
312. See Fort, supra note 12, at 152. 
313. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) lists the actual penalties available. The Administrator may impose 
civil penalties of as much as $10,000 per day of violation. Id. § 1319(d). The Administrator may 
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spite the ability to seek criminal penalties, the EPA has relied over-
whelmingly on civil restraints. Civil enforcement actions have been 
used primarily as inducement for conference and conciliation proc-
esses between the EPA and the polluter.314 In addition, section 505 
of the CW A provides two private enforcement actions to ensure 
compliance with requirements of the Act.315 Any citizen316 may com-
mence a civil action against a party alleged to be in violation of ex-
isting standards under the statute. An action may be brought 
against the Administrator of the EPA for his failure to perform any 
non-discretionary duty imposed by the Act.317 The federal district 
courts have been granted jurisdiction over these suits without regard 
to amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties.318 
The citizen suits are subject to certain procedural conditions. Sec-
tion 505 requires that notice be given to the EPA and the alleged 
instead seek civil restraints. The EPA may issue an order to comply, or commence a civil ac-
tion for appropriate relief, including permanent or temporary injunctions. [d. § 1319(b), con-
strued in U.S. v. Frezzo Bros. Inc., 602 F.2d 1123,1124 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1074 (1980). 
314. Glenn, The Crime of 'Pollution': The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanc-
tions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835, 836 (1973). Criminal actions have been reserved for major 
toxic spill pollution. [d.; Gould, supra note 201, at 110. The process of enforcement under the 
CW A is designed to induce compliance or reach a compromise before formal action is 
necessary. Once the EPA notifies a discharger of its violation there is a 30-day period in which 
the discharger may comply or modify its permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(I), (3), (b). In the case of 
a state approved discharger the EPA merely notifies the state agency, allowing the state 30 
days in which to correct the violation or bring a state enforcement action. [d. §§ 1313(a), 1314. 
315. [d. § 1365(a). These actions are available to an individual as well as a municipality, com-
mission, or political subdivision. [d. § 1362(5), construed in Massachusetts v. United States 
Veterans Adm'n, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976). The provisions of the CWA are intended to 
carefully channel public enforcement of standards under the Act or those established by the 
EPA. Enforcement suits under the CWA can only be brought for the violations of existing 
standards, not to develop more stringent standards. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
1242, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1497; Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 
564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). 
316. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(I), (g) (defining "citizen" as a person or persons having an interest 
which may be adversely affected by a discharge). The legislative history explicitly states that a 
person is adversely affected only if there is injury in fact. S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 145-46 (1972), reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3776, 3822-23, re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 328-29. This injury could be to one's 
aesthetic and environmental well-being but it must be demonstrated that, "the party seeking 
review [is1 himself among the injured." Sierra Club V. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). See 
Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1273 (1977). 
317. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)(g). For example, the weight of authority indicates that the Ad-
ministrator has a mandatory duty to make a finding that a violation may exist whenever facts 
are brought to his attention. See EPA V. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 
(1976). A court may order the administrator to perform his duty. Illinois V. Hoffman, 425 F. 
Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. III. 1977); United States V. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1182, 
1187-90 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
318. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Venue provisions are in id. § 1365(c). 
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violator sixty days prior to commencement. Also, no suit may be ini-
tiated where the EPA is diligently pursuing an action against a dis-
charger.319 The notice requirements are designed to encourage and 
afford opportunity for the EPA to institute administrative action 
before expiration of the notice period. This would in turn prevent the 
need for private litigation.320 
Section 505(h)321 specifically provides that the governor of a state 
adversely affected by a violation of an effluent limitation occurring 
in another state may sue the Administrator for failure to enforce the 
limitations. Like the citizen suit provisions, this action is geared 
towards enforcing standards which have already been promulgated 
by the EPA. 322 Technically for purposes of section 505, the enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation under the Act does not 
include section 303 water quality based limitations.323 If a compli-
ance deadline has not yet occurred, enforcement suits cannot induce 
a polluter to meet an earlier deadline. 324 Suits to promulgate new 
standards or to review the efficacy of given standards in order to 
revise them are not provided for in the Act through any of the causes 
of action.325 
It can be seen that neither the administrative hearing procedures 
nor the enforcement actions of the CW A directly address the prob-
lem of interstate disputes from pollution spillovers. 326 The regula-
tory scheme contains many gaps, as some areas of water pollution 
have remained unregulated and no effluent limitations or technical 
319. ld. § 1364(b). These limitations were designed to "carefully channel public participa-
tion." Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 1979). 
This is to prevent inconsistent results where both a citizen and the EPA bring enforcement ac-
tions against the same polluter simultaneously. See, e.g., Middlesex Cty Sewerage Authority v. 
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), where the EPA had brought an enforcement ac-
tion against a discharger and received a compliance agreement but the plaintiff continued to 
press his claims on the same dischargers. 
320. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 79, 80 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1497-98. See City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976) (referring to similar notice requirements in 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642); Steinberg,Is the Citizen Suit aSubstitutefor the Class 
Action in Environmental Litigation?: An Examination of the Clean Air Act, 12 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 107, 132 (1974). 
321. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
322. ld. § 1365(f); District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854,861-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1975). 
323. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) which does not include the water quality standards of sections 
302 or 303, id. §§ 1312, 1313, as enforceable under section 505, id. § 1365. 
324. See Kakoullis, supra note 4, at 549-50. 
325. ld. 
326. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 524, 530; Note, Umbrella Equities, supra note 13, 
at 150-53. 
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criteria have been established for the control of many identified 
pollutants. The provisions of the CWA do not afford protection of a 
state's right to adopt more stringent water quality standards. The 
Act provides possible avenues by which an offended state may abate 
an out-of-state discharge, but only to the extent of maintaining 
federal minimum requirements.327 
It is in this context that the savings clause of the CW A becomes 
central to our inquiry. Section 505(e) provides, in part: "Nothing in 
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of per-
sons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment ... or any other relief .... "328 Illinois believed that the 
CW A did not preclude the use of federal common law and that sec-
tion 505(e) specifically preserved its use. In recognition of the am-
bitious goals decreed by the Act, many courts and commentators 
have interpreted the savings clause broadly. 329 The necessary incom-
pleteness of any legislative scheme - and the gaps in the CWA par-
ticularly - would seem to make it inevitable that judicial action not 
specifically enumerated in the statute will be necessary to resolve 
unaddressed disputes.33o 
3. Illinois' Dilemma: A Case Study 
The nature of environmental processes and the mobility of pollu-
tion makes it quite conceivable that a state may find its own water 
quality harmed by permit-approved discharges from another state 
upstream. Pursuant to authority granted by section 510 of the CWA, 
Illinois had adopted effluent limitations and water quality standards 
more stringent than federal minimum to maintain the water quality 
level in its portion of Lake Michigan.331 The minimum standards in 
Milwaukee's permits were not sufficient to prevent degradation of 
Illinois' water quality standards.332 Further, the discharges were 
. -
327. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (h); Fort, supra note 12, at 159-60; S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1497. 
328. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
329. 451 U.S. 304, 329-30 (1981). Compare Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 
(7th Cir. 1980), with Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
330. Kakoullis, supra note 4, at 549; Note, State Ecological Rights, supra note 11, at 610. 
331. Post, supra note 13, at 117; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 529-31. See 451 U.S. at 
324. Compare Illinois Water Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations, Ch. 3, § 101-1205 
(1979), reprinted in 1 ENV'T REP. STATE WATER LAWS (BNA) 766: 0501-0528 (1979), with 
Wisconsin Administrative Code, Ch. NR 102-297.13 (1978), reprinted in 2 ENV'T REP. STATE 
WATER LAWS (BNA) 951:1001-2092 (1979). 
332. Illinois standards require all effluent discharged into Lake Michigan to comply with the 
following: 5mg/1 suspended solids; 1 mg/l phosphorous; 4 mg/l biochemical oxygen demand; 
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shown to have caused a nuisance. Even if Illinois could manage to ob-
tain a hearing, EPA review, or EPA veto of the Milwaukee permits, 
Illinois could be assured only that federal minimum standards would 
be met, not that its own higher standards would be protected.333 
The EPA had drawn secondary treatment requirements for munic-
ipal sewage discharge in terms of allowable limits of certain conven-
tional pollutants. No regulations existed regarding the discharge of 
viral and bacterial pathogens and phosphates which Illinois sought to 
control. 334 Since sewer overflows or sewer pipes which do not lead to 
a treatment facility are not considered publicly owned treatment 
works for purposes of section 301, sewer overflows are not even sub-
ject to secondary waste treatment requirements. 335 Although 
covered by permits, no specific effluent limitations have been issued 
to control overflows from combined or separate sewers.336 
The Better-than-Best conflict between technology based limita-
tions and water quality standards served to place Illinois in an ad-
ministrative bind. Illinois sought to preserve its water quality based 
standards which called for regulation of pollutants which the CW A 
and EPA had not yet addressed. Regarding those pollutants for 
which the EPA had set effluent limitations, Illinois' standards were 
stricter than the federal minimum. Water quality based limitations 
may have imposed more stringent limitations than those required by 
section 301 and contained in Milwaukee's permits. Yet throughout 
40/100 ml fecal coliform. Illinois Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations, Ch. 3 § 404(d) 
(1979). The standards in Milwaukee's permits were more lax: 30 mgll suspended solids; 1 mgll 
phosphorous; 30 mgll biochemical oxygen demand (variable standard allowed 85% removal 
regardless of numerical amount); 200/100 ml fecal coliform. 
333. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(d), 1365(a)-(f). 
334. [d. § 1311. Secondary treatment standards cover BOD5, suspended solids, phosphor-
ous, and fecal coliform. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102. These standards do not control viral and bacterial 
pathogens except to the degree that they may be diminished by fecal coliform treatment. See 
supra notes 37,234,253. Nevertheless, all these above mentioned groups of pollutants remain 
untreated when discharged from sewer overflows. 451 U.S. at 352 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 31, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, No. 
79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980). 
335. 40 C.F.R. § 133.03(a) (1978). See 599 F.2d 151, 172 (7th Cir. 1979). See supra text and 
notes at notes 288-90. 
336. Sewer overflows are considered point sources and so must be covered by a permit pur-
suant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Technically, under this permit a sewer overflow must comply with 
the minimum effluent limitations set forth pursuant to id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2). Never-
theless, no specific effluent limitations have been promulgated for sewer overflow discharges. 
Although they are defined as "treatment works" to satisfy Title II funding provisions, sewer 
overflows are not included in the definition of treatment works under id. § 1311. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 125.3(c)(2) (1980); id. § 122.3(bb) (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 33,423 (1980) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 123.3). See also 40 C.F.R. § 133.103(a); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 334, at 7. 
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the controversy, the EPA had not set TMDL criteria on which to 
base water quality standards. SS7 Illinois, therefore, had no technical 
basis by which to justify its request that the EPA impose newer more 
stringent standards on the Milwaukee discharges.sss Further, since 
the EPA had not promulgated control guidelines for water quality 
standards, its decision to impose stricter standards on Milwaukee 
would be characterized as an ad hoc policy determination. SS9 
Besides the confoundment of sections 301 and 303 (the better-
than-best problem) the EPA has not promulgated TMDL guidelines 
for even the conventional pollutants in sewer overflow discharges. S40 
Like Illinois, it appears that any affected downstream state seeking 
to protect water quality based limitations would draw an administra-
tive blank if it was concerned with pollution from sources not already 
covered by the EPA. The affected state would have difficulty per-
suading the EPA to modify another state's otherwise valid permit on 
the basis of asserting control criteria which the EPA itself has not 
seen fit to develop. S41 The background factor of EPA reluctance to 
implement strong water quality based standards beyond federal 
minimum standards and its assiduous avoidance of better-than-best 
conflict reinforce the uncertainty of an affected state's prospects 
under the CWA. 
As of 1972, Illinois no longer pursued any administrative remedies 
but persisted in its judicial federal common law claims. Although Illi-
nois received notice of the Wisconsin DNR proceedings, it did not 
participate in the hearings. Certainly this may be viewed as a tactical 
337. CEQ REPORT, supra note 29, at 117; Goldfarb, supra note 201, at 122. In 1978 the 
EPA further restricted the efficacy of invoking water quality standards to upgrade a neighbor 
state's discharge by providing that water quality TMDL figures need only be set for those con-
ventional pollutants already deemed suitable for minimum technology based limitations under 
section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Thus, water quality standards can be developed only to cover 
phosphorous, biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, and fecal coliform. Pathenogenic 
viruses and bacteria are excluded. See id. § 1314(b)(4). 
338. Another technical uncertainty is that the terms of the hearing procedures indicate they 
are to provide opportunity to review technology based limitations under section 301, not water 
quality based limitations under section 303. See id. § 1342(a)-(f). 
339. See supra ted and notes at notes 307-10. CSO REPORT, supra note 271, at 7-1,7-3. 
340. Decision on the actual level of control of sewer overflow discharge is made on a case-
by-case basis and referred to available funding. EPA BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 270, at 4; 
EPA PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 274, at 02. See Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 
530; Note, NPDES Hearings, supra note 297, at 3. But see Fort, supra note 12, at 155 n.148. 
See also Brief of Plaintiff at 5-7, Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93-853 Orig. (U.S., filed May 24, 
1982). 
341. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (state may only request public hearings and recommend higher 
standards); id. § 1342(b)(5) (state may request administration to veto proposed permit, but 
vetoes are rare); id. § 1313(c) (state may request higher standards as necessary to protect its 
water quality, but EPA has not developed water quality standards). 
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error on Illinois' part. 342 Yet Illinois' mistrust of the CWA reflects 
part of the inadequacy of the CWA as implemented by the EPA. 
Similar to other administrative avenues, Illinois' participation in the 
DNR hearings could only assure that federal minimum standards 
would be met. Under the CWA Illinois had no basis by which to 
modify the Milwaukee permit other than the need to protect its own 
standards. As a purely procedural matter, Illinois felt it could not get 
proper review of its factual case within the confines of agency hear-
ings.343 Procedurally, Illinois faced the catch-22 of having to prove 
the very case for which it sought a hearing in order to obtain a hear-
ing in the first instance.344 
In sum, this examination of the provisions and operation of the 
CWA reveals that despite the establishment of a detailed regulatory 
scheme by Congress, significant areas of water pollution problem 
are not regulated by the statute. Fundamentally, the pollution con-
trol standards in the CWA are not designed as part of a preventive 
or remedial scheme but as a regulatory mechanism.345 Under this 
scheme which focuses on the behavior of dischargers rather than the 
cleanup of a water body itself, nuisances which endanger the health 
and welfare of citizens may occur even where discharges comply 
with permit conditions. 346 In these cases, the CW A implicitly, and its 
savings clause expressly, allows that common law remedies may be 
obtained. The occurrence of a nuisance condition notwithstanding 
permit compliance is most troubling when caused by permitted dis-
charges from another state. While the CWA gives states a unique 
342. See.Fort, supra note 12, at 155-56 n.148. Such an exhaustion of remedies is argued in 
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93-853 Orig. (U.S., 
filed July 23, 1982). 
343. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(d). See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 7 ENVT'L 
L. 463, 470-73 (1977). 
344. Illinois felt that it would have to substantially prove the need for effective water quali-
ty standards in order to invoke such standards in a hearing because the EPA had failed to pro-
vide or develop such standards. Phone conversation with Joe Karaganis, counsel for Illinois, 
Nov. 13, 1981. See Casenote, Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation: Recent Developments, 11 
ENVT'L LAW 449 (1981); Comment, The Requir'ement of Formal Adjudication Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: When Is Section 554(a) Triggered So As to Require Application of 
Sections 554, 556 and 557? 11 ENVT'L LAW 97, 105-10 (1980). 
345. The EPA has maintained that the CW A was not designed as a remedial scheme or one 
that could achieve the immediate cessation of pollution. EPA Petition for Certiorari at 12, 
Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, No. 80-12 (U.S., filed July 3, 
1980); CWA construed in Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 III. 
App.3d 360, 332 N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976). 
346. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); City of Evansville v. Ken-
tucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979); Citizens for a Better Environment 
v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979) (EPA's guidelines under CWA ineffective to prevent 
adverse pollution effects in neighboring states). 
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right to promulgate standards more stringent than minimum, the 
hearings and enforcement provisions have not afforded any solution 
for the violations of such standards by transboundary pollution. 347 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 
found that the CWA addressed the claims which Illinois brought. 
Further, the Court held that the comprehensive scheme of the CWA 
prevented federal courts from exercising their limited lawmaking 
powers. The following section presents an analysis of the Court's de-
cision and then suggests an approach which reconciles the use of 
federal common law with the regulatory scheme of the CW A. 
VI. CITY OF MILWAUKEE: ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
The foregoing reviews of the CW A and the different interpreta-
tions given to the CWA by the various courts suggest the degree to 
which a court's presumptions and policies can be manifested in con-
tradictory readings of congressional intent. The majority and the dis-
sent in City of Milwaukee support their respective versions of con-
gressional intent by citing carefully to the legislative record. Under-
standably, the most meticulous references and the sharpest distinc-
tions involve the savings clause of the Act. The majority and the dis-
sent focus specifically on an exchange involving Senators Muskie, 
Hart, and Griffin regarding the effect of the CWA on pending litiga-
tion in which a federal common law claim was raised.348 As is fre-
quently the case, legislative history yields contradictory indications 
which can be used to either side's advantage. 349 A deeper look into 
legislative history itself does not clearly reveal whether references to 
common law generally were meant to include or exclude federal com-
mon law particularly. 
Perhaps, as has been suggested, the most satisfactory interpreta-
tion of section 505(e) is that it "takes no stand on the preemption 
347. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 provides that states may unilaterally impose more stringent stand-
ards on their interstate waterways as a matter of state law. See supra text and notes at notes 
222-25. In addressing the problem of conflicting state standards the CW A provides that an 
adversely affected state may only recommend that a discharger state adopt more effective 
control standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(3), (5), 1313(c). See 451 U.S. 304, 350-51 (1981) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
348. 451 U.S. at 330-32,331 n.23; id. at 342-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In response to a 
question by Senator Griffin, Senators Muskie and Hart expressed the opinion that the 1972 
amendments to the FWPCA (CW A) would not affect a suit pending against Reserve Mining 
Co. based, in part, on federal common law nuisance. 118 CONGo REC. 33,705-06, 33,713 (1972), 
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 191-94. 
349. See L. TRIBE, supra note 73, §§ 3-31 to 3-34; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 837-
38. 
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issue at all."350 Such a "wash" in legislative history is not at all un-
common. Section 505(e) does make it apparent that an enforcement 
action is not to be the exclusive remedy under the Act. The question 
whether Congress intended to save federal common law is still left to 
the federal judiciary for resolution. 351 What other forms of action or 
relief are available will have to be determined by references to other 
provisions in the Act, its overall structure and the Court's own ap-
proach to discerning legislative intent.352 The various judicial conclu-
sions as to whether federal common law was supplanted by the CWA 
were based on many different factors such as the conception of fed-
eral courts' powers, the breadth of the regulatory scheme, the ef-
ficacy of other remedies, and the need to address the complaint of an 
aggrieved party. Ultimately, the respective judicial retention or dis-
placement was justified on the grounds of "congressional intent." 
Yet it can be said in light of the contrasting opinions in the Illinois 
litigation that such judicially derived congressional intent was in ef-
fect a product of all the many policy and prudential concerns made 
by a federal court. 
The Seventh Circuit in Illinois 2 and the dissenters in City of Mil-
waukee followed the usual judicial standard of review requiring that 
Congress evince some expression of an intent to displace well-estab-
lished federal common law rights by the passage of the CWA. The 
majority opinion applied a new standard by which displacement of 
federal common law occurred by the enactment of the CW A unless 
Congress specifically and expressly retained federal common law.353 
The very standards by which the courts approached the question of 
congressional intent embodied their general policy preferences. 
It is in this policy sense that the Supreme Court decision purports 
to take a larger view of the Illinois controversy than did the lower 
federal courts. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate its 
preoccupation with its role as the court of final appeal and of policy 
formulation rather than its role as a factfinder or equity court of first 
resort.354 The Supreme Court opinion reflects policy considerations 
which seem to inundate its reading of congressional intent regarding 
350. Fort, supra note 12, at 161; Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 72, at 1517-18. 
351. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Frankfurter, John Marshall and 
the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219-20 (1955); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
75, at 852-58. 
352. See HART & SACKS, supra note 104, at 367-68; Mishkin, supra note 81, at 803-05; Note, 
Competence oj the Federal Courts, supra note 79, at 1084-86. 
353. See 451 U.S. 304, 307-08 (1981). 
354. Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some 
Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 501-03 (1981). 
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federal common law which would otherwise be equivocal at best. In 
this section the ostensible basis for the City of Milwaukee decision 
will be presented. Then the section will discuss the underlying policy 
concerns which in turn formed the Court's opinion that Congress 
intended to abrogate federal common law rights by passing the 
CWA. 
A. Comprehensiveness of the CWA 
Probably the most striking analytical feature of the City of Mil-
waukee opinion is its repeated reference to the "comprehensiveness" 
of the CW A. The majority continually cites to the legislative record 
that the Act was intended to be a comprehensive program for con-
trolling water pollution355 as though the use of the word "compre-
hensive" was indicative of a congressional intent to exclude all other 
attempts to abate water pollution. The recurring theme of the opin-
ion is that the comprehensive nature of the Act by definition mili-
tates against the use of any other remedies, especially judge-made 
remedies. As the Court stated, "the establishment of such a self-
consciously comprehensive program by Congress . . ., strongly 
suggests there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that 
program with federal common law."356 
The dissenters in City of Milwaukee decried such "talismanic" use 
of the word "comprehensive." They pointed out that many bills are 
characterized by their proponents as being comprehensive.357 In 
fact, the FWPCA before its repeal in 1972 was described by Con-
gress as a "comprehensive program."358 Moreover, the CWA itself 
has been subject to several substantive amendments since its incep-
tion as putatively comprehensive legislation by the Congress in 
1972.359 
355. 451 u.s. 304, 317-18 (1981). 
356. [d. at 319. 
357. [d. at 338-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "There is nothing new about federal law in this 
area being characterized by its proponents as comprehensive." [d. at 342 n.13. 
358. S. REP. No. 462, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947). 
359. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). The 1977 amend-
ments were fairly extensive. See 599 F.2d 151, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1979). The main provisions 
gave added authority to the EPA to break some impasses that had developed in the course of 
an EPA challenge to a state permit, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (Supp. II 1977). The compliance dead-
line for municipal treatment facilities was extended from 1977 to 1983. [d. § 1311(i) (Supp. II 
1977). The CWA was amended again in 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, and 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-510, 94 Stat. 2809 (1980). See 451 U.S. at 338 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The fact that 
Congress in 1972 once again addressed the complicated and difficult problem of purifying na-
tion's waters should not be taken as presumptive evidence, let alone conclusive proof, that 
Congress meant to foreclose preexisting approaches to controlling interstate water pollu-
tion"). 
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The dissent appears to be correct in its observance that the charac-
terization by Congress of its legislation as comprehensive does not in 
itself constitute a statement as to the availability of other remedies. 
To invest such meaning in the word "comprehensive" or the number 
of times it is used in legislative debates is not supported by any mode 
of judicial interpretation or by an understanding of the legislative 
process.360 The majority opinion's idiosyncratic use of the word 
"comprehensive" appears to be a manifestation of its prudential con-
cerns and policy preferences. The word "comprehensive" in City of 
Milwaukee can best be viewed as symbolic of two things: the Court's 
desire to observe strictly the separation of powers doctrine, and the 
Court's conclusion that there are no interstices in the CWA to justify 
federal common lawmaking by the courts. 
By this shorthand use of the word "comprehensive" the Supreme 
Court obviated the need to undertake detailed review of the provi-
sions of the CWA as done by the Seventh Circuit, and avoided a full 
understanding of the inadequacies in the Act which gave rise to Illi-
nois' claim before the Court. Once the Court found the CWA to be a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, its categorical analysis of Illinois' 
claim proceeded inexorably to demonstrate that no interstice existed 
to be filled by federal common law. The CWA authorized the EPA to 
set effluent limitations which were incorporated into the NPDES 
permits. Milwaukee sewage treatment plants operated under such 
permits. Therefore, the Court concluded, Illinois may not complain 
to the courts that further effluent limitations are called for when an 
expert agency designated by Congress has already promUlgated 
standards.361 
Illinois' request that standards be set for enteroviruses, bacteria, 
and other currently non-quantified pollutants was not regarded by 
the Court. The ambivalence of the EPA in efforts to upgrade water 
quality standards362 was not even considered as a general equitable 
factor favoring the need for judicial action when harms go unad-
dressed under a regulatory scheme. In addition, the Court did not ad-
dress the peculiar status of sewer overflows under the CWA which 
leaves sewer overflow discharges effectively unregulated. The Court 
did not address recent congressional reports which showed that com-
bined sewer overflow control needs were not being met under the 
360. 451 U.S. at 338. Accord, Isbrandtsen v. Johnson, 341 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). See L. 
TRIBE, supra note 73, at §§ 2-1 to 2-4. 
361. 451 U.S. at 319-24, 324 n.18. 
362. See supra text and notes at notes 255-65. 
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CWA even though sewer overflows are a major source of water pol-
lution. 363 The case-by-case permit variances for sewer overflows 
were rationalized by the Court as necessary flexibility to address a 
discharge which is somehow of a different nature than other point 
sources. Thus, the Court found Illinois' complaint did not point to an 
inadequacy of the CWA but merely called for more attention to a 
problem already addressed, however ineffectively. 364 
In stark contrast, the dissenters in City of Milwaukee observed: 
"[n]o provision of the Act explicitly addresses the discharge of raw 
sewage into public waters from overflow points."365 The dissent 
found that the record demonstrated that both Congress and the 
EP A were concerned with the inability of the CWA to address sewer 
overflows and that nothing in the record showed that either Con-
gress or the EPA intended to preclude federal common law.366 
The Court avoided mention of the precedent that otherwise ap-
proved discharges under a permit may still be conducted so as to con-
stitute a nuisance or cause harm. 367 The majority in City ofMilwau-
kee ignored the determination of the two lower federal courts below 
that the discharge of raw sewage from sewer overflows in Milwau-
kee, whether in compliance with a permit or not, constituted a public 
nuisance which posed significant risks to the health of Illinois' citi-
zens. 368 The Supreme Court characterized Illinois' complaint as en-
363. See supra text and notes at notes 270-85. The Court perpetuated the distinctive cate-
gorization of sewer overflows under the permit program which led to Illinois' complaint in the 
first instance. See Pub. L. No. 95-217 § 70, 91 Stat. 1608; S. REP. No. 370 Cong., 1st Sess. 81 
(1977); EPA CSO REPORT, supra note 271, at 8-3. 
364. "The difference in treatment between overflows and treated effluent by the agencies is 
due to differences in the nature of the problems, not the extent to which the problems have 
been addressed." 451 U.S. at 323. See id. at 324 n.18. Thus, Illinois must be satisfied with 
whatever level of control or treatment the EPA may have provided for sewage discharges 
under the CW A. In its rationalization of the apparent inadequacies of the CW A to prevent 
adverse nuisance effects from occurring in Illinois waters, the Court continued to overlook Il-
linois' basic claim that a permitted discharge may still be conducted so as to create a nuisance 
at common law. See supra notes 190, 243, 265. 
365. [d. at 352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent plainly recognized that sewer 
overflows were excluded definitionally from the technology based limitations of § 301, 33 
U.S.C. § 131l. 
366. 451 U.S. at 352-53. 
367. The court gave no consideration to what judicial relief could be awarded outside the 
CWA, as it assumed that the CWA could answer Illinois' complaint. [d. at 310-12. As the dis-
sent noted, legislative history clearly states that compliance with a permit under the CW A 
would not insulate a discharger from common law liability. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1457 ; H.R. REP. No. 
911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 132, 134, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 819, 
82l. 
368. See 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1977); 599 F.2d 151, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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tailing at most the inadequacy of certain permits rather than the in-
adequacy of the CW A itself. This minimization of Illinois' claim was 
perhaps necessary to the Court's conclusion that there were no regu-
latory gaps to be filled in the CW A, but such a categorical review of 
Illinois' case denigrates the Court's equitable powers. From the 
Court's decision it is plain that a state such as Illinois must be con-
tent with whatever level of pollution control has been developed by 
the EPA. According to the Court, "the question is whether the field 
has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular 
manner."369 
The shorthand use of the concept of comprehensiveness in City of 
Milwaukee permitted the Court merely to view the overall scheme of 
the CW A on its face rather than determine whether the Act as imple-
mented afforded relief to Illinois. Such a generic view of legislation 
did not require that the particular facts in the complaint be addressed 
by the statute, nor did the Court seem concerned about the adequacy 
of whatever remedies were available under the statute. In fact, the 
majority in its analysis appears to have relaxed the degree of 
specificity with which a judicial claim need be addressed by a statute. 
For example, three years earlier, in Mobil v. Higginbotham,370 the 
Supreme Court refused to provide a federal rule for damages for a 
claim of loss of society under maritime common law where Congress 
had not provided for such damages action. The Court found enough 
in the provisions of the relevant federal statutes by which to dispose 
of the controversy before it. There the standard of statutory review 
was stated: "the Act does not address every issue of wrongful death 
law . . . but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are 
not free to "supplement" Congress' answers. . . . "371 The majority 
in City of Milwaukee seems not to require that the statute speak 
directly to the question before it, as it states: "[t]he question whether 
a previously available federal common law action has been displaced 
by federal statutory law involves an assessment of the scope of the 
legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress ad-
dresses the problem . . . . "372 
When combined with the Court's predisposition against the exer-
cise of common law by federal courts, it would appear that any 
broad, detailed federal legislative scheme which explicitly made 
some remedies available would by its nature require the displace-
369. 451 U.S. at 324. 
370. 436 U.S. 618, 620 (1978). 
371. Id. at 625 (emphasis added). 
372. 451 U.S. at 315 n.S (emphasis added). 
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ment of federal common law.373 Certainly, the majority's approach in 
City of Milwaukee provides a useful, simple test for the displacement 
of federal common law which skirts the various complexities involved 
in a federal court's decision to exercise its lawmaking powers in any 
given instance. But the Court's approach may be overly simplistic, 
and as a result prove too much. For example, the majority states: 
"When Congress addresses a question previously governed by a de-
cision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual ex-
ercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears."374 The dissent's 
charge of "automatic displacement" of federal common law is not in-
accurate. It reflects an uneasiness with the majority's analysis which 
is so skewed by its underlying presumptions. For example, the dis-
sent properly distinguished Mobil v. Higginbotham by noting that 
the common law remedy there did not exist when the statute was en-
acted and thus, the question of congressional intent to preempt or 
preserve federal common law could not arise as it did in City of Mil-
waukee.375 Ultimately, the dissent is correct to note simply that 
"[t]he fact that Congress once again addressed the difficult problem 
of national water policy should not be taken as presumptive evi-
dence, let alone conclusive proof, that Congress meant to foreclose 
pre-existing remedies to controlling interstate [pollution] disputes."376 
B. Interstate Forum Under the CW A 
Having determined that the comprehensive scheme of the CW A 
satisfactorily addressed the elements of Illinois' complaint, the Su-
preme Court proceeded to find that the hearing procedures in the 
Act provided an adequate forum for the protection of Illinois' inter-
ests and the pursuit of its claim against Milwaukee. The majority 
opinion stated that the CW A provided ample opportunity for a state 
affected by decisions of a neighboring state's permit granting agen-
373. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 441 U.S. 11, 17 (1979); Middlesex 
Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
374. 451 U.S. at 315; id. at 334 (B1ackmun, J., dissenting). 'To say that Congress 'has 
spoken,' ... is only to begin the inquiry; the critical question is what Congress said." Id. at 
339 n.8. The dissent found the automatic displacement approach flawed in two respects. First, 
it failed to respect and consider the unique role federal common law has played in resolving in-
terstate resource disputes. Second, it ignored the Court's frequent recognition that federal 
common law may complement congressional legislation. Id. at 334-35. 
375. Id. at 338-39 & n.7. In addition, the Death on the High Seas Act contained no savings 
clause. Further, the majority's reliance on Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), is mis-
placed because City of Milwaukee did not entail a direct conflict between federal common law 
and statute as did Arizona. 
376. 451 U.S. at 336. 
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cy to seek redress. Furthermore, the majority suggested that the 
availability of the opportunity for a hearing under the CW A func-
tioned somewhat like a jurisdictional bar. The Court stated that be-
cause Illinois had not pursued statutory opportunities for relief 
under the CW A, it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Act for federal courts to provide separate relief under the guise of 
federal common law. 377 
The majority's view that the administrative procedures of the 
CW A were adequate to resolve Illinois' complaint can also be attrib-
uted to its view of the Act as capable of resolving all water pollution 
problems. Yet this characterization and the conclusion based upon it 
are misguided as regards the adequacy of hearing procedures to re-
solve interstate disputes. The CW A hearing procedures are geared 
towards opportunity for input from an affected state and do not im-
pose any obligation upon a polluting state to modify its discharges. 
Although the Act does provide the opportunity for a state to per-
suade a permit issuer to modify its standards, the most a state could 
be assured of would be compliance with federally established mini-
mum standards.378 Illinois' claim in this suit was that Milwaukee's 
compliance with federal minimum standards, without more, consti-
tuted a public nuisance in Illinois' water. The Court overlooked the 
fundamental administrative dilemmas faced by a state seeking to 
protect its waters by upgrading the minimum standards of another 
state. The EPA had not established objective criteria on which Illi-
nois could base its call for more stringent water quality standards. 
As a practical regulatory matter, the EPA has experienced great dif-
ficulties in its efforts to impose more stringent water quality based 
limitations upon discharges. A proper scrutiny of the actual facts of 
the case before the Court would have revealed the administrative 
cul-de-sac inherent in the CW A. 379 
The majority opinion is suspect in its elevation of the administra-
tive procedure in the CWA to the status of an exclusive remedy. 
Nothing in the structure of the CW A indicates that participation by a 
state in section 402 proceedings was intended as any sort of exhaus-
tion of remedies requirement. Section 402 hearing and comment pro-
377. [d. at 323-27. 
378. See supra text and notes at notes 291-311; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(d). These provisions 
relied on by the ma.jority merely ensure notice and an opportunity to comment on a proposed 
permit. They do not obligate the issuing state to modify its discharge. 
379. This is not to suggest that the Court was obliged to find a forum which could assure Il-
linois that its claims could be vindicated, nor that an "adequate" forum must be a successful 
forum. 
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cedures are not mandatory, but voluntary and optional. Nowhere in 
the Act is it suggested that these procedures are to be the exclusive 
mechanism for resolving disputes between states with conflicting 
standards.380 In fact, the dissenters in City of Milwaukee pointed to 
legislative history concerning a proposed amendment that would 
have made participation in section 402 hearings a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to judicial relief. The proposal was rejected by the Senate 
Conference Committee in 1977.381 Among the stated reasons for its 
rejection was the Justice Department's statement that federal com-
mon law would continue to be relied upon in the effort to control na-
tional water pollution. In practice, the EPA has continued to rely 
upon federal common law for remedies outside the provisions of the 
CW A to protect water quality. 382 
On a theoretical level, the problem with maintaining a federal com-
mon law nuisance lies in its possible interference with the federal 
regulatory scheme for pollution control. The issue is not one of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, or primary jurisdiction, or of 
equity deferring to law, even though application of these judicial self-
restraint principles might yield the same result. 383 In this sense, the 
majority opinion's approach to the implicit jurisdictional bar in the 
CWA is really a further manifestation of the Court's concern with 
the separation of powers doctrine. This being so, the concern with 
judicial encroachment of legislative functions should not have been 
embodied in the form of a remedies exhaustion rationale. 
On a practical level, the facts of the Illinois case appear to make 
the erection of such a jurisdictional bar somewhat absurd and unfair. 
It was conceded by the majority that Illinois had exhausted the ad-
ministrative remedies which existed prior to the commencement of 
judicial action in 1972.384 The hearing procedures which the majority 
suggests Illinois should have exhausted before seeking judicial relief 
were not available until well after Illinois had received a judgment 
from the Supreme Court in 1972 and filed suit in the federal district 
380. 451 u.s. at 345 & n.19. 
381. H. REP. No. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1977), cited in 451 U.S. at 346 n.20. 
382. Letter to Senator Muskie from James Moorman, Ass't. Atty. Gen., Land and Natural 
Resources Div., Oct. 18, 1977, cited in 451 U.S. at 346 n.21. See, e.g., Evansville v. Kentucky 
Liquid Recycling Co., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastic Corp., 12 ENVT'L L. 
REP. 20701 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. 
Vt. 1972), af/d, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States 
v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (Conn. 1980). 
383. Fort, supra note 12, at 136-37 n.37. 
384. 451 U.S. at 305-10. 
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court.385 As the dissenters in City of Milwaukee noted, this is an un-
precedented and harsh notion of exhaustion of remedies concerns. 
The use of such a jurisdictional prerequisite would impose severe 
burdens on a complainant by obligating him to pursue newly devel-
oped administrative avenues as they occur in the course of ongoing 
litigation in the courts. 386 
The majority opinion's determination that the CWA provided an 
adequate forum for Illinois' complaint to the exclusion of federal 
courts fails to account for the respect granted to the legal complaints 
of a state in our federal system. The failure of the FWPCA in 1972 to 
provide an effective mechanism for protecting a state's quasi-
sovereign interests was a primary impetus for the Supreme Court's 
decision to employ federal common law in Illinois. Similarly, the 
failure of the mechanisms of the CW A to address these concerns was 
a crucial basis for the Seventh Circuit's decision to utilize federal 
common law.387 The dissent in City of Milwaukee also voiced con-
cerns that the comment procedures of the CW A might not adequate-
ly protect Illinois' ecological interests. 
The procedural history of the City of Milwaukee controversy and 
the Oklahoma complaint currently before the Court both indicate the 
importance of considering the need to provide a federal court forum 
capable of respecting the important quasi-sovereign rights of a state. 
The dispute between Illinois and Milwaukee was one to which the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended. Although the 
Court in 1972 declined to exercise original jurisdiction within the 
bounds of its discretion, the Court was careful to note that such dis-
cretion should be exercised only when it was assured that an alterna-
tive forum was available capable of respecting the status of a state's 
complaint, and so remanded the case to the federal courts.388 In City 
of Milwaukee this original jurisdiction is not questioned by the Court, 
but the reasons for it are ignored. No consideration is given to the 
quasi-sovereign nature of Illinois' complaint, nor is there discussion 
of the special federalism rationale supporting the exercise of inter-
state common law by the Supreme Court to resolve interstate dis-
putes. As intimated by the dissenters, a more balanced approach by 
the majority would have led the Court to respect the traditional need 
for a federal court forum and a federal rule of decision which had 
385. See supra text and notes at notes 292-329. 
386. 451 U.S. at 345-46. 
387. 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972); 599 F.2d 151, 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1979). See Note, Preemption, 
supra note 4, at 531 n.191. 
388. 406 U.S. 91, 103-07 (1972). See 451 U.S. at 349. 
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been announced by the Court upon first viewing the Illinois case. In-
stead, the Court informed Illinois that the very legal rule under 
which it continued to litigate for nine years was displaced some five 
months after it was originally granted. 
C. Policy and Presumption in Judicial Inquiry 
A broader perspective of the principles of analysis used by the 
Court can be gained by viewing the recent development of the 
Court's strict view of federal courts lawmaking powers. Perhaps the 
most dramatic restriction of judicial lawmaking is evidenced in the 
Court's approach to the problem of judicially implied private rights 
of action. The judicial implication of a private cause of action not 
otherwise expressed in a statute represents but one specific instance 
in which a federal court may exercise its judicial lawmaking powers 
and entails many of the same jurisprudential considerations as feder-
al common law generally. 389 
1. Federal Courts and Judicially Implied Rights of Action 
The presumptive method of inquiry used in City of Milwaukee to 
displace federal common law despite the absence of an express con-
gressional intent represents a change in the traditional approach of 
federal courts towards their lawmaking powers. Recently the Court 
has developed a restrictive, narrow conception of the discretionary 
lawmaking powers of federal courts in the context of implied rights 
of action cases.390 Nevertheless, the Court has continued to recog-
nize the broad equitable powers of federal courts to formulate feder-
al rules of decision to protect federally granted rights, especially 
Constitutional rights. 391 In its strict adherence to separation of 
389. The doctrine of implied private actions is related to but distinguishable from other ex-
ercises of federal judicial lawmaking such as: (1) instances where federal jurisdiction exists but 
no statute covers the particular question, as in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); (2) 
where a federal statute provides federal jurisdiction but no rule of decisional law, United Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); (3) remedies implied in common law 
to protect constitutional rights, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); and (4) statutory interpretation and construction, Stafford v. 
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). See Friendly, supra note 50, at 383; HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 75, at 798-800. 
390. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Middlesex 
Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radciff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
391. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 
(1974) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]n suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes 
lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this court has authorized such relief 
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powers doctrine, the presumption against federal common law, and 
its method of gleaning congressional intent from the overall scheme 
of legislation, the majority opinion in City of Milwaukee is represent-
ative of the more restrictive view of federal courts' powers devel-
oped in implied rights of action cases. In fact, the majority seems to 
have transplanted the analysis used in these cases to further narrow 
the reach of federal common law powers. 
While policies respecting the separation of powers doctrine, feder-
alism, and the limited nature of Article III courts have always infused 
the Supreme Court reading of congressional intent,392 the Court has 
sought to provide some objective guidelines to structure its inquiry. 
In Cort v. Ash393 the Supreme Court promulgated a four factor test 
to determine whether a private right of action should be judicially im-
plied from a federal statute. The development of Supreme Court 
cases since the Cort decision has witnessed the predominance of a 
more limited view of federal courts' powers as the Court's inquiry in 
implied rights of action cases has focused wholly on legislative intent 
to the exclusion of the more flexible Cort test.394 In its reading of leg-
islative intent the Court has brought a renewed concern for the 
observance of separation of powers doctrine and Article III con-
straints to the forefront of its analysis. 395 
where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning 
the substantive provisions of the statute"); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 240 (1976); Sea Clam-
mers, 453 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[OJur truly conservative federal judges 
. . . readily concluded that it was appropriate to allow private parties who had been injured 
by a violation of a statute enacted for their special benefit to obtain judicial relief"). 
392. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 800-06; Monaghan, supra note 72, at 12; 
Note, A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 (1980). 
393. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
The Cort factors are: 1) Does the statute create a federal substantive right in favor of the 
plaintiff! 2) Is there any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to create or deny a 
private remedy other than those specifically set forth in the act?; 3) Is the implication of a 
private remedy consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative action?; and 4) Is the 
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law? 
394. The Cort test has been criticized by the Supreme Court and commentators for pro-
viding insufficient guidance as a legal principle and allowing too much discretion on the part of 
a federal court to merely advance the policies of a statute by implying a remedy. In short, the 
Cort test appeared to have permitted the implication of a private remedy too often, as virtually 
any implied action could be said to effectuate the purposes of a statute. Touche Ross v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 
(1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). See 
Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Statutes: The Emergence of a Conserva-
tive Doctrine. 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429,459 (1976). 
395. In his dissent to Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), Justice Powell 
expounded the policy premises which have since come to dominate the Court's approach 
towards federal courts' lawmaking powers. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
376 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:295 
To safeguard these concerns a new presumption has been devel-
oped by the Court. This presumption requires that absent some com-
pelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, federal courts 
should not infer private actions from federal legislation. 396 This 
presumptive method of inquiry is designed to prevent a federal court 
from making an active policy analysis and emphasizes the narrow 
range of discretion a court enjoys in its capacity as a statutory inter-
preter.397 In Touche-Ross v. Redington,398 the Supreme Court adopted 
the new proscriptions against the implication of a private cause of ac-
tion. In Touche-Ross the court found that section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1934 provided certain regulatory devices to protect the 
plaintiff. The Court refused to imply a private action for damages, 
since considerations of judicial restraint and statutory construction 
militated against the inference of broader rights from those specif-
ically delineated by Congress. 399 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 22 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). The Cort test was criticized for allowing 
a federal court to substitute its views for those of the legislature in the construction of a 
statute. Such discretion was seen as tantamount to judicial encroachment of legislative func-
tions which could not be squared with the separation of powers. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731, 746-
47 (Powell, J., dissenting). The discretion permitted under the Cort test was regarded as 
beyond the sphere of federal court powers. According to Justice Powell, even where the courts 
did not actually usurp legislative powers, it resulted in a form of government by abdication in 
that it encouraged Congress to leave legislative problems unresolved to be filled by judicial 
second-guessing. 
396. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 746-47 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). By contrast, the Cort test 
had allowed a court to look for any explicit or implicit intent to create or deny a remedy. 422 
U.S. 66, 68 (1975). Nevertheless, in the area of constitutional rights the Court may still 
presume that the federal courts are the ultimate protectors of federal rights and will fashion 
federal common law or imply a private right unless there are "special factors counseling 
hesitation," Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,21 & n.5 (1980), or Congress has provided an equal-
ly effective remedy explicitly declared to be a substitute for direct recovery under the Con-
stitution. [d. at 1474, n.10; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1974). 
This proliferation of standards based upon the characterization of a federal court's exercise 
of power in a given instance is especially confusing because no clear delineations exist among 
the court's exercise of its lawmaking powers when implying a remedy, interpreting a statute, 
and filling an interstice. All these aspects may be involved in a single case. See Monaghan, 
supra note 72, at 20; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 800-06. 
397. E.g., Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
Since the key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature, it is "unnecessary to discuss at 
length the principles set out in recent decisions, Cort test concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action . . . without saying so explicit-
ly." [d. at 9-10. 
398. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
399. [d. at 568, 573. Once Congress created an express remedy the Court stated it should be 
"extremely reluctant" to imply a cause of action broader than one Congress provided. [d. at 
574. This form of literal review approaches that of expressio unius alterius unum. See Nat'l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974). 
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In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (TAMA), 400 the 
Supreme Court's inquiry focused on a narrow reading of legislative 
intent to the exclusion of nearly all other considerations. Since 
Transamerica, where a federal statute on its face appears to provide 
a generally comprehensive enforcement scheme the Court will be re-
luctant to imply any further remedies. The adequacy of expressed 
remedies to deal with an individual complaint will not be considered 
by the Court.401 Since Congress is presumed to know how to create a 
private right of action when it intends to, no private right will be 
found without affirmative evidence to that effect in the text of the 
statute, or in its legislative history. In Transamerica the presump-
tion favoring some limited judicial lawmaking to advance congres-
sional goals has come full circle. When legislative history demon-
strates no positive specific intent to preserve or imply a remedy, this 
lack itself becomes "persuasive evidence" that federal courts should 
not infer a private remedy beyond those enumerated in the statute it-
self.402 
The strongest statement of the Supreme Court's restrictive view 
of federal court's powers came in Middlesex County Sewerage Au-
thority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.403 The Supreme Court held 
that where an express cause of action with procedural requirements 
has been given in the CW A federal courts should not imply other ac-
tions or remedies even under the savings clause which preserves any 
other relief under common law. Although the enforcement actions 
provided by section 505 of the CW A did not provide for damages, the 
actual adequacy of these express remedies to relieve the plaintiffs 
was not given separate consideration; rather, adequacy was assumed 
in the Court's determination that the legislative scheme of the CWA 
is comprehensive.404 
400. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
401. "It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro· 
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." 442 
U.S. at 571·74 (1979). 
402. By contrast, the Court has explicitly declared the need to evaluate the efficacy of an ex-
press remedy in other statutory implication cases where the protection of particular federal 
rights are involved. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 393-95 
(1974) (Harlan, J., concurring) (damages action against federal officials implied for violation of 
4th amendment rights where none had existed before); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-21 
(1980) (the remedy provided by Congress must be "equally effective" relief for the violation of 
5th amendment nondiscrimination rights); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 682 
(1979) (remedy implied by Court to effectuate Title IX of the Education Act guaranteeing non-
discriminatory treatment where no damages action had existed). 
403. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
404. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). The Third Circuit court had implied a private right of action 
for damages from the CW A because plaintiffs had failed to provide notice of their intent to sue 
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Two recent Supreme Court cases in the area of federal securities 
law reaffirm this approach to the interpretation of statutes and con-
gressional intent, and the implication of federal common law reme-
dies.406 The Court allowed plaintiffs to seek implied remedies in con-
junction with the express remedies for fraud or misrepresentation, 
but was careful to note that the implied remedy was directed toward 
distinctly different types of wrongdoing. Whether or not this distinc-
tion is capable of being applied consistently, the cases represent the 
Court's longstanding concern for federal securities fraud remedies 
more so than any shift in the Court's approach to federal judicial law-
making powers.406 
2. Application to Federal Common Law 
Since the presumption in the Court's analysis is now decidely 
against the judicial implication of remedies, it is apparent that the 
Court's inquiry into legislative intent asks a fundamentally different 
question than its traditional analysis posed. In the context of City of 
Milwaukee, the view disfavoring implied rights of action has been ex-
panded to create a negative presumption against the exercise of any 
judicial lawmaking where a federal statute is involved. Despite the 
Court's examination of the legislative intent of the CWA, it need not 
have found any intent to displace federal common law. The Court's 
own emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the statute effectively 
as required by the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976), and so were precluded from injunctive 
relief under the Act. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1979), vacated and remanded sub nom., Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
In Sea Clammers the Court built upon the City of Milwaukee opinion which found the com-
prehensiveness of the CW A sufficient to address nearly all problems of water pollution. See 
Note, Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n: Implied Rights of 
Action for Damage Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 12 
ENVT'L L. 197 (1981). This piggy-back mode of analysis and the narrow statutory review 
engaged in by the Court in Sea Clammers has been criticized. "The Court's current approach 
... is out of step with the Court's own history and tradition." 453 U.S. at 19-20 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). "No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's remedial scheme to 
be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial avenues open." Id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The majority's approach was considered particularly inappropriate in light of the savings 
clause of the CW A which explicitly preserved all available remedies at common law or from 
other statutes. 
405. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Herman & Mac-
lean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). 
406. The Court's reasoning in Curran supporting the implication of remedies is irksome in 
its observance that such common law remedies for fraud were recognized generally on June 4, 
1975, the date Congress adopted the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 
89 Stat. 97. Why, then, was the recognition of federal common law nuisance to abate pollution 
at the time of the FWPCA Amendments not regarded as significant in City of Milwaukee? 
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answered the question whether Congress intended to preserve a 
common law remedy.407 
The Supreme Court's reversal of the traditional standard of con-
struction respecting the preservation of common law rights in the 
absence of express legislative intent to displace common law does 
not appear to be justifiable in City of Milwaukee. First, even in its 
limited role of statutory interpreter, the Court has not recognized 
that the comprehensiveness of an act is of itself the crucial element 
requiring judicial restraint.408 Second, the restrictive view of federal 
courts' powers was developed in the implied rights cases as a func-
tion of the ordinary limits on a court's discretion in statutory con-
struction. The Court has since continued to acknowledge that it acts 
very much like a general federal law court in its protection of federal 
rights and in declining to exercise equity powers in the context of en-
vironmental pollution. 409 In cases of constitutional and federally 
granted rights the Court has engaged in a broad range of policy anal-
ysis and exercised a choice among traditionally available judicial 
remedies according to the substantive social policies embodied in the 
federal statute.410 In the case of City of Milwaukee, the federal com-
mon law of nuisance was a well established existing remedy to pro-
407. In the absence of express congressional interest to abrogate existing common law 
remedies the Court has been reluctant to find these remedies preempted. Nader v. Allegheny 
Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980). Rather than look for any indication, express or im-
plied, to preserve federal common law, the majority opinion in City of Milwaukee required an 
express intent to preserve federal common law even though there was no express intent to 
displace it .. 451 U.S. at 328-30 (1981). In light of City of Milwaukee, Sea Clammers and implied 
rights of action cases it can be said that the more Congress has legislated in an area, the less 
federal courts may exercise federal common law, regardless of the adequacy of the statute. 
408. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 
(1971) did not preclude judicial implication of a federal common law action); Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 771 (1979) (that other provisions of a complex regulatory scheme 
create express remedies has not been accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an 
otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section of law). 
409. Customarily federal courts are more conservative in the use of their lawmaking powers 
when interpreting statutes in which specific remedies have been delineated. Hill, supra note 
79, at 1024-27. Federal courts historically have exercised broad equitable powers to protect 
federal rights via federal common law. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 680, 684 (1964); Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 392 (1974); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 240, 245 (1979). See Hill, supra note 79, at 1124-31; Monaghan, supra note 72, at 24; 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 798 (considering Bivens as implying a remedy, not as 
common law per se). 
410. Justices Harlan and Powell, two jurists who greatly respect the limited nature of 
federal courts in the federal system have agreed that a federal court must at times take into 
account a range of policy alternatives at least as broad as those of a legislature and that such 
an approach entailed an aspect of the federal common law powers of the courts. Carlson v. 
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tect the federal rights granted to Illinois under the CW A, and the 
federalist rights of Illinois as a state. 
A third fault in this utilization of a presumption against common 
law in City of Milwaukee is that, unlike the implied rights of action 
cases, the CW A contained a savings clause which explicitly preserved 
any other common law relief.411 In its sophisticated analysis the 
Court in City of Milwaukee reasoned that although the savings 
clause of the CW A appeared to preserve federal common law, the 
rest of the provisions in the Act implicitly displaced it. The Court did 
not point to any legislative history or provision in the CW A which af-
firmatively stated that federal common law should be supplanted. 
Legislative debates demonstrate that Congress specifically consid-
ered federal common law and concluded that the enactment of the 
CW A would not limit or preclude this cause of action.412 In light of 
the savings clause and the legislative history of the CW A, it becomes 
apparent that the Supreme Court's conclusion that the CWA dis-
placed federal common law was largely a result of the Court's own 
conception of the role of federal courts and its own policy prefer-
ences as embodied in its mode of analysis. 
While this section has argued that the presumptive method of in-
quiry followed by the Court was inappropriate in City of Milwaukee, 
it certainly does not suggest that the underlying premises which 
formed its presumptions are invalid. Considerations of Article III 
constraints, separation of powers, and federalism are factors in any 
federal court's decision to invoke its lawmaking powers. The next 
section will advert to the principles of separation of powers and 
federalism to show that a proper respect for these concerns need not 
require the restrictive view of judicial lawmaking taken by the Court 
in City of Milwaukee and Sea Clammers. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14,22-23 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed-
eral Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Monaghan, 
supra note 72, at 10-12, 22-24; Hill, supra note 79, at 1024. See supra text and notes at notes 
110-22 (discussing development of federal common law). 
411. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e); Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18 (1981); City of Milwaukee, 451 
U.S. 309, 341-42 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
412. 118 CONGo REC. 10780 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 
688 (Rep. Dingel); id. at 33,705-09, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 
191-94 (Sen. Griffin) ("federal courts have ... traditionally upheld the right of the States to 
protect the health and safety of their citizens"); id. at 10,773, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 676 (Rep. Fraser); id. at 33,705, 33,713, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 191, 211. 
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D. Reconciling Federal Common Law With Separation 
of Powers Doctrine 
381 
At the heart of the City of Milwaukee decision lies the Court's con-
ception of the limited, circumscribed powers of federal courts under 
the constraints of Article III, Erie principles and separation of 
powers doctrine. The Court's analysis emphasizes the special con-
straints on federal courts vis-a-vis the Congress: the separation of 
powers doctrine. In order to assure the proper judicial deference to 
the legislative functions of Congress, the basic tenet of separation of 
powers requires that federal courts are not free to provide solutions 
as they see fit when Congress has specifically addressed the problem 
in its legislation.413 In City of Milwaukee, the Court gave expression 
to the importance of this consideration by stating: "[O]ur commit-
ment to the separation of powers is too fundamental to continue to 
rely on federal common law by judicially decreeing what accords 
with 'common sense and the public weal.' "414 
The majority stressed the extraordinary circumstances in which 
federal common law has been justified, characterizing its use as a 
"necessary expedient" only.415 The Court then cited to cases which 
underscored the ambivalent status of the exercise of federal common 
law powers. Nonetheless, as the above discussion of federal common 
law precedent indicated, the Court has not always interpreted feder-
al judicial lawmaking powers narrowly. It is more accurate to say 
413. 451 U.S. 304, 314-15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 100, 122 (1976) ("The Framers of the 
Constitution regarded the checks and balances of a tripartite Federal Government as a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment . . . of one branch at the expense of the 
other"); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 (1947); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393, 401 (1856) ("[NJeither the legislative, executive, nor judicial departments of the 
Government can lawfully exercise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the Constitu-
tion"). 
414. 451 U.S. at 315 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). See Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (A court has "no authority to substitute its views for 
those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute"); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 244, 
248 (1951) ("It is not for courts to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the Na-
tion's lawmaking body"). 
415. 451 U.S. at 314 (quoting Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewerage 
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976)). Nevertheless, the full quote from Jones 
Falls actually supports the use of federal common law: 
This 'new federal common law' . . . came into being as a necessary expedient in the 
resolution of interstate controversies. . . . The law of the state whose citizens were 
subject to injuries by the interstate pollution ought not to govern the conduct of 
citizens and municipalities in another state, while to apply the law of the offending 
state would be a utilization of the laws of a state whose selfish interest was in the pro-
tection of the offenders, herself, her political subdivisions or her citizens. 
539 F.2d at 1008. 
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that the Court has had difficulty defining those instances or classes 
of cases in which the use of federal common law would be appropri-
ate.416 A thorough review of common law precedent reveals that de-
spite the Erie doctrine and separation of powers principles, federal 
courts do possess a degree of general lawmaking power. The com-
mon law powers of federal courts are limited because they are 
tempered by considerations not incumbent upon state courts.417 
Nevertheless, it is well established that federal courts possess signifi-
cant equity powers and have a special responsibility in the process of 
creating a "living" body of federal law with Congress.418 In effect, a 
federal court "makes law" whether it decides to fashion federal com-
mon law or declines to do so for policy reasons. This is a uniquely 
reflexive feature of federal courts' jurisprudence: the powers of 
416. Note, Choice of Law, supra note 82, at 133 n.2; Note, Competence of Federal Courts, 
supra note 79, at 1099; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 513 n.82. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust 
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[Wlhere federally protected rights have been 
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their 
remedies to grant the necessary relief"); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 430, 432-34 (1961); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 386 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 240 (1976); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
417. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 497 
(1954). Federal judicial intervention requires special justification which must be drawn from 
congressional statutes or the Constitution. Note, Choice of Law, supra note 82, at 144-45; 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 830. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 
301, 309 (1947) (in the federal scheme the role of the federal courts, outside of constitutional 
area, "is more modest than that of state courts, particularly in the freedom to create new com-
mon law liabilities, as Erie itself witnesses"). 
418. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 830. The basic premise of law is its capacity for 
growth and it must include the creative work of federal courts. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. 
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). "Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be 
impotent. This follows from the futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is ap-
parent from the terms of the Constitution itself." Id. at 468-69 (Jackson, J., concurring); 
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("[Ilnterstitial federal 
lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts"). 
Commentators suggest that Erie is not controlling on problems implicated in the operation 
of a congressional program. Erie's basic holding is that where an area is one that is usually 
governed by state law of its own authority the mere grant of federal jurisdiction does not carry 
with it the power to declare an independent federal rule. Erie considerations are much less im-
portant in the operation of a federal statute. Mishkin, supra note 81, at 799-800. See Com-
ment, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L. J. 
325 (1964); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 763. Friendly, supra note 50, at 398 ("the 
complementary concepts of Erie and federal common law are a natural development. Federal 
courts must follow state decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by 
the states whereas state courts must follow federal decisions on subjects within the national 
sphere"). See Monaghan, supra note 72, at 12-14, 20-24. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 386 (1971). The very issues of choice of law in diversity 
cases and in cases dealing with federal relations of the courts and Congress are for federal 
courts themselves to decide. Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 72, at 1531-35. 
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federal courts are potentially broad, but for a number of policy 
reasons - implicit and explicit - they have been limited by the fed-
eral courts in practice.419 
1. Interstate Federal Common Law 
The majority in City of Milwaukee was suspicious of the somewhat 
discretionary, unruly nature of federal common law. They felt that 
the potentially discretionary aspects of the exercise of federal judi-
cial powers should yield to a more controlled, strict observance of the 
separation of powers doctrine. It is significant that the Court in City 
of Milwaukee did not fully address the continued use of interstate 
common law. Although federal common law is subject to the quirks 
and inconsistencies by which the majority portrays it, the category of 
interstate common law has been embraced by the Supreme Court 
with decidedly fewer misgivings than other areas of federal common 
law.420 Interstate resource and pollution disputes have been a partic-
ular circumstance consistently requiring the use of federal common 
law. As suggested in the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois in 
1972, the unique strength of the justification for interstate common 
law in pollution disputes lies in its intertwined bases of federal inter-
ests, the federalism rationale and its constitutional underpinnings. 421 
In City of Milwaukee, the Court relegated its consideration of inter-
state common law to a single footnote. Interstate common law was 
considered by the Court to be subject to all the shortcomings of fed-
eral common law generally, and to be without special justification.422 
419. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 471; HART & SACKS, supra note 104, at 
367-68; Mishkin, supra note 81, at 803-05. While they may be self imposed, such restraints im-
plement very real constitutional limits which cannot be transgressed. Nevertheless, there is 
some slippage between the self restraint policies of federal courts and the constitutional limita-
tions because jurisdictional statutes and policies have usually been drawn more narrowly than 
the ultimate constitutional extension of federal courts' powers. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS, § 3 (3d ed. 1976); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 553. See Osborne v. 
Bank of the United States, 103 U.S. 738 (9 Wheat.) (1824); American Well Works v. Layne & 
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
420. 451 U.S. at 334-35 (B1ackmun, J., dissenting). See supra Section lILA.; Friendly, 
supra note 50, at 408 n.119; Hill, supra note 79, at 1030-32, 1075-76; Monaghan, supra note 
72, at 13-14 & n.72; Leybold, supra note 75, at 293. 
421. Interstate federal common is regarded as constitutionally compelled and so distinct 
from other areas of federal common law. Mishkin, supra note 81, at 805-07; Friendly, supra 
note 50, at 408 & n.1l9. See 406 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1972). Interstate common law was used as an 
adjunct to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in disputes to which a state was a par-
ty. Comment, Article III Courts, supra note 418, at 80. 
422. Interstate common law was subsumed by the Court into the general category of federal 
common law. "Whether interstate in nature or not, if a dispute implicates 'commerce among 
the several states' Congress is authorized to enact the substantive federal law governing the 
dispute." 451 U.S. at 315 n.8. 
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In this manner the opinion most directly brought its policy prefer-
ences to bear. A better reasoned analysis would have addressed the 
unique justifications for the utilization of interstate common law. In 
particular, the element of the federalism rationale which inheres in 
our constitutional structure should have been given some weight to 
counterbalance the Court's doctrinaire adherence to the separation 
of powers. 
In the majority's view of federal relations there may be only two 
categories of pollution control standards under the CW A: federal 
legislative standards, and state legislative or common law standards. 
Separation of powers principles dictate that federal standards be set 
by Congress alone. The Court stated: "We start with the assumption 
that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropri-
ate standards to be applied as a matter of federallaw."423 Having 
found no interstices in the comprehensive scheme of the CW A, the 
Court declared: "Federal courts lack authority to impose more strin-
gent limitations under federal common law than those imposed by 
the agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehen-
sive scheme."424 
This passage intimates a formalized, rigid view of Article III and 
the separation of powers doctrine. Separation of powers doctrine en-
tails a harmonization of powers, not the static displacement of one 
branch's recognized powers by the mere exercise of powers by an-
other branch. The historical development of federal courts under the 
Constitution and our federal system demonstrates that policies re-
straining federal courts are not inflexible, but subject to change.425 It 
is through an active balance of competing policy demands and shift-
ing conceptions of the proper function of federal courts that Article 
III doctrines have evolved. As the dissent notes, there is a kind of 
dynamic tension between a federal court's obligation to apply federal 
common law in some cases, and its need to exercise self-restraint and 
defer to Congress in others.426 A federal court is no more free to dis-
423. [d. at 316-17. 
424. [d. at 317. 
425. Monaghan, supra note 72, at 22; L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-1 to 2-4 (1978). 
"[T]he separation of powers cannot be watertight .... " Mishkin, supra note 81, at 799-800. 
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ashwander v. 
T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 352-53 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 
14, 22 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 386 (1971). 
426. 451 U.S. at 339 & n.8. This is especially so when the Court has continually held that 
statutes will not be construed in derogation of the common law unless such an intent is clear. 
Isbrandtsen & Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 
U.S. 290 (1976); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
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regard congressional intent to further its own principles of restraint 
than it is to overlook legislative acceptance of the continued use of 
federal common law. 
2. Federal Common Law and the CW A 
Most recently, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,427 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the equitable powers of federal courts under the 
CW A, albeit with somewhat curious results. The Court held that fed-
eral courts may apply traditional common law balancing of hardships 
in an injunctive action where plaintiffs sought to halt unpermitted 
discharges of pollutants. As a result of such equity balancing, the 
Court's decision allowed violations of the CWA to continue unabated 
instead of requiring immediate abatement pending NPDES permit 
variance or an exemption.428 Accordingly, Romero-Barcelo supports 
the notion of federal courts' equitable powers, but leaves the content 
and application somewhat unclear and further suggests that the 
CW A should be regarded as the sole source of pollution control - no 
matter how ineffective. 
The grant of relief to Illinois by the lower federal courts in the 
form of effluent limitations and sewer overflow control standards 
highlights the tension between the lawmaking powers of a federal 
court and principles of judicial restraint under the separation of 
powers doctrine. In City of Milwaukee the Supreme Court was criti-
cal of the lower court's imposition of technical control standards on 
the offending discharges. The Court charged that the district court 
in Illinois had plucked effluent limitations "out of thin air" despite 
427. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Romero-Barcelo v. 
Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 
305 (1982). 
428. The district court refused to enjoin the unpermitted discharges from a Navy training 
area, finding that a balancing of equities favored continuation of the discharges because of the 
high public interest in military training activities and public defense. The First Circuit reversed 
and remanded, ordering an injunction until permits or necessary exemptions were obtained 
under the CW A. The court ruled that in such cases of clear violation of the Act the court's duty 
is not to weigh hardships but to enforce the statute in an effective manner. See TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 155-56 (1978); Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. 
L. REV. 524 (1982) Oegislative balancing of public interests and hardships is embodied in 
legislation, therefore, court's equitable discretion is not to set priorities of behavior but to 
decide how best to enforce the policies set forth in the statute). 
The Court's decision in Romero-Barcelo is the first under any theory to allow violations of a 
statute to continue without abatement. It seems an incongruous result when one considers 
that the CW A does not prohibit pollution itself, but prohibits only pollution without a permit. 
It seems reasonable that federal courts should use their equitable powers to enjoin pollution 
problems where appropriate. Nevertheless, such discretion also entails the ability to decline to 
exercise equitable powers. 
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the establishment of an expert agency by Congress to develop such 
standards.429 The Court emphasized that in this form of relief the ef-
fects of possible violation of the separation of powers were manifest 
and further stated that it demonstrated the inappropriateness of ex-
ercising federal common law under the CW A. 
For a federal court to substitute its own standards simply because 
they are deemed more desireable would certainly constitute the usur-
pation of legislative function in violation of the separation of 
powers.430 The grant of a judicial remedy in the form of technical 
standards does not of itself, however, require the conclusion that a 
federal court has exceeded its limited powers. A judicial remedy may 
mirror other remedies prescribed in applicable statutes as a function 
of the equitable powers of a court to fashion appropriate relief for 
the parties before it. The actual formulation of an equitable remedy 
does not undermine the antecedent judicial decision to apply com-
mon law.431 Thus, the ultimate question is whether the remedy im-
posed by the lower federal courts in Illinois 1 & 2 was justified by the 
principles of federal common law upon which the decisions were 
based, not whether the form of the remedy negated federal common 
law power. 432 
In City of Milwaukee, the Court's use of the form of the remedy 
awarded to reveal the impropriety of federal common law obscures 
this fundamental issue. By criticizing the form of relief which paral-
leled standards of control set forth in the CW A, the Court masked a 
thornier underlying problem. That problem is to what extent a pollu-
ter discharging under a permit will be subject to further liability 
under other laws. The language and history of the CW A state that 
compliance with a permit will not be a defense to an action pursuant 
to other laws. 433 The legislative history of the Act unequivocally says 
429. 451 U.S. at 322-24, 324 n.18. 
430. Leybold, supra note 75, at 312. A federal court is not free to devise its own rules in a 
statutory field merely because its sense of justice implies it to do so. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
195 (1978); Casenote, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 767, 783-84 (1973). 
431. 406 U.S. 91, 101-03, 104-05 (1972); Leybold, supra note 75, at 298. But see Note, In-
terstate Pollution, supra note 11, at 1439. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 404 (1971) ("It is not the nature of the remedy which is thought to 
render a judgment as to the appropriateness of damages as inherently legislative"); Note, 
Judicial Protection of Federal Regulation, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145, 148 (1970). 
432. See 406 U.S. 91, 105-07 (1972); Leybold, supra note 75, at 294, 298 & n.8. See also 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 465 U.S. 305 (1982). 
433. Compliance with administrative pollution standards is no defense to other liability 
since these standards represent only the legal minimum requirements, and a court legally may 
require greater care. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, at § 36. Even a legislative waiver or permis-
sion to violate standards may not protect a polluter against common law actions. See Urie v. 
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"[c]ompliance with requirements under this Act would not be a de-
fense to a common law action for pollution damages. "434 The EPA it-
self ruled conformance with the terms of a permit would not "[a]u-
thorize any injury to private property or invasion of other private 
rights, or any infringement of Federal, State, or local laws or regula-
tions."435 The Court in City of Milwaukee condemned the use of fed-
eral common law because court imposed discharge standards would 
subject dischargers to multiple liabilities and conflicting standards. 
This overlooks previous Supreme Court interpretation of the nature 
of a permit in which the Court noted that NPDES permits merely 
"insulate permit holders from changes in various EPA regulations 
during the period of the permit."436 
Compliance with an NPDES permit under the CWA is not a de-
fense to common law or statutory action outside the Act, yet pollu-
ters may offer compliance as a relevant factor as to liability or relief 
to be weighed by the court in equity. Injured parties have continued 
to seek solutions to pressing pollution problems in the courts as well 
as under the federal environmental statutes. The gaps and inade-
quacies of a single statutory scheme make it inevitable that the 
courts will continue to be called upon to abate pollution. Put simply, 
the exclusive reliance on statutory and regulatory remedies may be 
inadequate. The CW A does not prevent pollution or its effects; it 
only prohibits discharge of pollutants without a permit.437 The 
Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 134-35,218 A.2d 360,362-63 (1966) (legislative permit-
ting of a continued public nuisance amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property for non-
public purposes; immediate abatement ordered.) See supra text and notes at notes 190, 243, 
265,367. 
434. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in [1972J U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3746-47, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1499. 
435. 40 C.F.R. § 122.11(dX2) (1978). 
436. See U.S.C. § 1342(k), construed in E.!. du Pont de Nemours V. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 
(1977). It has been established that conformance with the terms of an NPDES permit does not 
even constitute compliance with all of the provisions of the CW A, only with those provisions 
contained in the actual permit. See supra text and notes at notes 241-43. 
437. Scientific data used to promulgate regulations seldom are conclusive as to what is 
"safe" or "unsafe." See Lead Indus. Ass'n V. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1137-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(scientific basis for ambient air standards for lead). In some regulations the EPA must take in-
to account the technological and economic factors of control which vitiate the level and quality 
of pollution control. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b(2)(B) (factors in adopting effluent limitations). 
See supra text and notes at notes 237-60, 269-80 (discussing the better-than-best problem and 
CSO funding). While actions under environmental statutes have been successful in compelling 
the EPA to regulate some previously unregulated sources of pollution, there are long delays in 
such procedures before actual promulgation and subsequent control occur, resulting in con-
tinued and cumulative harm from pollution. E.g., NRDC V. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976), 
affg 411 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (compelling the EPA to list lead as an air pollutant); 
NRDC V. Train, 396 F. Supp. 2127, 8 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 2120, 2123-25 (D.D.C. 1975) 
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Supreme Court's concern over the form of remedy granted by the 
lower courts would appear to regard any judicial relief which mirrors 
penalties or standards in pollution control statutes as an encroach-
ment of legislative functions. 
A quick review of the lower court's decisions in the Illinois litiga-
tion will reveal the propriety of the relief granted. The district court 
in Illinois was asked to abate a nuisance in an interstate waterway 
caused by discharges emanating from out-of-state.438 Traditionally, 
the courts in other federal nuisance cases have enjoined the emission 
of pollutants at the source or developed cooperative agreements to 
abate the pollution through a modified injunction. These cases 
acknowledge that an otherwise lawful activity may be conducted so 
as to be a nuisance but that such compliance may temper the court's 
remedy.439 The lower court's imposition of effluent limitations on 
Milwaukee's discharges is defensible as an equitable remedy short of 
an outright injunction tailored to the facts of the controversy before 
the court. The requirement of eventual sewer overflow elimination 
and the timetable to effectuate that order most closely resemble a 
modified injunction.440 
Illinois had proven the existence of a nuisance by clear and con-
vincing evidence in the district court. The Seventh Circuit confirmed 
(compelling new source performance standards for water pollutants). Often, the EPA cannot 
meet set deadlines and continually requests extensions. See Note, EPA's Ten Years of 
Rulemaking for Water Quality Standards Nears Completion, 15 NAT. RES. L. 511 (1983). 
438. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1977); 451 U.S. 304, 305-06 (1981). In 
a federal common law nuisance suit the traditional limitations on equitable remedies apply. 
Thus, injunctive relief can be granted only when the right to relief is clearly shown and the 
remedy at law is inadequate. United States v. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d 597,611 (3d Cir. 1974); 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at 364-69 (1973). 
439. E.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); Vermont v. New York, 406 
U.S. 186 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). See Leybold, supra note 75, 
at 309. The Court in Illinois discussed the need for equitable remedies. See 406 U.S. 91, 106-08 
(1972). The Court made clear that the results of a federal common law case will depend upon 
its facts. The Court engaged in a balancing in the formulation of relief for a nuisance. Equity 
requires a court to balance the relative harm a defendant will suffer in relation to the benefits 
bestowed on the plaintiff in public nuisance. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, at 603-04; R. 
STEWART & G. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY, 244-47 (1978); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 438, at § 2942. 
440. Comment, Ecosystem, supra note 9, at 1254. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 
N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); Renken v. Howey Aluminum, Inc., 226 
F. SUpp. 169 (D. Or. 1963); Dell-Webb Developers v. Spurr Industries, Inc., 108 Ariz. 178,494 
P.2d 700 (1972). As part of its equitable relief a court may enjoin a nuisance, or provisionally 
enjoin it, or set up a timetable for the gradual abatement of the nuisance. See Davis, Theories 
of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 WISC. L. REV. 738, 766-67. Furthermore, when pollution 
actually endangers public health injunctive relief may be proper without resorting to a full 
balancing of equities. Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredder Co., 528 F.2d 1107,1112-23 (7th Cir. 
1976). 
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this finding.441 The lower federal courts did not fabricate effluent 
limitations from whole cloth. The courts looked to the standards set 
forth in the CW A as a guideline for the development of a particular 
remedy. Also, the courts simply sought to protect the exercise of Illi-
nois' right under section 510 of the CWA to adopt more stringent 
water quality standards for its water. Most fundamentally, the lower 
courts were motivated by the need to prevent the adverse effects of 
a proven nuisance in a manner consistent with the policy balances 
struck in the CW A. 442 The district court's remedy is justifiable as the 
least restrictive measure to abate the nuisance in Illinois' water. To 
enjoin the discharges completely would have impinged directly upon 
the gradual compliance schedule contained in the Act.443 In recogni-
tion of Congress' realization that pollution could not be eliminated 
immediately, and in deference to the more lenient guidelines for mu-
nicipal sewage treatment compliance, the court imposed effluent 
standards similar to those Illinois had adopted for its own water. 444 
441. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, (N.D. Ill. 1977). In the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction the Supreme Court has applied a clear and convincing evidence standard when the 
defendant is a state. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Recently the Court 
suggested that this was to offset any deficiencies of the Court when acting as a trial forum, 
since it is structured to perform more as an appellate tribunal. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals 
Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1971). The Seventh Circuit found the clear and convincing stand-
ard unnecessary because the district court regularly functioned as a trial court and because 
political subdivisions are not states for jurisdictional purposes. 599 F.2d 151, 166-67 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
442. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. Pursuant to the CWA Illinois had adopted more stringent effluent 
limitations and water quality controls than the federal minimum. 451 U.S. 304, 305 (1981). See 
supra Section V.B.3. To disallow the use of a common law remedy in this instance would in ef-
fect nullify a state's more stringent pollution control standards, even where a nuisance to 
public health has been estabished. 351 U.S. at 353 n.32; 599 F .2d at 175, 176 (7th Cir. 1979). 
443. Leybold, supra note 75, at 312-13. To abate the nuisance in Illinois waters the court 
could have taken two approaches: 1) that, insofar as possible, the objectionable results of the 
discharges should be halted; 2) that only those effects of the discharges which create a 
nuisance should be curtailed. The first approach would require a finding that virtually any 
discharge constituted a nuisance, and so should be enjoined. The equitable balancing of cost 
and availability of alternatives and the social utility of the activity would likely preclude an in-
junction. Leybold, supra note 75, at 313; Note, State Ecological Rights, supra note 11, at 738. 
The second approach is more plausible since it abates only that degree of the discharge which 
has created a nuisance while allowing for the continuance of modified discharges. See 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1281(b), 1311(b), 1316(a)(1). The CWA requires only the application of best prac-
ticable technology and secondary treatment for phase one until 1983. This suggests built-in 
considerations of economic burdens and the problems of overcoming existing pollution. An in-
junction would upset the balance of these concerns embodied in the timetable and ignores Con-
gress' implicit recognition that pollution will not be eliminated immediately. Leybold, supra 
note 75, at 313; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 518, n.116. 
444. See supra text and notes at notes 331-47. The levels Illinois had set for its waters were 
regarded as a model level of control which would prevent the nuisance from occurring. 366 F. 
Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Cemetery Ass'n, 159 Ill. 385, 390, 42 
N.E. 891, 892 (1896). 
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The Seventh Circuit displayed greater solicitude for the Act by 
modifying the relief to coincide with federal minimum effluent limi-
tations. The court also took note of the special leniency which Con-
gress demonstrated for municipal sewage problems before affirming 
the district court's relief ordering the elimination of sewer over-
flows. The remedy thus imposed was the level of control necessary to 
prevent a nuisance in Illinois' waters. This remedy was not chosen 
because the courts felt they were better decisionmakers, but rather 
because the inadequacies of the Act had given rise to the controversy 
before them. The implicit justification of the remedy lies in the no-
tion that some pollution effects are reasonably to be expected in pop-
ulated areas, but not to the degree that they cause a provable nui-
sance. Thus, only the discharge levels which resulted in a nuisance 
were abated while those levels of discharge that did not interfere 
with Illinois' water quality, although undesireable, continued un-
abated.445 
The control standards applied by the lower federal courts in Illinois 
would not be warranted merely on the grounds that they approxi-
mate Illinois' standards. The nature of the right to be defended is not 
that Illinois is entitled to govern the interstate waters within its 
borders but that Illinois is entitled to be free from outside interfer-
ence which creates a nuisance.446 Under the circumstances of the 
case, Illinois' standards are only a model representing a feasible level 
of control which can abate nuisance effects. These standards were 
coopted under the federal lawmaking of the courts which, in turn, 
formed relief in accordance with the provisions in the CW A and the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
E. Federalism and the Problems of State Law 
Another policy basis in the City of Milwaukee decision is the 
Court's concept of the federal system. The majority opinion's view of 
federal-state relations emphasized the element of state autonomy 
under the CW A, respected the reserved police powers of the states, 
and showed concern for the fiscal burdens of states and municipali-
ties. The Court evaded those aspects of the federalism rationale 
which support the use of federal common law. There was no discus-
445. See 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979); 451 U.S. 304, 352-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
446. Leybold, supra note 75, at 312. Otherwise the court's reasoning would have been 
tautological in the sense that the nuisance would have been defined functionally in terms of the 
degree of the degradation of Illinois' standards caused by the discharges from Milwaukee. See 
28 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1976). 
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sion of the need for a federal rule of decision to protect the quasi-
sovereign rights of one state from impairment by another state. In-
stead, the Court appeared to advance a simplistic state-versus-
federal mode1447 of pollution control standards rather than a more 
organic view of the federal system as a whole. In the Court's analy-
sis, the separation of powers demanded that Congress, not the feder-
al courts, promulgate federal standards. The Court held that Con-
gress had not preempted state common law in the CW A. Therefore, 
it would be impermissible that federal common law should preempt 
the state common law which Congress had not itself preempted. 
This line of reasoning was translated through the Court's reading 
of legislative intent: "[W]e start with the assumption that the histor-
ic police power of the States were not to be superseded by the Feder-
al Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."448 
The contrast to the presumption against the continued validity of 
federal common law is apparent. The Court required express affirm-
ative intent to preserve federal common law; it required clear and 
manifest intent to preempt state common law. Since the concerns for 
state autonomy were not presented in federal common law, the 
Court did not insist on similar evidence of an express purpose to 
displace federal common law.449 It appears that the Court's develop-
ment of separation of powers and federalism principles overlap to 
presumptively negate the exercise of federal common law. 
1. State Common Law and Statutory Law 
The Court in City of Milwaukee is correct in its observance that the 
determination of preemption of state law differs from that of the dis-
447. The Court disclaimed any such intention, as it stated: "[O]ur analysis has included 'due 
regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of dif-
fusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy.' " 351 
U.S. 304, 316 (quoting San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)). This statement 
occurred in the context of the Court's discussion of preemption of state law, not its analysis of 
federal common law. The Court's failure to address the federalism rationale for federal com-
mon law, its emphasis on the financial burdens of municipalities, id. at 322-23, and its use of 
Jones Falls, an intrastate pollution case, as support to displace a federal rule in an interstate 
pollution case, id. at 326-27, all indicate a concern for localism. 
488. [d. at 316. 
449. "Such concerns for state law are not implicated in the same fashion when the question 
is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and accordingly the same sort of 
evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required." [d. See HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 75, at 800-03, 470-71; Mishkin, Sorn.e Further Last Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) ("That Congress may have constitutional power to make fed-
eral law displacing state substantive policy does not imply any range of power for federal 
judges"). 
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placement of federal common law. JUdicially developed principles of 
statutory construction have required more evidence of congressional 
intent to preempt state law than to supplant federal common law.450 
But this does not require a literally expressed intent by Congress as 
suggested by the Court in City of Milwaukee. Under traditional 
state-federal law preemption analysis, even in the absence of express 
indication by Congress, state law has been preempted where the 
Court has determined it would conflict significantly with federal con-
cerns,451 subject a federal regulatory scheme to multiple inconsistent 
burdens,452 or where Congress dominates an area so as to afford no 
place for the use of state law.453 While state law has been accorded 
special respect in the interpretation of federal legislation, the Court 
has been sensitive to the potential frustration of national policies if 
the states are allowed to control conduct which is covered by a feder-
ally regulated scheme.454 In City of Milwaukee the Court's configura-
tion of federal-versus-state laws has minimized the unique role of 
federal courts in the promotion of federal legislation. Although the 
concept of interstitial federal courts lawmaking suggests a coopera-
tive interaction between the courts and Congress that should be less 
active where federal-state questions are involved, these considera-
tions do not require the wholesale displacement of federal common 
law. This is especially so in the context of interstate pollution dis-
putes such as City of Milwaukee where both a unique federal interest 
and a constitutional federalism interest are at stake. 
The Court's use of federalism principles to displace federal com-
mon law is hardly compelling. The plain language of section 505(e) of 
the CW A preserving relief under "any statute or common law" is 
arguably broad enough to pose a choice of law question.455 The Court 
450. Generally, when there has been no manifest intent by Congress to preempt state laws, 
the courts look to find an implied preemption. In doing so, the traditional police powers of the 
states have been accorded respect. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Huron Portland Cement 
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 448 (1960); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519-25 (1977); 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 
451. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
452. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 
453. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961). Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218 (1947). 
454. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); Florida Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See Note, Competence of the 
Federal Courts, supra note 79, at 1085; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 75, at 544. 
455. 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e). See 451 U.S. at 350-51; Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 521. 
The choice whether federal law applies is decidely a federal task for a federal court. Neverthe-
less, "[t]he inner logic of federalism ... supports placing the burden of persuasion on those 
urging national action. " Wechsler, supra note 75, at 545. "In deciding whether rules offederal 
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has answered this question by requiring that "common law" can 
mean only "state common law" in the CWA. The Court's recognition 
of state common law seemed to come about as a result of its efforts 
to construe "common law" so as to exclude "federal common law" 
rather than as an affirmative identification of alternative common 
law relief. 456 
Having suggested that state common law must be accepted before 
federal common law under the CW A, the Court gave no further con-
sideration to the content, operation, or effect of state common law 
remedies under the Act. The Court's efforts to exclude federal com-
mon law relief avoids a recurring underlying issue: to what extent 
will a polluter discharging under a permit be subject to liability under 
other laws? Since compliance with a permit under the CW A is not a 
defense to other liabilities, an action for damages or injunctive relief 
could only exist if Congress intended that some conditions other than 
those set by the CW A could apply to discharges. 457 As of the decision 
in City of Milwaukee, these other legal standards must be found in 
state statutes or common law.458 
The Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee surmised that state com-
mon law was acceptable as a vehicle for redressing wrongs outside 
the provisions of the CW A. The Court expressed no concern over 
whether the state court imposition of more stringent standards 
would result in the same disruptions of federal regulation, usurping 
of legislative functions, and multiple liabilities upon dischargers 
which the Court found so objectionable in the use of federal common 
common law should be fashioned, . . . a significant conflict between some federal policy or in-
terest and the use of state law. . . must first be specifically shown." Miree v. DeKalb County, 
433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)(em-
phasis omitted». See Mishkin, supra note 81, at 814 & n.64; Note, Competence of Federal 
Courts, supra note 79, at 1085. 
456. "It is one thing, however, to say that States may adopt more stringent limitations 
through state administrative processes, or even that states may establish such limitations 
through state nuisance law, .... " 451 U.S. at 328. But see, H.R. REP. No. 91, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 134, 136 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 823. ("It should be 
noted, however, that the section 505(e) would specifically preserve any rights or remedies 
under any other law"). The savings clause makes no distinction between state and federal com-
mon law and legislative debates indicate that Congress was specifically aware of federal com-
mon law when it amended the FWPCA in 1972. See 451 U.S. at 344-45 (B1ackmun, J., dissent-
ing). 
457. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 1499; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 132, 134 (1972), reprinted in 1 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 819,821. The CWA intends that both federal and state 
standards of conduct will be imposed on discharges. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(C); 40 C.F.R. 
122.11(d)(2) (1978). See E.!. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1978). 
458. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 519-20. The only source of federal injunctive relief 
must be the citizen enforcement suit provisions of section 505 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
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law. Short of an immediate injunction of polluting discharges or the 
award of permanent damages, a state court is just as likely to employ 
the effluent limitations scheme embodied in the CW A to grant flexi-
ble relief, as did the lower federal courts in the Illinois litigation.459 
State common law injunctive relief in the form of revised effluent 
limitations or pollution control standards implicitly would interfere 
with the regulatory scheme of the CWA. Similarly, injunctive relief 
which forces the shutdown of a plant or requires the immediate 
cessation of a discharge would subject permit-conforming discharges 
to great burdens in apparent conflict with the CW A. 460 Without fur-
ther restricting the scope of the injunctive powers of state courts, 
the City oj Milwaukee opinion would permit state common law to en-
croach upon federal legislative functions in the very manner which 
was condemned in the use of federal common law. 
2. The Problem of State Law and Interstate Pollution 
It would seem that only state common law damages actions can be 
reconciled with the CW A after the City oj Milwaukee decision. The 
legislative history of the CW A reveals that Congress at least pre-
served the ability to obtain compensatory damages at common law.461 
The CW A itself does not provide an action for damages incurred as a 
result of water pollution.462 It is logical to conclude that the case for 
the preservation of common law damages is strongest. Since injunc-
459. Although not noted by the Court, section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, has been construed so 
as to allow states to impose more stringent effluent limitations and order immediate cessation 
of pollution under state common law. People ex reI. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 III. 
App. 3d 607, 611, 352 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (1976); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States 
Steel Corp., 30 III. App. 3d 360,370,332 N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 976 
(1976). 
460. See Stockdale v. Agrico Chemicals Co., 304 F. Supp. 244, 261 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (per-
manent injunction not granted because it would close phosphate plant important to local econo-
my); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 315 (1970) (permanent injunction not granted because it would close down plant employ-
ing 300 persons); Post, supra note 13, at 131; Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environ-
ment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145 (1972). 
461. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). "[TJhe section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies 
under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. 
Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action 
for pollution damages." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note I, at 1499 (1971). 
462. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)-(d). The Court has also refused to imply a cause of action for 
damages. Middlesex Cty Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
Since the EPA has maintained the CW A is only a regulatory scheme, not a remedial scheme, it 
is highly unlikely any damage actions will be inferred. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from 
Federal Re.qulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 291-292 (1963). 
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tive relief is not specifically mentioned in legislative history and is 
subject to the restrictions voiced in City of Milwaukee, its preserva-
tion is perhaps not so certain even under state common law. Some 
commentators have suggested that state common law damages ac-
tions would not disrupt the federal scheme in the manner to which 
the Court objected in City of Milwaukee. 463 Notably, similar 
arguments have not been made for the use of injunctive relief. 
Commentators urging the acceptability of state common law dam-
ages reason that since the nonuniformity of standards under the 
CW A is primarily to encourage state initiative, the application of 
state common law was intended for parties seeking damages from 
pollution. It is said that an action for damages between private par-
ties would be far removed from the federal interest in the regulation 
of water pollution under the CW A and would only indirectly affect 
the finality of standards under the Act. 464 The argument for state 
common law damages actions concludes that the polluter merely 
pays the judgment as a license to continue polluting. Because 
damages are seen as having only a deterrent effect it is said that 
disparate results in case law would not frustrate any policies or goals 
of the CW A. 465 
463. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 520-23; Note, Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 10, 
at 70-7l. 
464. When a state institutes its own permit program under § 1342(b), the enforcement of 
these permits are considered state law actions. District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 
854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This, combined with the authorization of a state to set more strin-
gent standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, and the Erie presumption which favors the retention of 
state law in the role of state police power, are advanced as the reasons that state common law 
is preserved: See Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 521, n.132, 522 & n.135. 
465. In this sense the resolution of factual questions of injury and causation between private 
parties is thought to involve the federal interest only insofar as it might indirectly advance 
pollution control. Thus, the federal interest would be "far too speculative, far too remote a 
possibility to justify the application of federal law to an area essentially of local concern." Bank 
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956). See Parsell v. Shell Oil 
Co., 428 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (D. Conn. 1976), affd memo sub nom. East End Yacht Club, 
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 
U.S. 493, 497 (1971) (pollution injuries, like most local disputes, present no substantial issues 
of federal law). But see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972) (distinguishing Wyan-
dotte, assigning federal question jurisdiction to environmental pollution disputes between 
states, and announcing a unique federal interest in the environment). 
Once damage actions for pollution have been characterized as essentially local disputes, the 
Erie doctrine and state law preemption principles are used to fortify the use of state common 
law. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977) (damage action for breach of 
federal contract causing fatal airline crash governed by state law despite federal interest in 
airline safety); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (state 
regulation may be concurrent with federal regulation where it serves a differing purpose and 
is in an area traditionally regulated by the state, such as health). But see Trautman, The Rela-
tion Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
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This reasoning, however, cannot support the retention of state 
common law to the exclusion of federal common law. First, it avoids 
the inevitable conflicts arising from the character of injunctive relief 
under the CWA by focusing on state law damages actions.466 There is 
no real basis for this distinction between common law remedies. Sec-
ond, the CW A anticipates the imposition of stricter standards from 
both state and federal sources of authority.467 The nonuniformity of 
standards under the Act does not mean that state law should be the 
exclusive source of more stringent standards. In fact, the coopera-
tive federalism enforcement scheme of the CW A guarantees that, in 
the final analysis, all promulgated standards are federally approved. 
Third, while the federal interest in the outcome of a damages action 
between two private parties may be minimal, the federal program is 
not unaffected where major polluters are involved. Certainly, the 
federal interest would not be minimal where a state is involved. In 
the case of City of Milwaukee, Illinois sought to protect its higher 
standards which were promulgated pursuant to section 510 of the 
CW A. The federal interest in adjudicating the rights granted to a 
state under a federal program is significant. 468 Fourth, polluters are 
not likely to regard damages merely as a license to pollute, especially 
when damages escalate.469 The disruption of economic planning and 
financial burdens imposed upon polluters was a salient factor in the 
Supreme Court's disapproval of federal common law in City of Mil-
waukee. The same dislocation of resources strongly argues against 
the reasonableness of expecting that permitted dischargers will pay 
damage awards without offering their compliance with the CW A as 
a defense.47o Furthermore, to expect litigants to be content with 
common law damages is unrealistic. Damages can only attempt to re-
105, 126 n.75 (1977) (criticizing Miree in light of the strong federal interest evinced in congres-
sionallegislation); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-103 (1972). 
466. Commentators note that injunctive relief from nuisance is the prime state common law 
remedy, not damages. Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM. 
BAR FOUND. R.J_ 349, 368-69; Note, Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 10, at 70-72. 
467. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(b), 1313, 1329. See supra text and notes at notes 
251-77. 
468. 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972). Also, the argument for state common law restricts itself to 
private nuisance or damages, not public nuisance. Note, Preemption, supra note 9, at 522. 
469. Note, Private Nuisance, 8 SUFF. L. REV. 1162, 1168-72 (1974); Comment, Eco-System, 
supra note 9, at 1254; Note, Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 10, at 48. See Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870,876,309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 321 (1970) (Jansen, 
J., dissenting). 
470. Note, Private Nuisance, supra note 469, at 1171; Comment, Eco-System, supra note 9, 
at 1257. In addition, the traditional balancing of equities often would prevent the court from 
ordering injunctive relief. Note, Private Nuisance, supra note 469, at 1162. 
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pay amounts lost to pollution whereas injunctive relief can actually 
prevent pollution from occurring. There is an ineluctable tendency in 
environmental litigation to seek injunctive relief. 471 Thus, the very 
distinction between injunctive relief and damages actions used to 
support the use of state common law breaks down in practice. 
Finally, the prospect of requiring all fifty states to pursue the 
resolution of pollution problems through their respective common 
laws is not comforting. This would be particularly troublesome in an 
interstate pollution dispute. On a practical level, issues of the extent 
of long-arm jurisdictional statutes and proper venue will continue to 
be contested as they were in the Illinois litigation.472 Variations 
among states' long-arm statutes might prevent some states from ob-
taining the necessary jurisdiction over a polluting source outside 
their borders.473 Presuming these hurdles are cleared, enforcement 
problems will persist since the courts of one state may find it neces-
sary to retain jurisdiction over an out-of-state polluter. In such cases, 
full faith and credit principles should provide for necessary oversight 
and enforcement of the remedy. Nevertheless, the incentives for one 
state to maintain a remedy imposed by another state's courts on a 
discharger in the first state are lacking.474 
471. Note, Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 10, at 48. Injunctive relief is preferred because: 
1) it affords greater opportunity for parties to adjust their differences before trial; 2) it per-
mits the court to award flexible, tailored relief to account for various factors; 3) it avoids the 
nagging problem of dollar valuation of pollution damages; 4) it can actually halt the adverse ef-
fects of pollution. Id. Note also that in general there are still many restrictions.on the use of 
state law to abate pollution, such as standing, exhaustion of remedies, and balancing of 
equities barriers. W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 18, at 31 (2d ed. 1956). 
472. See 451 U.S. 304, 353-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
473. Note, Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 10, at 48-49; Fischer, supra note 22, at 439. 
The recent Supreme Court decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1968) require that for due process purposes a 
defendant must have a reasonable expectation that his activities in a state would be such that 
he could anticipate being haled into court there, or that he purposefully avails himself of the 
privileges of that state. These standards are not amenable to environmental litigation jurisdic-
tional problems. Id. at 439-40. 
474. Commentators note that the chief difficulty of state common law or statutes to abate 
interstate pollution is that of enforcing an equitable decree outside the state. Comment, 
Developments in the Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1031-32 (1965). Full faith and credit cannot 
be relied upon to enforce an equitable decree where the nuisance originates in another state. 
Note, Interstate Pollution, supra note 72, at 1458 n.62. The Supreme Court has not ruled 
whether full faith and credit require the enforcement of another state's equitable decrees. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 comment c (1971). State courts have typi-
cally assumed that it does not. Developments, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1044. Also, injunctive or 
damages relief requiring administrative burdens and oversight by the enforcing court present 
the least favorable class of judgment for full faith and credit. Note, Interstate Pollution, supra 
note 72, at 1458. These special difficulties do not arise if a federal forum and federal rule of 
decision are applied. 
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On a theoretical level, the use of one state's common law to enjoin 
or modify pollutants discharged in another state poses serious consti-
tutional questions. The importance of an impartial federal rule of de-
cision in such an interstate pollution conflict is manifest.475 Nonethe-
less, City of Milwaukee would restrict the avenues of a state seeking 
relief to the hearing procedures of the CW A or the use of state com-
mon law. 
In summary, the use of state common law to control pollution with-
in the context of the CW A is replete with problems not addressed by 
the Court in City of Milwaukee. In light of these problems the Court's 
use of state common law to exclude federal common law from the 
common law preserved by the CW A seems ill-advised. The use of 
federal common law to abate interstate spillover pollution is not in-
consistent with the recognition of state autonomy. Pollution effects 
do not confine themselves to conform with state boundaries. Spill-
over effects are the most persistent and troubling type of pollution to 
regulate in a centralized manner.476 When pollution from one state 
causes harm to a sister state the offending state should not escape 
liability by using its sovereign status as a shield because to do so 
would implicitly infringe on the autonomy of the offended state. The 
same considerations which support state autonomy require the ac-
countability of a state when pollution emanating from its sources in-
vade the autonomy of its sister states. 477 
475. See 406 U.S. 91,103-06 (1972); supra. text and notes at notes 80-120. After City ofMil-
waukee the question of the applicability of state common law to interstate pollution disputes 
was addressed in Scott v. City of Hammond, 519 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1981), appeal ar.Qued 
No. 81-2236 (7th Cir. Dec. 3,1981). The court held that state common law applies to extrater-
ritorial pollution conflicts because such pollution is not purely a federal question. The court 
also urged immediate appeal, noting the Seventh Circuit must consider the same question on 
remand of City of Milwaukee. Yet the court subsequently ruled in Chicago Park District v. 
City of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. 1981), that neither state statutory law nor state 
common law applied, expressing a need for uniformity in the regulation of interstate pollution. 
See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), eert. 
denied 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (dismissing state common law claims); Illinois v. Sanitary District 
of Hammond, 530 F .. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (interpreting City of Milwaukee as continuing 
the preemption of state law by the CW A). But see Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 
U.S. 493, 498-99 (1971) (interstate pollution is not a basis for federal question jurisdiction), 
distinguished in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 96-98 (1972). 
476. Post, supra. note 13, at 123-25; Fischer, supra. note 22, at 430-32. 
477. 
The existence of substantial spillover effects would . . . justify coercing state en-
forcement of federal measures . . . . 
Where, as here, the harm imposed upon sister states is attributable to pollution 
emanating from a state's own facilities, the offending state should not be able to 
escape liability to corrective measures by asserting claims to state autonomy that 
would implicitly deny the autonomy of sister states . . . . [T]he very claims of state 
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The policies guiding our federalism do not simply entail leaving 
matters to the states in a localized manner. They involve the safe-
guarding of each state's sovereign interest amongst the other states 
under the umbrella of the federal union. It is in this sense that the 
use of interstate federal common law is a vital and efficient tool to 
implement the federal legislative policies of water pollution control. 
F. Summary: The Contours of Preemption After City of Milwaukee 
In light of the broad language of the Supreme Court opinions in 
City of Milwaukee and Sea Clammers, and the Court's underlying ap-
proach to legislative intent in each of those cases it appears that vir-
tually any legislative scheme which regulates a given area requires 
the preemption of federal common law. It may well be that the 
Court's analysis of congressional intent in City of Milwaukee simply 
proves too much. The Court's legislative inquiry in City of Milwaukee 
does not directly support the conclusion that Congress intended that 
pollution control standards under the NPDES program be the exclu-
sive means to abate pollution hazards. First, such an intent to pre-
empt federal common law is merely inferred by the Court; it is not 
expressed in the CW A, and a congressional intent to preempt ap-
pears on its face to be wholly inconsistent with the savings clause of 
the CWA.478 Second, the Court's inquiry began with a presumption 
against the continuance of common law rights which is contrary to 
established judicial modes of interpretation of legislation. By extend-
ing the mode of inquiry developed recently in implied rights of action 
cases, the Court required that Congress affirmatively express a de-
sire to retain federal common law. This standard of review not only 
is the reverse of the Court's usual approach, but it also plainly alters 
the "rules of the game" well after Congress passed the legislation.479 
Third, that legislation is dubbed "comprehensive" by legislators does 
not demonstrate the extent of its actual coverage and provides even 
less guidance as to Congress' intention regarding matters not ad-
dressed in the legislation. The word "comprehensive" is not the 
autonomy which underlie Usery [Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery] dictate accountabili· 
ty qua state when harms emanating from state facilities invade the autonomy of 
sister states. 
Stewart, supra note 211, at 1241·42. To allow the state a defense of compliance with statutory 
permits in the context of transboundary pollution "runs counter to the basic concerns of comi· 
ty; it would permit states to foist the consequences of local industrial activity on neighboring 
jurisdictions." Fischer, supra note 22, at 483. 
478. See supra text and notes at notes 407·12. 
479. See supra text and notes at notes 371·76. 
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equivalent of the word "exclusive"; nor does the Court's declaration 
make it so. Such wholesale, automatic displacement of federal com-
mon law undermines the vital equitable powers of federal courts in 
an area of interstate conflict.480 
Finally, the broad reasoning of the Court in City of Milwaukee is 
specious - it seems plausible at first, but obscures fundamental 
issues. Furthermore, the Court's analysis invites lower federal 
courts to apply the Court's conclusions without engaging in an anal-
ysis of congressional intent or a review of the facts. This aspect of 
the Court's decision was made evident in Sea Clammers, where the 
Court extinguished federal common law nuisance throughout the en-
tire field of water pollution. In Sea Clammers, the Court suggested 
that its opinion in City of Milwaukee had already laid the ground-
work for such extinguishment of federal common law, requiring 
merely that the Court view the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) as being "comprehensive" in the manner 
of the CW A. Thus, the Court precluded not only implied rights of ac-
tion, but federal common law as well under the CW A and the 
MPRSA.481 
A closer look at City of Milwaukee reveals that the factors support-
ing the Court's decision all relate to the legislative delegation of au-
thority to a specialized expert agency, the EPA, charged with polic-
ing dischargers and thoroughly regulating discharges through a per-
mit program. Sea Clammers involved similar concerns. There the 
dischargers all held permits issued by the EPA and the Army Corps 
of Engineers pursuant to the CWA and MPRSA, respectively. The 
activities complained of were regulated-nominally, at least-and re-
viewable by an expert agency of some sort. 
The City of Milwaukee and Sea Clammers opinions are most ac-
ceptable and least objectionable when viewed from this perspective. 
In fact, this is the view which accurately reflects the issue presented 
480. See supra text and notes at notes 398-410. 
481. 453 U.S. at 4-5,22 (1981). Plaintiffs alleged that sewage sludge dumped into New York 
harbor and the Hudson River damaged fishing grounds. They sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief as well as damages, alleging that the discharge permits were improperly 
issued. The relief requested was as an implied cause of action under the CW A and the MPRSA, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-444 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by Title I, Reauthorization, Pub. L. 
No. 96-572 § 3, 94 Stat. 3344 (1980). The Court held that neither federal common law nor im-
plied remedies could be sustained in the context of such regulation. The appeal was based on 
the implied cause of action and so plaintiffs did not brief the common law issues. In addition, 
having found preemption, the Court avoided plaintiff's requests for damages, despite the clear 
congressional intent to preserve damages under the savings clause, § 505(e), of the CWA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
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to the Court: whether federal courts should exercise their lawmaking 
powers to address a fact situation which is already addressed by fed-
eral legislation. By holding that Congress in the CW A has legisla-
tively preempted federal common law, the Supreme Court in City of 
Milwaukee displayed a healthy respect for the detailed regulatory 
scheme of the CWA in general and the NPDES program in particu-
lar. Even without regard to whether or not the CWA program 
"works" the Court's decision makes sense on this basic level. What-
ever the drawbacks in the scheme of the Act, a federal court may 
legitimately refuse to exercise its equitable powers to remedy a nui-
sance and, indeed, may be bound to such self-restraint according to 
its view of relevant legislation.482 The Court was concerned that the 
legislative program of the CW A should have the opportunity to 
prove itself. This required an absence of judicial second-guessing of 
permit standards. Otherwise, what legal and economic significance 
could be accorded to the compliance with permit standards when a 
court in a separate nuisance action could require different stand-
ards?483 Finally, it is not unreasonable to assume that Congress 
would prefer that the expert agency to whom the implementation of 
the CW A has been delegated set discharge standards, as opposed to 
the courts, whose expertise is limited.484 
Nonetheless, one can accede all of these points and still disagree 
with the holding in City of Milwaukee. The arguments against pre-
emption are equally compelling. The states have the authority to set 
water quality goals more stringent than those of their neighbors. 
This right is explicit in the federal legislation and is an integral part 
of an overall federal, national effort to clean the nation's waters.485 
In addition, by virtue of the federal compact of states, a state whose 
environment is materially violated by pollution from neighboring 
states is entitled to a federal judicial resolution of the dispute even 
where federal legislation provides some relief. 486 The ostensible 
bases of the Court's opinion in City of Milwaukee may be unobjec-
tionable in themselves, but they do not address the conflicting con-
cerns involved in federal common law. Nor do they address the dil-
emma of the downstream state in pollution problems. The recent Ok-
lahoma complaint makes it plain that the CW A still does not address 
the very same problems raised by Illinois over ten years ago. 
482. See 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972); 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979). 
483. See Fort, supra note 12, at 151·52. 
484. See id. at 160-61. 
485. See supra text and notes at notes 331-47. 
486. See supra text and notes at notes 377-88. 
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Assuming that the Court is correct in its determination that the 
discharges in question are regulated under the CW A, there would be 
little objection to the narrow basis of preemption described above -
that federal courts should not interfere with an active regulatory 
program run by an expert agency. The cases would then simply rep-
resent a hearty respect for the maturing NPDES program under the 
legislative scheme of the CWA. Unfortunately, the Court's reason-
ing and language have set a broad foundation for the displacement of 
federal common law throughout a wide range of legislative subject 
areas. The following section examines the effects of City of Milwau-
kee in other areas of environmental regulation. 
VII. City of Milwaukee AS ENVIRONMENTAL PRECEDENT 
In response to the Court's decision in City of Milwaukee, lower 
federal courts have dismissed federal common law nuisance claims 
under the CWA.487 The question whether City of Milwaukee signals 
the preemption of federal common law in the area of air pollution is 
an active one. The interests supporting federal common law recog-
nized in Illinois v. Milwaukee were extended expressly to interstate 
air pollution by the Court in Washington v. General Motors.488 Sever-
al federal courts have wrestled with its application since then.489 
After City of Milwaukee, however, the federal and federalism inter-
ests delineated in Illinois must be supported by a legislative intent 
favoring federal common law. In this context, whether the Clean Air 
Act490 (CAA) is sufficiently comprehensive to preclude federal com-
mon law may pose a troublesome inquiry. 
The controversy surrounding acid precipitation most clearly illus-
trates the similarities and differences between the CWA and the 
487. E.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982) (preempting 
federal common law for discharges prior to 1972 amendments to FWPCA); In re Oswego 
Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1981) (§ 311 of 
CWA is exclusive recovery provision for oil spills); Love v. New York State Dep't Envt'l Con-
serv., 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (CWA preempts federal common law); United States 
v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 11 ENVT'L L. REP. 20,977 (D.N.J. 1981), vacating 11 ENVT'L L. REP. 20,472 
(dismissing federal common law claims for water pollution from hazardous waste disposal site). 
488. 409 U.S. 109, 110-11 (1972). 
489. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979) (federal 
common law trespass); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.), in-
junction stayed, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), modified on other grounds and remanded sub nom., 
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1974); Bd. Supervisors of Fairfax Cty v. 
United States, 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 
1977). See Connecticut v. Long Island Lighting Co., 535 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
490. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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CAA. The problem of acid rain distinctly is one of interstate and in-
ternational dimensions.491 It is also one of continuing scientific de-
bate.492 The CAA, however, directly regulates neither acid precipita-
tion itself nor the sulfates of which it is composed.493 The CWA, by 
contrast, has been considered comprehensive because it is designed 
to regulate every point source discharge in the nation. The CAA reg-
ulates only major emitters which threaten national ambient air quali-
ty standards; it does not extend to smaller emitters.494 Under the 
CAA, not all known emitters are regulated, nor are all emissions 
which form acid precipitation regulated. Thus, on its face, the CAA 
appears to be a less comprehensive scheme than that of the CW A. 
On the other hand, the EPA is charged with a broad mandate to 
administer the CAA to achieve a national goal of clean, healthy 
air.496 More importantly, the CAA contains provisions for mechan-
isms to resolve disputes arising from emissions which have trans-
boundary effects.496 In this sense, the CAA may be at least as com-
prehensive as the CWA, if not moreso. Concededly, as with the 
CWA, the federal minimum goal of healthful air quality levels does 
not require a federal common law rule of decision for every instance 
of interstate air pollution. As pertains to acid precipitation and un-
regulated pollutants and unregulated emitters, however, a judicial 
federal rule may be deemed necessary to fill a distinct gap in the 
CAA in order to fulfill national air quality goals. Even in light of Erie 
491. Lee,lnterstateSulfatePollution, 5 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 71, 71·81 (1981); Post, supra 
note 13, at 118-25. 
492. The EPA has conceded that current scientific knowledge is insufficient to justify ra-
tional regulations of acid rain problems. See Lee, supra note 491, at 71-73; Ruckleshaus An-
nounces Delay in Acid Rain Controls, Boston Globe, Dec. 2, 1983, at 2, col. 2-4. 
493. Acid rain forms as a conversion product of emitted sulfur dioxide after it has been pres-
ent and transported in the atmosphere for several hours or days. Under the Clean Air Act, 
neither acid rain nor sulfates (an intermediate form) are directly regulated. Sulfur dioxide is 
regulated only in the instances of new plants which must comply with nationally uniform per-
formance standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. Older plants are regulated only to the degree that each 
individual state chooses to impose emission restrictions in order to achieve the national am-
bient levels required, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. All federal law requires is that states do not exceed na-
tional ambient air quality standards. States must also comply with "prevention of significant 
deterioration" provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7470-7479, but these provisions allow for 
significant latitude among state standards. 
494. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). See Comment, Requiem for the Federal Common Law of 
Nuisance, 11 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,191, 10,195 (1981). 
495. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401. 
496. Section 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b), authorizes a state to petition the EPA for relief 
from air pollution emissions emanating in other states. Section 1l0(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(E), allows EPA approvals of a state implementation program only if it provides 
adequately for interstate pollution problems. 
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doctrine concerns, interstate air pollution implicates matters of 
federalism moreso than matters of traditional local concerns. As a 
result, several commentators have argued forcefully that federal 
common law is appropriate in many instances under the CAA.497 
The decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New Eng-
land Legal Foundation (NELF) v. Costle,498 appears to be the first to 
tackle the question of CAA preemption of federal common law. In 
NELF the court concluded that the challenged emissions were ex-
empt as a matter of law from common law claims because the emis-
sions were federally approved under variances permitted by the 
CAA. The court further indicated that all other sources regulated 
either by the CAA directly or by State Implementation Plans pur-
suant to the CAA would be similarly exempt, even where the emis-
sions exceeded the specified limitations of such regulation.499 This 
sort of blanket preemption is not required at all by the Supreme 
Court's opinion in City of Milwaukee. This approach is especially ill-
founded where the emitter has not complied with permit condi-
tions.50o Finally, even under City of Milwaukee federal courts must 
inquire into the legislative intent and interpret that intent to make a 
judicial determination regarding the comprehensiveness of the 
regulatory scheme. This analysis is not at all evident in the NELF 
opinion; rather, the court simply followed the results reached in City 
of Milwaukee. 
Unfortunately, the deficiencies of the Second Circuit's reasoning 
in NELF v. Costle are not unique. After City of Milwaukee, other 
federal courts have ruled that the CAA preempts federal common 
law nuisance as it applies to air pollution emanating from various 
sources.501 The courts in these decisions do not undertake an analysis 
of legislative intent. In addition, once a court preempts federal com-
mon law as it pertains to one aspect of an environmental area, that 
court often finds it a very short logical leap to conclude that federal 
common law must be precluded from the entire area to which the 
497. See Lee, supra note 491, at 75-77; Post, supra note 13, at 125; Note, Umbrella 
Equities, supra note 13, at 152. 
498. 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.1981). The district court had declined to apply an equitable remedy 
to pollution sources approved by the EPA, thereby avoiding the federal common law issue, 475 
F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979). 
499. 666 F.2d at 35-36. 
500. The problem of "midnight dumping", or knowing violations or pollution caused by un-
regulated sources, is a significant area calling for the exercise of federal common law. See City 
of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). 
501. See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (federal com-
mon law abatement for air pollution from hazardous waste dump preempted by CW A); Con-
necticut v. EPA, 13 E.L.R. 20,135 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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statute refers. The cases illustrate the fear expressed by the dissent-
ers in City of Milwaukee - that the majority's approach would lead 
to unreasoning, wholesale, or "automatic" displacement of federal 
common law. To date, federal courts have applied City of Milwaukee 
in its broadest, least supportable interpretation so as to preclude 
federal common law relief in the area of air pollution altogether. 502 
The status of federal common law in the area of hazardous wastes 
presents a particularly complex situation concerning the interplay of 
legislative intent and statutory interpretation. The field of hazardous 
wastes is governed broadly by three federal statutes, the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),503 the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),504 and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA).505 TSCA provides for a mechanism to identify various 
toxic substances introduced into commerce in order to prevent un-
reasonable risks of injury to health or the environment. RCRA sets 
forth a regulatory program for the transport, handling, and disposal 
of hazardous wastes. RCRA provides a permit scheme for such ac-
tivities and authorizes the federal government to bring abatement 
actions in cases of imminent hazard to health or the environment. 506 
In 1980, RCRA was supplemented by the emergency enactment of 
CERCLA, often referred to as the "Superfund" legislation because 
of its special trust fund set up to compensate clean-up costs at haz-
ardous waste sites. 507 CERCLA is directed toward the clean-up of 
designated inactive hazardous waste sites and is not des.igned as a 
regulatory statute in the manner of the CW A and the CAA - even 
when operating in conjunction with its counterpart, RCRA.508 
Concern for this legislative pattern and application of City of Mil-
waukee could lead to the conclusion that in the area of hazardous 
waste generally, federal common law is preempted. While such a 
view is not implausible, it fails to account for the express legislative 
language preserving common law as a supplemental, complementary 
basis of liability for hazardous waste pollution. Indeed, Congress ex-
502. See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (the court re-
versed its previous decision to accord with City of Milwaukee). 
503. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
504. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
505. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980). 
506. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. III 1979). RCRA has a citizen suit provision with a savings 
clause virtually identical to the CWA's. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e}. 
507. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9607. 
508. Belfiglio, Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675, 
678 (1981). 
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plicitly stated that Section 7003 is a codification of federal common 
law principles, which at the time of RCRA's passage represented the 
predominant body of law in the area.509 Congress intended that the 
federal common law of nuisance should be the substantive basis of 
decision for actions under the imminent hazard provisions of RCRA 
and CERCLA.510 Furthermore, the savings clause of CERCLA is 
drawn broadly to provide exemptions for certain "federally permit-
ted releases" but states that: 
nothing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of 
State or Federal law, including common law, for damages, in-
jury, or loss resulting from a release of any hazardous substance 
or for removal or remedial action or the costs of removal or 
remedial action of each hazardous substance.511 
These provisions and such legislative history would appear to satis-
fy the requirement of the Court in City of Milwaukee that congres-
sional intent to preserve common law be affirmatively expressed, 
and should avoid the unique interpretation given to the savings 
clause of the CWA.512 It appears likely, however, that federal courts 
will apply the broadest preemption rationale of City of Milwaukee so 
that even the legislative intent of RCRA and CERCLA may be 
viewed simply as not "affirmative" enough. Perhaps the better view 
is that federal courts should apply the more supportable basis of City 
of Milwaukee and look to the degree and nature of statutory regula-
tion. Application of this judicial approach might result in the dis-
placement of federal common law in the area of hazardous wastes de-
spite the clear legislative intent to the contrary. Like the CW A, the 
legislative reports on RCRA indicate that it was intended to be a 
"comprehensive" approach to the management of the hazardous 
waste field. Similarly, both RCRA and CERCLA are administered 
by an expert agency, the EPA, charged with implementing the stat-
utes in an area of highly technical, recently recognized problems. 
These represent the same sort of concerns which underlY the Court's 
509. S. REP. No. 1972, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1979), reprinted in [19801 u.s. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 5023. See also REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE 31 (Comm. Print 860IRC-31) (Oct. 1979). 
510. United States V. Solvents Recovery Service of N.E., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-39 (D. 
Conn. 1980) (§ 7003 merely authorizes the filing of lawsuits, while substantive liability is to be 
determined by federal common law, "to which hazardous waste disposers have always been 
subject", United States V. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980)). 
511. 42 U.S.C. § 96070). 
512. See 451 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1981); 42 U.S.C. § 9614. 
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insistence in City of Milwaukee that the ad hoc approach of common 
law is ill-suited to resolving pollution problems. 
Several courts recently have addressed these problems. Few have 
engaged in extensive analysis of legislative history; rather, most 
courts have concluded simply that federal common law has been pre-
empted by the relevant regulatory schemes of RCRA or CERCLA.513 
The absence of inquiry into legislative intent in these post- City of 
Milwaukee cases reveals the danger of the Court's own broad lan-
guage and presumptive policy analysis in City of Milwaukee and Sea 
Clammers. These cases demonstrate the need for reasoned analysis 
and an objective view of legislative intent balanced with a temperate 
consideration of federal courts policies rather than the mechanical 
"comprehensiveness" approach of City of Milwaukee. 
VIII. THE RATIONALE OF FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
In the situation presented to the Court in City of Milwaukee, the 
use of federal common law could be justified by all three necessary 
criteria - a uniquely federal interest in water pollution, the need to 
resolve interstate disputes, and the lack of legislative intent contrary 
to its use. The Supreme Court, however, found that all three criteria 
were left unsatisfied. In fairness, the weight of the federal interest 
as justification for a federal rule of decision by itself poses a close 
question. Similarly, congressional intent always is problematic, 
although the Court's new rules of interpretation made the question 
look easy. While the Court's reading of legislative intent is assailable 
on many fronts, ultimately, it is the Court's treatment of the federal-
ism rationale for federal common law which is the most inadequate. 
Put simply, the Court did not address properly the federalism in-
terest justifying the use of interstate federal common law. Case law 
precedent, especially that delineated in the Court's earlier Illinois 
decision, acknowledges the particular application of federal common 
law to interstate pollution disputes.514 A greater regard for these 
513. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United 
States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J.), afi'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (RCRA and 
CERCLA, due to their comprehensive nature, have preempted federal common law); United 
States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 20819 (N.D. Ohio 1981). 
514. Accord Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 92-93 (1981). See 
Illinois, 406 U.S. 91, 103-106 (1972); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 524 (1936) (suit to 
enjoin water diversion); New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931) (same); 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-71 (1931) (same); New York v. New Jersey, 
256 U.S. 296, 298 (1921) (suit to enjoin discharge of sewage into interstate waters); Missouri v. 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241-45 (1901). 
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principles of federalism and a thorough examination of the nature of 
Illinois' complaint-the dilemma of the downstream state-would 
have revealed the strengths of interstate common law. Similarly, the 
deficiencies of relegating Illinois to remedies under state common 
law or "improved" legislation would have been apparent. Indeed the 
most recent complaint by Oklahoma before the Court clearly indi-
cates not only that Illinois' dilemma was not unique, but also that the 
CW A still does not address the problem of downstream state water 
pollution today, some ten years after the initiation of Illinois' suit. 515 
Interstate common law was developed by the Supreme Court as an 
equitable rule of decision for the adjudication of disputes between 
neighboring states concerning their respective quasi-sovereign in-
terests in interstate resources. Although states may freely utilize 
resources within their own borders, the ecological rights of one state 
preclude the detrimental use by another of the resources shared by 
both. This federalism concern has long been within the purview of 
federal common law. 516 
The federalism rationale remains an important principle in the pro-
tection and ordering of interstate relations. 517 Under the CWA a 
state may find that its waters remain or become polluted despite its 
strict compliance with federal requirements. This condition may be 
due to extremely poor existent water conditions, non-point source 
pollution, or discharges emanating from another state. Having 
determined that more stringent standards are necessary to protect 
515. Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93-853 Orig. (U.S. filed, May 24, 1982). 
516. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981). E.g., Vermont v. 
New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974) (per curiam); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); New 
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907) 
("whenever ... the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws into the 
territory of another State, the question of the extent ... of the rights of the two States 
becomes a federal matter of justiciable dispute"); New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 372-73 
(1953). In its role as guardian and sovereign the state is given a unique form of standing, as 
parens patriae, to assert the general rights of its citizens. The state itself must have a distinct 
interest of its own which arises when the injury seriously jeopardizes the health, comfort, and 
welfare of the state as a whole. Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U.S. 434, 451 (1945); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591-92 
(1929). The state cannot invoke parens patriae standing merely for the benefit of individual 
citizens, but must have an interest of its own. Oklahoma ex reI. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 
396 (1938); accord, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945). 
517. E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (interstate transportation 
railroads); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932) (interstate water); Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (interstate natural gas); New York v. New Jersey, 256 
U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921) (interstate water); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907) (interstate air); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (interstate water). 
Historically, once such an injury was shown, the state was allowed to assert its interests by in-
voking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
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its waters, a state must have some means of safeguarding that deci-
sion. Irrespective of actual water quality standards, there is no 
justification under the CWA or elsewhere for requiring that one 
state tolerate a nuisance or degradation of its waters solely because 
the offending state's discharge complies with some minimum techni-
cal regulations.51S The very decision of a state to adopt more strin-
gent standards under the CWA exemplifies the recognized bases for 
the application of interstate common law: an express federal interest 
in the nation's waters and the quasi-sovereign interests of a state 
within our federal system.519 These federal and federalism interests 
are especially pronounced where a state's more stringent standards 
are the result of the exercise of a specifically granted right pursuant 
to a federal legislative scheme such as the CWA. 
It is recognized that pollution does not confine itself to one state 
geographically and that the spillover effects of pollution are not 
prevented by minimum effluent limitations on point sources. Out-of-
state discharges may continue to degrade a state's adopted stand-
ards, interfering with the rights of that state as a state, and rights of 
that state under the CWA. The CWA does not solve this dilemma. In 
addition, interstate pollution still poses difficult questions of conflict-
ing state economic and social policies as well. 520 In the area of inter-
state and boundary waters this dilemma calls for a clear resolution. 
The CWA provides none. Neither state should have these important 
policy decisions made by the EPA alone or the courts of its neighbor-
ing state. 
518. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). "Each State stands on the same level with 
all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its 
own to none." [d. at 97·98. See 406 U.S. 91,107 (1972) ("Thus a State with high water-quality 
standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to 
lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor"). In an interstate conflict the 
vested interests and potential parochialism of either state's courts would find expression in the 
state's laws. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971); Woods & Reed, at 
710-11. The offending state would seek to protect its economy and regulation procedures from 
any injunction while the victim state would seek vindication of its health and ecological con-
cerns. Such intergovernmental disputes should be resolved by an impartial uniform federal 
rule. 
519. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 allows the states to adopt more stringent standards. Both the court 
and Congress could foresee that neighboring states might differ in their approaches to their 
regulation of pollutant discharges. 451 U.S. at 350·51 (1981). See Illinois v. Outboard Marine 
Corp., 619 F.2d 623,630 (7th Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 
(7th Cir. 1977); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D. S.D. 1979); Citizens For 
A Better Environment v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979). 
520. Stewart, supra note 258, at 1227; Woods & Reed, supra note 354, at 710; Post, supra 
note 13, at 126-28. 
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The premise of precedent case law is that interstate common law is 
the suitable rule of decision to reconcile the rights of both states in-
volved. 521 Wisconsin and Illinois each ran federally approved water 
pollution programs under the CW A. The purpose and effect of Illi-
nois' program standards were defeated by the pollutant discharges 
from Milwaukee. When these discharges degraded Illinois standards 
and created a public health nuisance as well, the CW A failed to pro-
vide a means of protecting Illinois' resources and its decision to 
adopt certain standards of pollution control under the Act. 522 Inter-
state common law fills this void in the legislative scheme of the 
CW A. The issuance of effluent limitations as an element of the judi-
cial remedy does not interfere with the prerogatives of the Congress; 
nor does it negate the validity of such an interstatial exercise of 
federal common law by the courts. The submission of interstate con-
flict to the impartial rule of interstate federal common law is both a 
necessary rule of federalism and an exercise of judicial power wholly 
in accord with the provisions and intent of the CWA. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court decisions in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Association set forth a broad foundation for the displacement of fed-
eral common law nuisance by environmental statutes generally. 
While the decisions are compelling in their concern for the complex, 
technical legislative schemes for regulating polluting conduct, the 
decisions are objectionable on several levels. First, the Court's 
unique standards of review and discernment of legislative intent are 
difficult to reconcile with past precedent and the strong sources of 
521. See supra text and notes at notes 110-22. 
522. 406 U.S. 91, 107 n.9; Friendly, supra note 50 at 408 n.119. Much of the use of federal 
common law grew out of the court's grant of original jurisdiction over interstate disputes 
where the nature of the controversy made the application of one state's law inappropriate. 
From this grant the power to utilize federal common law was inferred. Woods & Reed, supra 
note 354, at 708-11. The Illinois decision in 1972 diverted these disputes to federal district 
courts by assigning federal question jurisdiction to a federal common law claim. 406 U.S. 91, 
100 (1972). This does not alter the underlying rationale justifying the use of federal common 
law. Stewart, supra note 258, at 1229-30 (pollution spillovers require federal court adjudica-
tion until specifically addressed by federal legislation); Post, supra note 13, at 143 (problem of 
conflicting state standards under CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, could be solved through use of 
interstate common law). Interstate common law presents no irreconcilable conflict with 
policies of CWA. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (quoting 
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907)); accord, Isbrandsten 
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). Far from conflicting, federal common law is a "vital 
supplementary mechanism" for protecting states. Note, Preemption, supra note 4, at 529. 
1984] FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE 411 
the legislative history of the CW A and other environmental statutes 
which support the use of federal common law. Second, the prudential 
concerns expressed by the Court limiting federal courts' lawmaking 
powers are well established, but the Court gave short weight to the 
unique prudential bases of interstate common law. The justification 
for federal common law is especially strong when used to protect a 
state's ecological interests and to safeguard that state's authority 
within the federal system. Third, the preeminent factor in the 
Court's preemption analysis - a finding that the CWA was "com-
prehensive" legislation in the field of water pollution - encourages 
the wholesale displacement of federal common law by other environ-
mental statutes in many areas notwithstanding the apparent or ac-
tuallegislative intent of such statutes. Fourth, the Court's decisions 
leave unresolved thorny issues pertaining to the applicability and ef-
ficacy of state laws to resolve or control interstate pollution disputes. 
Further, the Court has advanced no reasons why the application of 
state laws would not have disruptive effects upon regulatory 
schemes similar to those associated with the use of federal common 
law. Fifth, while a federal court certainly is free to decline to exer-
cise its equitable powers, the Court's refusal to look closely at the 
facts of the dispute in City of Milwaukee and its recent decision in 
Romero-Barcelo allowing continued violation of pollution control 
regulations to remain unabated both suggest a one-way view of the 
discretion of federal courts. Finally, the Court in City of Milwaukee 
avoided the clear weight of case law authority and explicit congres-
sional intent indicating that compliance with statutory standards 
may be relevant to liability remedies, but is not a defense to common 
law nuisance claims. 
Primary efforts to control and prevent environmental pollution 
have been and must continue to be statutory. By its nature litigation 
is suited only to solving immediate problems in particular circum-
stances, and is not a vehicle for the promulgation of standards of 
general applicability. Yet the inevitable incompleteness of some stat-
utory schemes and the very design of others make it certain that 
federal courts will be called upon to remedy pollution problems not 
otherwise resolved directly by relevant statutes. In such instances a 
federal court should not hesitate to undertake an active and forth-
right analysis of the particular statutory scheme as well as a 
thorough examination of the full scope of its own equitable and law-
making powers. This much is wholly in accord with the decision in 
City of Milwaukee. 
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In the context of interstate water pollution disputes the use of 
federal common law does not necessarily present irreconcilable con-
flicts with the CW A. The CW A is not designed to be a remedial stat-
ute. Nor does it prohibit pollution per se, only pollution without a 
permit. Thus, waterways may develop conditions which threaten 
human health and the environment despite full compliance with mini-
mum statutory standards. Federal common law can fill such statu-
tory gaps in the CWA while advancing its purposes in a manner 
which is consistent with the provisions of the Act. The flexibility and 
temperance intrinsic to a federal court's equitable discretion can 
mitigate potential hardships on polluters or disruptions of the con-
sistency of statutory regulation and other economic effects. 
Ultimately, however, the responsibility for a vital and effective 
program of federal environmental law rests not only with the federal 
courts, but with the legislature in the first instance. After City of 
Milwaukee perhaps federal courts cannot be expected to advance 
federal common law remedies without further indication or guidance 
from Congress as to the role of federal common law. With positive 
congressional impetus federal common law may fulfill its potential as 
a crucial, case specific supplement to broadly drawn environmental 
regulatory legislation in order to develop a truly comprehensive ap-
proach to the control, abatement and eventual elimination of harmful 
environmental pollution. 
